Amidst all the hype over Indian involvement in Afghanistan and lamentations over declining India influence in that country, here is a quick check of the possible reasons that drive India’s continued interest in Afghanistan.

Let us start with the ridiculous one first. India is coveting Afghan natural resources to fuel its economic growth and thus it seeks a presence in Afghanistan. But Afghanistan is not rich in minerals, oil or other natural resources. What the heck, even Bangladesh has more natural gas reserves than Afghanistan and it is far closer to India and far less turbulent than Afghanistan.

Next is the belief that altruistic motives such as India’s historical relations with Afghanistan, promotion of democracy in Afghanistan and well-being of Afghan nationals drive India’s engagement with Afghanistan. India has far deeper historical relations with Indonesia, Myanmar closer home can surely do with some democracy and there are enough Indians whose well-being should be a higher priority for the Indian government. Indian foreign policy has never, not even in Nehru’s time, been driven by idealism. And it is no different today.

Now the outrageous one: the enemy’s view, repeated ad nauseam in the Pakistani media. India wants to create its strategic outpost in Afghanistan to encircle Pakistan and foment trouble inside Pakistan. But except for Rehman Malik’s bombastic pronouncements, not an iota of proof of an Indian hand has been presented so far by Pakistan. Moreover, India doesn’t need to go to Afghanistan — spend billions of dollars and lose Indian lives — to merely foment trouble inside Pakistan. It can very well do it from the Indian mainland with far lesser commitment of resources.

This argument, however, is bound to leave many people unconvinced and needs a little more deliberation. Many in India wish for a tit-for-tat policy of a Battle of thousand cuts against Pakistan now, reminiscing for the days when India retaliated to Pakistan’s fomentation of the Khalistan movement by paying Pakistan back in the same coin. But the situation in the 1980s was different: Pakistan wasn’t a nuclear power then, the jehadis were not threatening the existence of the Pakistani state, and India and Pakistan were poised geo-politically by the rivalries of the Cold War era. Today India cannot afford to trigger a condition that further destabilises Pakistan because a nuclear-armed, imploding Pakistan — teeming with jehadis and a radicalised army — is the last thing India would wish for on its western borders.

Finally, the idea that India is maintaining a presence in Afghanistan to deny strategic depth to Pakistan in case of a conventional war. Sounds good, especially when General Kayani spouts it so nonchalantly in front of the international media. But Pakistan is a declared nuclear power and the flexibility of its nuclear threshold provides Pakistan as much strategic depth as it desires, both in time and space. If there is no need for Pakistan to have that fig leaf of strategic depth in Afghanistan, then the question of India denying it the same in Afghanistan does not even arise.

Does that mean that India has no reason to stay engaged in Afghanistan and should completely pull out from there? No. On the contrary, there is a very valid reason for India to enhance its commitments in Afghanistan. India has to ensure the security and well-being of its citizens, thereby providing them with a better life. If India has to secure a better life for its population in the coming years, it urgently needs to log double digit growth rates consistently. A better security environment in the country, starting from and including the state of Jammu & Kashmir, is an essential precondition for achieving those growth rates.

Our experience of last two decades clearly shows that the trajectory of jehadi violence in India, and particularly in Jammu & Kashmir, is inextricably linked to the political and security situation in Afghanistan. The exit of the Soviets from Afghanistan coincided with the rise of militancy in J&K in 1989, and the sustained high level of violence by foreign terrorists in J&K — and terror strikes in other parts of the country — coincided with the Taliban’s reign in Kabul in the 1990s. The decline in violence and the return of normalcy to J&K occurred after 2001, when the US & NATO forces had displaced the Taliban regime in Kabul. With the perceptions of a US pull-out from Afghanistan gaining ground after President Obama’s announcement of a new AfPak policy, the recent attempts by Pakistan to send highly-trained terrorist teams and to fund organised stone-pelting in Kashmir valley reaffirms that connection between Afghanistan and J&K.

The increased threat of jehadi strikes has not been restricted only to Jammu & Kashmir but has impacted the whole country, as evident from the terror cloud hovering over various sporting events being organised in India. This kind of security situation, with adverse travel advisories issued by most western countries, dents India’s image as a rising economic power and makes it an unattractive business destination.

Thus India has no option but to do all it can to deny the Taliban and other jehadis a stable base in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, India cannot do that by shovels alone.

