Tag Archives | building

The paradox of Pakistan

By on May 24, 2011 in Uncategorized

A strong military means a weak nation.

What does Pakistan need? Nation building or counter-terrorism. The greedy ones will say both. And they are right. But both can not happen simultaneously. There aren’t enough resources available in Pakistan to undertake nation building immediately. Nation building has to be a long-term goal for the Pakistani society while counter-terrorism is what the Pakistani State must undertake immediately. However this duality gives rise to a dichotomous situation.

Counter-terrorism would obviously mean devolving more powers to the military — making it bigger, stronger and more powerful. But a more powerful military is then not going to give up that power on its own, or undertake anything which will reduce its importance in the system.The short-term task of counter-terrorism is likely to render the long-term goal of nation-building untenable.

Furthermore, a stronger military is a drain on the Pakistani exchequer and shifts resources away from the project of nation building. In fact, Pakistan can’t economically afford its current-day military, leave alone a more powerful one. Besides the economic unviability, the torque applied to the military by its overt allies (US, Saudi Arabia and China) and the overt enemies (al Qaeda and Taliban) has deformed Pakistani society into an ugly shape. The chastising experience of a strong military intervention in 1971 in the erstwhile East Pakistan raises questions about the political sagacity of employing the military for internal security duties.

If Pakistani military undertakes counter-terrorism in full earnest, its social, political and economic costs are unaffordable for Pakistani nation, its state and society.

This is the paradox of Pakistan. Pakistan needs a strong military to survive. The costs incurred in maintaining a strong military weaken the Pakistani state and society. A weaker Pakistan needs an even stronger military to hold up. The damaging cycle is self-perpetuating.

Something has to give at some point. Unless this cycle can be broken. How? There are no easy answers.

Ah, and do not forget to factor in the jehadis and the nukes, and the danger of their mating, in any solution you propose .

hold up

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The talks have begun

By on October 20, 2009 in Uncategorized

Quiet talks between the Kashmiri separatists and centre have started. It is a long and bumpy road ahead.

The process has started. Jammu & Kashmir Chief Minister Omar Abdullah has ordered the release of separatist Kashmiri leader Shabbir Shah. This confidence building measure is in keeping with the Union Home Minister’s plan of “quiet dialogue” and “quiet diplomacy” while holding talks with Kashmiri separatists in a discreet manner.

The list of confidence building measures demanded by Mir Waiz is the usual mix of polemical and orotund, designed to keep the allegations of capitulation from the rival Geelani faction at bay.

India should completely demilitarize the cities, towns and villages of Kashmir, Disturbed area act and other draconian laws should be repealed, International humanitarian organizations should be allowed to visit Kashmir, Human rights violations should be stopped immediately, political prisoners should be released, cross LoC trade and interaction should be allowed as confidence building measures before dialogue is initiated.[Xinhua]

No one should be fooled in to taking these demands seriously because the quite talks between the centre’s emissary and the separatist leaders have already started. It is also clear that the Indian government is keeping the pro-Pakistan Hurriyat leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani out of the ambit of these talks. It has been rumoured in some circles that the US state department has pushed forward Mir Waiz as the Kashmiri leader with whom India should settle the Kashmiri problem. And the recent events wherein Mir Waiz seems to be at the centre of these talks certainly lend some credence to these rumours.

However, Mir Waiz still wants to be seen as engaging Geelani, and bring him to the table for these talks. This is mere public posturing by Mir Waiz because for one, Geelani will never accept the leadership of Mir Waiz, and secondly, he is unlikely to change his long-stated “Kashmir is part of Pakistan” stance now. Mir Waiz is going to find it equally difficult to convince Yasin Malik, Shabbir Shah, Abdul Gani Bhat and Bilal Gani Lone to even accept him as the “first among equals” in the separatist leadership during these talks.

Meanwhile, Geelani has assiduously refused to comment on the peace dialogue between the separatists and the centre. This raises suspicions about his next move because the support from the Jamaitis provides him with a substantial base in certain pockets of the Valley. If the centre succeeds in its strategy of marginalising Geelani, then it would have won half the battle in its quest for normalcy in Kashmir.

It has to be conceded that the timing could not have been more favourable for these talks between the centre and the separatists. Violence in the state has come down, Pakistan is preoccupied in fighting its own internal battles, the political opposition at the centre is in a state of complete disarray to meaningfully oppose any of the UPA government’s proposals, and the international community (bar China) would favour a negotiated settlement of the dispute to dispel the Pakistani bogey of Kashmiri dispute distracting it from taking on the “good” jehadis in that country. It is now a test of political will of the Indian government and the willingness of the separatist leadership to seek a peaceful solution to the Kashmiri problem. The road ahead will not be easy, but a start has been made nevertheless.

Finally, Prem Shankar Jha has been again proved wrong — as always on most issues — in his reading of Indian government’s treatment of the Mir Waiz.

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No more arrows in the Indian quiver

By on January 19, 2009 in Uncategorized

There is no diplomatic option without a credible military option to back it up. Start with building up India’s military capability.

It left most Indians feeling frustrated and angry when the Pakistani interior minister said this today–

If the Indian demand for handing over the accused in the Mumbai attacks persisted, then the accused of the Samjhauta Express case might be asked for.

So the diplomatic encirclement of Pakistan has eventually ended up as a slanging match between the ministers of the Indian and Pakistani government. This has turned out to be an exemplary exercise in losing the gains of last decade of dehyphenating India and Pakistan in international discourse.

In 2001, after the terror attacks on Parliament, India exercised the military option. It yielded certain short-term results but eventually ended up as an exercise in futility. And the military option was exhausted for the future.

This time around, the strategy seemed to be focused on a diplomatic option. It is now evident that this has also ended up in a whimper. Perhaps the diplomatic option has also been exhausted for the future now.

So when the next spectacular terror attack happens, what option is left for the Indian state to exercise? Nothing unless the nation can build a credible military option. A diplomatic initiaive means little unless it is backed by a credible threat of punitive military strike.

There seems to be an acknowledgement of this lacunae in certain sections of the Indian media. Unfortunately, even there the debate will never go beyond defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP, unspent expenditure and big-ticket military acquisitions. These expenditure bills will achieve little without a holistic reform and restructuring of the Indian armed forces and the national defence setup.

If the nation does not bestow top-most priority to this process of overhauling the Indian armed forces, India will continue to bear the brunt of terror attacks and suffer the ignominy of having no credible military option, either as a stand-alone strategic action or as a back up to a diplomatic offensive. This reform process has to be the starting point in preparing  to handle the Pakistani military-jehadi network in the future. However it will need that our politicians, bureaucrats, courts, media and the intelligentsia first discard their fascination with the Holy Cow image of the Indian armed forces.

But why do the difficult thing by ruffling feathers and being an iconoclast when the grandstanding gestures — singing homilies, writing paeans and eulogies, and spending a few hundred millions on big-ticket purchases — provide the easier way out. Can the civil society use its power to vote to force the Indian state to embrace the difficult path?

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