As a bold political gambit to finish the separatists.
In an edit yesterday, Mint joined issue with P Chidamabram and made a strong case for continuation of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in Kashmir. They based their argument on three premises. First, the crisis after the Shopian issue is unrelated to AFSPA. Second, the situation in Kashmir continues to be critical which needs the strong hand of the army. Three, the army can only operate against the terrorists under the protection of the AFSPA.
On the face of it, the argument seems plausible. But a slightly deeper study reveals a few major flaws in the prescription.
At the outset, it is amply clear that the Shopiyan incident is totally unrelated to AFSPA in any manner. In fact, the security forces camp — allegedly involved in the rape and murder of two Kashmiri girls — is a camp of the paramilitary forces which, unlike the army and the Rashtriya Rifles, does not operate under the protection of the AFSPA.
Should AFSPA go because of Shopiyan incident or because the hardliner separatists like Geelani demand it? No, obviously not. But should AFSPA be reviewed, at least for certain selected areas of Kashmir? Yes, it should.
Now that is a rather difficult case to argue because the easiest prescription for the government is to send the army (or keep the army there in this case) and invoke the AFSPA (or continue with it in this case). It signals strong action by the Indian government and can not be opposed by any well-meaning Indian in the name of patriotism. But an extended army deployment under the AFSPA is no panacea for separatism as our experiences of North-East so clearly tell us.
Now consider the context of army and AFSPA in Kashmir. The army moved in to the Kashmir valley for counter-insurgency duties after terrorist violence shot up in 1990 and the local police was unable to control it. The deployment of the army was backed by invoking the AFSPA, and for valid reasons. If figures for violence were a reason for bringing the army and invoking the AFSPA, then the current figures of violence (for terrorists, security forces and civilians) — which are back to pre-1990 levels — certainly call for a review of army deployment and the AFSPA. This is obviously contingent on the movement of army and the RR to a pre-1990 situation in these areas, after handing over the law and order duties to the state police. Once the army and the RR move out from these selected areas, the AFSPA is automatically no longer an issue to be debated there.
In terms of a COIN theoretical framework, the current stage of counter-insurgency in population centres of Kashmir is beyond the counter-terrorism stage. While army (and AFSPA) are necessary for counter-terrorism actions, they may have to be dispensed with in later stages of COIN operations. By all accounts, the insurgency in Kashmir valley, which is in its terminal stages, calls for a review of the deployment of army and thus, will lead to a review of the employment of AFSPA.
If we look at this in terms of the Clear-Hold-Build stages of COIN operations, the dipping violence figures in the state clearly indicate that the Clear phase is over in certain areas, with the Indian and state governments focusing there on the subsequent two phases of COIN — Hold and Build. As it is no longer an indigenous insurgency, the Hold phase is to be mainly practised on the LoC to prevent infiltration and eliminate any infiltrators who might sneak through the border fence and the multi-tiered army deployment. This Hold phase is where the counter-terrorism operations are going to take place, which will necessitate the employment of army operating under the AFSPA there. In fact, the army has been there at the LoC for over six decades now, insurgency or no insurgency in the Kashmir valley. That deployment, in itself, is not a part of the debate.
After the successful conduct of elections, the most critical phase, primarily a political one — the Build phase — is currently in progress in the cities, towns and villages of J&K. For the first time, the pressure from the average Kashmiri for economic growth and development has forced separatist hardliners like Geelani to stay away from strikes and hartals, and advocate peaceful demonstrations. To negate this success of development based political agenda of the mainstream Kashmiri politicians, the separatists have moved their ideological argument from a politico-ethnic-territorial one — of Kashmiri independence — to a Jamaiti ideology fuelled politico-religious one — of an Islamist-Kashmiri identity in danger.
Whether one likes it or not, the AFSPA is a potent weapon in the hands of the separatists to fuel the emotions of the local Kashmiris. Reviewing the employment of AFSPA where the army and the RR is not needed today — strictly based on the figures of violence — will not only defang the major plank of the separatists but also strengthen the hands of the mainstream politicians in this dangerous ideological battle in Kashmir.
To protect the state against nefarious Pakistani designs, Indian army is needed at the LoC and in other border areas of J&K. Where the Indian army and the RR are so employed, they will have to operate under the protection of the AFSPA. At other places — mainly the population centres in Kashmir — an area-based review of army’s deployment, and thus the AFSPA, is not a sign of weakness of the Indian state. It, in fact, signals a bold political step, a final gambit by the Indian state to finish the scourge of Pakistan-based Islamist separatism in Jammu & Kashmir. Let us not close our options on AFSPA in Kashmir altogether without considering the subject in its entirety.