In response to the earlier blogpost on the controversy surrounding Mr. Shashi Tharoor’s ‘interlocutor’ statement in Riyadh, Ms. Suhasini Haider, Dy. Foreign Editor [CNN-IBN] replies.

Dear Pragmatic,

Permit me to suggest that you may be guilty of precisely the kind of ‘callousness and disdain’ you accuse me of in your article “A Manufactured Controversy”, re: the comments of the Minister of State for External Affairs Shashi Tharoor in Riyadh.

My own tweet that you have reproduced in the article was suggesting, in what I admit was a somewhat tongue-in-cheek manner, that perhaps Mr. Tharoor was a victim of the fact that his comments came on a Sunday, when newsrooms are understaffed, especially as it also came in the middle of the Holi weekend.

It also referred to the fact that any senior journalist covering the MEA beat would be able to tell you that regardless of the dictionary meanings and context of Mr. Tharoor’s remarks, India would not be announcing such a significant departure from enshrined policy of “no 3rd-party mediation’ right in the middle of such an important State visit. Mr. Tharoor’s command over the language, of which I am an admirer, is too well known for anyone to question his ability to use the appropriate word.

Incidentally, I plead guilty to having been on leave that day myself, but when I was called by the CNN-IBN newsdesk and apprised of the story- gave them the same inference, asking them to use only the exact quote and byte we had, and referring to the controversy that ensued. A few hours later, when the MEA spokesperson reverted back to me with Mr. Tharoor’s clarification of his comments, we reflected that as well. I am sure you would not hold us responsible for what other channels chose to do with the story.

My rejoinder tweet requires no explanation, and I have no quarrel with you choosing to portray my ‘smiley’ as ‘patronising’. What I do object to is your portrayal of me as someone who ‘reeks of unbridled power’. I think that is unfair, as also the idea that I think of bloggers as ‘petty’. I presume you say this because you see me as a TV journalist, and on the other side of some virtual divide- but let me assure you of my web-credentials- as a reporter for rediff.com (1997-1999), a web-contributor to CNN.com (1999-2004) and as a regular blogger on the ibnlive.com website since 2005.

I apologise for the length of this rejoinder, since clearly it would never fit on our regular 140-character exchange on Twitter, but I would be grateful if you could publish it in its entirety, and with the same prominence you gave to what you may now find was an erroneous understanding of my tweet on the matter.

Sincerely etc.

Another public statement by Shashi Tharoor and another controversy. So what’s new with that? It is easy to dismiss that off with a shrug and get back to watching that heady cocktail of Bollywood, cricketers [its not about the sport any more, but only the stars], horrors of jehadi terror, saturated coverage of the union budget for days culminating in an overdose of stuffed nonsense on the budget day, and shrill studio debates which, at the end, leave you little wiser about the subject. Welcome to the world of Indian television news. And this excludes stations like India TV and Aaj Tak, which are not worth wasting your breath over, unless you are suffering from jetlag like GreatBong.

Incidentally the above description of Indian news television has been drawn from the blogposts [here and here] by two TV reporters themselves. And we are not even venturing into that apperceptive — and accusatory — piece by P Sainath in the Hindu, which has gone unanswered by otherwise so-prone-to-feign-indignation star editors and editor-cum-owners of the Indian news television houses.

Just a quick recap of what happened earlier today. In response to a question on whether India will seek Saudi Arabia’s support to influence Pakistan to address India’s concerns over terrorism emanating from Pakistani territory, Minister of state for external affairs Shashi Tharoor, as part of the Indian PM’s delegation to Saudi Arabia said:

We feel Saudi Arabia has a long and close relationship with Pakistan and that makes Saudi a more valuable interlocutor to us.[TOI]

The statement was unequivocal, on-the-record, captured by the TV cameras and accurately tweeted by ANI News editor  Ms. Smita Prakash. A little discussion on the subject took place on twitter between Smita, Acorn, Offstumped, Filter Coffee, and this blogger, which resulted in a blogpost on the subject by The Acorn. Attempts to search the above quote and related news item on the web met with no success for a couple of hours after that.

By late in the afternoon, the Indian TV news stations woke up from their Sunday slumber and flashing tickers on TV screens said that Tharoor had asked for Saudi mediation with Pakistan. More amazingly, TV news stations played the video clip of Tharoor making the statement and followed up the clip with newsreaders interchangeably using the words like interlocution, mediation and intervention in their commentary. English news channel editors are supposed to possess a decent knowledge of the language to not make such basic errors. Even if they don’t, a quick glance through a good dictionary or a Wiki search on the internet would have explained the meaning of interlocutor to the editors.  Perhaps, as someone suggested, this being a Holi weekend, editors were on leave, leaving this to rookie interns. More on that weekend thing later.

If one reads it carefully, this is not really a path-breaking statement. Even if one were to read signs of a tactical shift in India’s position on bilateral nature of disputes with Pakistan, it nowhere — by any stretch of imagination — calls for a mediation or intervention. It merely suggests that India is asking Saudi Arabia to use its influence over Pakistan so that India and its citizens are better protected from the jehadi terror emanating from Pakistan. They say it is a dramatic shift without looking back at the active interest displayed by the US [interlocution, mediation, intervention, interference... take your pick here] to bring the Kargil conflict to an end in 1999 and then to stall the military stand-off between India and Pakistan in the wake of the attack on the Indian Parliament. The Acorn explains the geo-political context in which this is a realistic option for India today; although other analysts and media houses are free to disagree with the proposition and criticise it vehemently. What they are not free to do though is twist the statement to suit their argument and create a controversy that harms the national interest.

That bring us to the real issue under the scanner. It is not about Shashi Tharoor or the choice of English words. It is about the nature of some media houses in this country to feed off manufactured controversies to sustain their TRPs. National interest be damned.

The callous and disdainful attitude of the electronic media is best exemplified by this twitter conversation between Suhasini Haidar, Deputy Foreign Affairs Editor of CNN-IBN and The Acorn. First, the tweets from Suhasini.

suhasinih Methinks the articulation of interlocution may have been particularly badly timed….on a long news-free holi weekend.

suhasinih Or maybe we say it like it is….that India wd love for US, China and Saudi to intervene on OUR behalf with Pak. But nt the other way around

suhasinih Anyway Tharoor has now clarified….

Here is Nitin Pai’s reply.

acorn @suhasinih It is shameful that media decided to misrepresent a nuanced point @shashitharoor made, because it was a news-free holi weekend

acorn Good people of India beware, the TV media has a long news-free weekend!

And here comes the killer patronising line, with a smiley in tow, from Suhasini against the other media [i.e. bloggers and twitter users]

suhasinih @acorn also beware of media that blames media rather than gov

And finally, Nitin again.

acorn @suhasinih We do need media to keep media on the ball. Government is checked by opposition, media & punished by public. Not so for media

It was more surprising because Suhasini, in her media pieces and social media interactions, comes out as one of the more sensible and down-to-earth journalists on Indian television. One can then well imagine the attitude of those starry TV news editors that populate and shine on the Indian news channels.

It is difficult to digest the patronising  and dismissive tone which reeks of unbridled power — We make the rules, we decide how it is done, we know best,  how dare these petty bloggers correct us or point out the facts to us? And finally, we give a damn.

There were even more cynical responses from the media fraternity. Mr Tharoor has again created a controversy to stay in the news. Well, one may disagree with Mr Tharoor and his conduct or views but to bring it down to the level of a personal vendetta campaign is rather disagreeable. Personal attacks are just not done, whether on a politician or on a journalist.

A related argument is that why can’t Mr. Tharoor be like other politicians and keep quiet. This actually seems to be the whole agenda of this campaign to create controversies around Mr. Tharoor and diss him in the public domain. Certain sections of the electronic media are so rooted in their old ways that they don’t want our ministers to directly talk to the people, and talk a lot more at that. Rather than report that accurately, they want to continue with the old-style nexus between certain journalists and ministers. These ministers will either provide leaks attributable to sources within the government or interviews to favoured news channels, resulting in exclusives. Once the government becomes more transparent and accessible to all in its direct communications, these journalists and media houses will lose this exclusivity and the business their channels derive from that nexus, and consequent exclusivity.

This is not a rant against a particular journalist or a media house or in favour of one smart politician. This is not even about bloggers versus mainstream media. That’s an old story played many times over. This is about the role and responsibility, or lack of it, amidst sections of the Indian mainstream media, especially those broadcasting in the English language on television. If they claim to hold a mirror to all the other sections of the society, they must learn to hold a mirror to themselves. Else it will hurt them badly when active sections of the society, or even the government, are forced to hold a mirror to them and their ugly reflection is out in the open. They won’t certainly want that to happen. Nor does the nation.

Update [03 March] — Here is the response from Ms. Suhasini Haider.

The jehadis have struck again on the Indian mainland; this time in Pune, albeit more than a year after the horrendous terror attacks on Mumbai in November 2008. The initial response, while going with the most plausible and popular assumption that the blast was the handiwork of Pakistan based jehadi groups, is one of indignation. Perhaps understandably so as tempers are bound to run high. And this emotion is likely to be further amplified as the Indian mainstream media hyperventilates and virtually runs amok with its over the top coverage of the incident.

On the other end of the spectrum is the rather logical sounding response that India should unequivocally reaffirm its commitment to continue peace talks with Pakistan, as the sole aim of the perpetrators of this blast is to disrupt these peace talks. This response would appeal to both realists and peaceniks alike.

So what is the correct response — surgical strikes against Pakistan or talks with Pakistan come what may? The response, in the end, has to come from the government of India and it will not be easy for them to articulate one. One way of framing the desired response is by breaking it down into Indian goals in a short-term, mid-term and long-term framework.

The short-term goal of the Indian government is to assuage the hurt feelings of Indians and protect them from any terror attacks in the future. It has to also somehow convey to Pakistan that India is not willing to be pummelled by non-state actors sponsored by sections of the Pakistani establishment. But how does it do that? Indian government has not been able to figure it out for the last 25 years when the country has been prone to such terror attacks.  One of the simplest ways of conveying a message across the border is to emulate the deeds of Mossad in the UAE. Surely, it is not too much to ask of the Indian state.

In the mid-term, there is no option for India but to talk to Pakistan. This will deny Pakistan the excuse that Indian intransigence is preventing it from meeting the US goals in the region. Pakistan assumes great importance in the current US war plans which can be aptly described to be based on the hammer and anvil theory. As the US military offensive in Afghanistan moves southwards from Marja, Pakistan military will have to hold the jehadis from its side of the Durand Line. It is in India’s interest that the US strategy succeeds. India has to also continue to talk to Pakistan so that the idea that the complete region, India-Af-Pak is one single theatre, doesn’t gain ground and become accepted wisdom the world over.

When it comes to Indian long-term goals vis-à-vis Pakistan, it is a long story. To put it in a nutshell, Pakistan needs a Macarthur. Period.

If you look at the debate on the subject in this country, most of it is unbalanced and focused on only one of the above goals. This focus on only one of the goals, while completely ignoring the others, is detrimental to the national interest. However, it must be conceded that there are inherent conflicts between the three goals and balancing them simultaneously is a very tricky proposition. It presents a real challenge which the policy makers in the government of India must confront and overcome.

Too many trees have been felled and much ether used to debate the Indian offer to recommence peace talks with Pakistan. Most of the sensible debate — not the jingoistic bit of how we have been shamed by Pakistan cocking a snook at us — is predicated on the Obama plan of starting the withdrawal of US-NATO forces from Afghanistan by the middle of next year. Combine this with the proposals at the London conference of buying out the Taliban and detractors of the Indian offer for talks are convinced that India has already ended up on the losing side.

While all this seems overtly true, it just might not be the complete truth — and certainly not the final truth. It is here that this piece in Indian Express by K Subrahmanyam assists us by filling in some of the blanks. He flags two important issues. First is the course of action followed by the US forces between the completion of the surge and start of the drawdown operation.

That depends on the course of the campaign the US will launch on completing the surge operation. The purpose of buying up the pseudo-Taliban is to pacify the Afghan territory as the US forces will move closer to the Durand line and intensify their attacks on the jihadis on the Pakistani side with their drones.[Indian Express]

The Time magazine story on Operation Moshatrak to capture Marja in Afghanistan further strengthens Subrahmanyam’s thesis.

If he and his forces prevail, it will serve as the template for the far more challenging battle this summer for the Taliban capital of Kandahar, about 100 miles to the east. Success in Kandahar, Afghanistan’s second largest city, would mean that McChrystal is on track to achieving Obama’s ultimate goal: to start sending U.S. troops back home in July 2011.[Time]

The second point that K Subrahmanyam notes was also pointed by this blogger earlier[here]. Let us hear it again in the words of K Subrahmanyam.

Faced with these alternatives, there is a distinct possibility of the Pakistani army getting yet another terrorist act perpetrated in India to provoke an Indian military response which can be used as an excuse to dodge responding to the US demand for action against the jihadis. …The most important issue for India today is not the purchasing campaign for the pseudo-Taliban, but how to deal with the likely Pakistani provocation to trigger an Indo-Pakistan war in order to dodge action against the jihadis.[Indian Express]

In no way can one argue that this makes an open-and-shut case for Indian offer of talks with Pakistan. This blogger is still not fully convinced of the case for talks but Mr Subrahmanyam’s piece does help us gain a better understanding of the reasons for this engagement. While concentrating on getting a better understanding of the situation is important, it is equally, if not more, important to explore and suggest ways in which India can make the best out of this engagement. That is the real challenge moving forward now.

While all this sounds fine and nice, it does leave us with a big question. Is it merely the US using India to further its goals in the region? Or is India also doing something to use the US to secure its own interests in the region? This is not a rhetorical question. Ponder.

P.S. — A couple of other related issues that must be highlighted here. They have been flagged courtesy a very vigorous email discussion with my fellow INI blogger Ananth.

One, it is now clear that the sudden surge in opinion pieces in the Indian mainstream media — albeit poorly-argued and hastily put together — asking for Indo-Pak talks was rather well-synchronised with the telephonic call made by the Indian foreign secretary to her Pakistani counterpart. It would be hard to digest that this was purely coincidental.

Two, Indian government has to handle its public diplomacy and strategic communication in a more professional manner. Although everything dealing with the nation’s diplomacy and national security can not be in the public domain — RTI or no RTI — the government owes the nation an explanation as to what prompted it to commence the talks now. A stony silence from the state is not an option in today’s time and age.

The Acorn is known to choose his words carefully. So when he sets out to welcome the impending Indo-Pak talks, albeit cautiously and with a big caveat in tow, one has to sit up and take notice. His only rationale for welcoming the talks is that it takes away the Pakistani excuse of an intransigent India threatening Pakistan, which Pakistan claims is not allowing it to devote all its energies towards combating the Taliban in that country.

The premise that Pakistan’s litany of excuses can be so destroyed is wrong on many counts.  For one, General Kayani made it amply clear the other day by stating that “We plan on adversaries’ capabilities, not intentions”. And Indian military capabilities are not going away in a hurry, especially when India has to deal with another far more powerful threat emanating from a rather strident China. Moreover during the recent visit by Robert Gates to Pakistan, Pakistan military spokesperson briefed US journalists in no uncertain terms about the US request for commencing military operations in North Waziristan.

Six months to a year would be needed before Pakistan could stabilise existing gains and expand any operations. We are not in a position to get overstretched.[Indian Express]

Talks or no talks, it is amply clear that Pakistan army, by its own admission, is not going to start any new operations against the jehadis. Thus, it will not be much harder for Pakistan to use the an excuse even if, hey, “open-ended talks on all outstanding issues” are in progress.

While Obama administration has not generated much confidence with its handling of AfPak, Iran or China, it would still be erroneous to assume that Obama administration doesn’t realise that all this talk about an existential threat from India is a charade by the Pakistan army. Pakistani army is keen to hedge its options in case of a US pull out from the region and is thus disinclined to take on the friendly jehadis, its strategic assets— to be used in Afghanistan and against India. Perhaps, the US has no other leverage left over Pakistan army — having granted Pakistan a handsome aid package in form of the Kerry-Lugar Act — and this is the proverbial last throw of the dice, almost in desperation hoping that Pakistan would budge.

Pakistan though, if past history is any indicator to go by, is unlikely to change its course. Then this offer of talks by India is not going to make any difference whatsoever to the situation in Pakistan [except provide more fodder to gristmills of the TRP-hungry, sensationalist Indian media]. In fact, it actually ends up explicitly conveying India’s helplessness when it comes to dealing with Pakistan.

Bringing out India’s  helplessness in the open leaves Indian citizens more susceptible to fresh terror attacks by the jehadis. And if, God forbid, these bilateral talks do start to make some substantial progress, it would be almost imperative for the Pakistani military-jehadi complex to launch a spectacular terror strike on Indian mainland to derail the process.

But even this dark cloud has a silver lining. When that terror attack happens, India will have a ready option available to publicly retaliate against Pakistan: call off the bilateral talks. Now how would India have retaliated if there were no bilateral talks happening and a terror attack took place. Ponder!

PS — If Indian government has made this offer of talks under US pressure, it is all the more important that the Indian commentators  and political opposition convey the prevailing public opinion against such talks in no uncertain terms. This would highlight the huge political risks being taken by the government in initiating such talks. It would allow the government to extricate far more in return from the US while simultaneously providing it the leverage to call off these talks or threaten to call them off at any time. And there exists a recent precedent of such ‘planned’ opposition. Prime Minister Vajpayee had masterly done this by using the Communists when under pressure from the US to contribute troops to Iraq. Only if the current political leadership of the UPA would display such realpolitik as PM Vajpayee did.

Political power flows from the barrel of a gun.~Mao

Here is Nirupama Rao’s answer to the sudden surge in media pieces asking India to resume talks with Pakistan.

Karan Thapar: What about the opinion expressed by some analysts that if India were to resume the dialogue process, it might strengthen Islamabad’s hand in delivering on terror?

Nirupama Rao: I know the school of thought and it I think especially has gained some currency in Pakistan in recent months. But let us look at it this way. Terrorism is not a tap you turn on and off because of the absence of or prevalence of dialogue. Dialogue does not flow from the barrel of the gun, Karan.[IBN]

Dialogue does not flow from the barrel of the gun… Well said, Ms. Rao. Take a bow.

There are periods in history in which it isn’t enough to say you’ve done your best, when the only test is whether you have done what is necessary.~Churchill

It seems that the wonderfully efficient marketing machinery at an Indian newspaper has been able to achieve what even Prime Minister Manmohan Singh couldn’t achieve after Sharm-el-Sheikh — convince the Indian mainstream media commentators that India had no option but to resume peace talks with Pakistan. The usual candle-lighting suspects have persevered at this for years — in locations as diverse as Delhi, Singapore, Dubai and Kabul. Now it is the turn of  journalists like Suhasini Haider and Maya Mirchandani to advocate resumption of Indo-Pak talks. Supporting voices have come in from certain unexpected quarters, including a strident ex-General whose views about Pakistan have suddenly gone soft; now he wants India to extend the hand of friendship towards Pakistan.

Let us look at the broad arguments being proffered by these commentators. A caveat, though may be in order. While the nuances of the arguments may vary from one commentator to other, the essence of their arguments remains unaltered.

First and foremost, all the commentators display a clear sign of fatigue with the current state of affairs. Their premise: how long can we in India continue with this stalemate? They perhaps forget that old cliché: all movement is not progress. Furthermore, it seems that in the eyes of these commentators,  the onus is solely on India to initiate recommencement of talks. Pakistan wants India to start the talks status quo ante; India wants Pakistan to show some substantive progress on the trials of those accused of plotting the Mumbai terror attack of November 2008 before starting talks. In fact, it is natural that both the sides should be willing to move  some way forward before such proposals can be considered seriously.

A related argument is that the Law of Diminishing Returns for this coercive Indian diplomacy of past one year has already set in. A continuation of the same wouldn’t achieve more from Pakistan and thus TINA — there is no alternative — but to talk to Pakistan. Firstly, process by itself is not a substitute for substance. Secondly, there could be alternatives, only if we were willing to look at them. Seriously debating the merits of other alternatives — a greater Indian military presence in Afghanistan for one — could be the way ahead. If coercive diplomacy [although it is hard to classify Indian stance as coercive in the first place] is not paying dividends now and status quo is not acceptable, the coercion need not necessarily be scaled down. It could even be scaled up to achieve Indian long-term strategic goals.

Then there is the laundry list of usual arguments about strengthening democracy and engaging the moderate civil society in Pakistan. It is a fanciful notion that has been proved wrong time and again over the last six decades. Needless to add, history has shown that actors and institutions deriving their strength from a radicalised society and a powerful military in Pakistan will always prevail over the so-called moderates when it comes to national security, an euphemism for India-centric policies. Such people-to-people contact, in fact, tends to camouflage the sinister designs of the Pakistani military-jehadi establishment by providing a soft sheen of normalcy. The lack of such “friendly people-to-people” activity, though unpleasant, helps the nation and the international community in sustaining its focus on the doings of the Pakistani military-jehadi complex.

As for the saintly argument that India — being a liberal and democratic society besides being the larger country — must display its commitment to humanity by talking to Pakistan, there is no answer. Because such blithe concern can lead India to transfer Jammu & Kashmir, Hyderabad and Junagadh to Pakistan even now.

There is a common thread running through all these exhortations for recommencing peace talks with Pakistan. It is a false premise that underpins the arguments: equating talks with peace. The road of Indo-Pak peace talks, traversed in the past, is littered with the debris of Kargil, Kandahar hijacking, Parliament attack, Kaluchak massacre, Hyderabad blasts, Mumbai train blasts, Jaipur blasts, Delhi blasts and finally the spectacular Mumbai terror attack of November 2008. India, with a combination of fortuity and enhanced internal security measures, has had no major jehadi terror attack — bar a few in Jammu & Kashmir — after November 2008, a peaceful span co-terminus with the No Talks period of Indo-Pak relations. If the proof is in the pudding, then talks do not mean peace. Peace for Indian citizens that is.

Meanwhile the status quo on ceasefire on the Line of Control or annual exchange of list of nuclear installations has been maintained between the two countries even in the absence of any peace talks.

Perhaps this kind of containment and tactical deterrence can ensure peace for Indian citizens from Pakistan only in the short-term and it may give away soon. As the Reaganites are fond of saying, “True peace is not the absence of war, it is the absence of evil.” For a permanent peace between India and Pakistan, which is in the interest of ‘humanity’ of South Asia and the world at large, there is thus no option but to destroy Pakistan’s military-jehadi complex.

There are certainly some people who hope that things might be different this time and thus we must talk to Pakistan now. But then hope cannot be a substitute for policy.

Finally, if all the experts — or an overwhelming majority of them — are publicly suggesting that India should initiate peace talks with Pakistan, then the Indian leadership has to heed and follow their advice. Or maybe it will instead pay heed to Henry Kissinger’s word of advice:

It is, after all, the responsibility of the expert to operate the familiar and that of the leader to transcend it.

P.S. — It seems that Indian media and experts are perhaps tired of having nothing new to report on on the Indo-Pak impasse. Another big Indo-Pak peace talks drama means more photo-ops, more chatter, more drafting of joint statements, more backroom gossip passed as authentic information attributed to ’sources’, dollops of controversy — all that the Indian mainstream media currently thrives on. Maybe the marketing managers of a particular Indian newspaper can then even claim bonuses from their own employers (and other media houses) for a successful marketing campaign to boost circulation (and TRPs)!

It is for good reason that K. S. Bajpai has been a huge favourite of the INI bloggers. Although his pieces appear rather infrequently in the media, Bajpai’s perceptive analysis and clarity of thought always shines through. So it came as a pleasant surprise to note that Sardar Patel’s famous letter to Nehru on China in November 1950 was conceived by his father, Girja Shankar Bajpai, former secretary-general in the ministry of external affairs.

Patel’s letter listed 10 precautions, including military and intelligence appreciations, reappraising military preparedness, constructing and policing boundary posts, political and administrative measures and internal security. Nehru, normally politely prompt in correspondence, didn’t answer Patel: recognising Bajpai’s views, he walked into his office and laughed—“So you are marshalling the big guns behind you”. Indirectly, though, Nehru responded with his China assessment in his November 17 letter to chief ministers. As in his other ruminations, one can detect signs of firmness and realism amongst idealistic hopes and historical imagination. But little except administrative consolidation was done regarding the main purpose of the November 7 letter. Instead, while insisting we stood by our frontiers, we went ahead with reducing the army: 52,000 less in 1950, another 1,00,000 less planned for 1951.

Some 60 years later, we are still seen as caught between the down-to-earth toughness attributed to Patel and the softness associated with Nehru. The realistic approach, so simple and obvious that it hardly needs formulation, needs projection: you must be seen as ready and able to look after your interests purposefully and efficiently. That is where our ways of functioning are our own worst enemies.[Outlook]

Bajpai’s brilliant piece on China is, in a sense, complimented by Shekhar Gupta’s column in the Indian Express. Two examples of good, sensible stuff being articulated on India’s approach towards China. Is South Block listening?

There’s a fine line between fishing and standing on the shore like an idiot. ~Steven Wright

In two separate op-ed pieces today, former army chief General Shankar Roychowdhury and defence analyst Ajai Shukla try to find ways for India to influence the events in Afghanistan. Roychowdhury suggests that India must guard its long-term strategic interests by undertaking massive training of Afghan National Army. Ajai, in contrast, opines that India should help the US win over large parts of moderate Taliban on to its side, even if it happens to be at the cost of  undercutting the current Afghan President, Hamid Karzai.

Both decry the current Indian policy and the level of involvement in Afghanistan as insufficient. But they stop at expounding timid options for India to exercise in that country. Thus they betray a lack of boldness and gumption by refusing to explicitly acknowledge that Indian strategic interests in the region can only be secured by an Indian military involvement in Afghanistan.

As far as Ajai’s argument about arriving at a settlement with moderate Taliban — different from al Qaeda and Quetta Shura — is concerned, the answer comes from Robert Gates.

…Gates plead agnosticism as to whether al-Qaeda would move its headquarters from Pakistan to Afghanistan but said “what’s more important than that, in my view, is the message that it sends that empowers al Qaeda.”The Afghanistan-Pakistan border area, Gates said, represents the “modern epicenter of jihad.”  A place “where the Mujahedeen defeated the other superpower,” and in his estimation of the Taliban’s thinking, “they now have the opportunity to defeat a second superpower.”

Defining al-Qaeda as both an ideology and an organization, Gates said their ability to successfully “challenge not only the United States, but NATO — 42 nations and so on” on such a symbolically important battlefield would represent “a hugely empowering message” for an organization whose narrative has suffered much in the eight years since 9/11.[Danger Room]

The case for deploying Indian armed forces in Afghanistan has been made as a cover story in Pragati last year, well before Obama, McChyrstal and 26-11 happened. Nothing much has changed to alter the basic arguments but here is a slightly updated rhetorical version of the case made there.

The litmus test for putting a glass ceiling on Indian involvement is simple. Is India threatened less than the US by the return of Taliban to Afghanistan? The direct and indirect threats emanating from a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan to India are far graver and greater than those to the US. If the US were to contemplate only providing infrastructural aid, or negotiate with moderate Taliban or only undertake training of Afghan army, it would be decried as having let down the comity of free nations. Why should India then get away by doing even lesser and then pontificating about playing its legitimate role in bringing stability to this part of the world?

If Taliban were to succeed in Afghanistan, the jehadis will again end up becoming a diplomatic and military tool of the Pakistani military-intelligence complex to be employed against India, and on the Indian mainland. The comparison between an Indian deployment in Afghanistan and maintaining the status quo thus could not be starker. The question that ought to be asked is: Between Indian soldiers and innocent, unarmed civilians, who is better placed to tackle the Taliban jehadis? Should India allow its civilians to be massacred by these jehadis in the hospitals, streets, railways stations and hotels of Mumbai or should our soldiers be pummelling these jehadis in the barren lands of Afghanistan?

As of now, US does have a strategy in Afghanistan and it wants to stay there, but it doesn’t have the troops to resource that strategy. India can help the cause only by providing the proverbial boots on the ground, not by restricting itself to developmental works.  Even if India were to run crash recruitment training programmes for the Afghan army, there will be a requirement for trainers, mentors and advisors to guide these newly raised units into combat during their initial tours of duty in Afghanistan. While that level of involvement is just a step short of sending battle-hardened Indian troops into that country, the difference in results on ground between the two will be significantly different in the short to mid-term.

As far as Pakistan is concerned, any level of Indian involvement will invoke a Pakistan veto. It will continue to raise a shindig irrespective of India’s indulgences or abstinences in Afghanistan. But who cares? From drone attacks in FATA to explicit calls about targeting the Quetta Shura, the US is dictated not by Pakistani sensitivities but solely by its own interests.

With the current media hype over the Chinese security threat, India will not be able to spare any military formations earmarked for the Chinese border. If these formations have to be pulled from the Pakistan border, it automatically takes care of the Pakistani bogey of an Indian threat on its Eastern borders restraining it from going the whole hog against the jehadis.

With the decreasing level of violence in J&K, it makes immense sense to move a couple of divisions of battle-hardened, specialist counterinsurgency force, the Rashtriya Rifles to Afghanistan. Besides meeting the internal political goal of demilitarising J&K, it will also shift the battlefield in this proxy war against Pakistan-backed jehadis from Kashmir to Afghanistan. India must not only choose its battles but also choose where and when it wants to fight them.

Finally, if the US is expected to unshackle itself from its traditional mindset of an Atlantic alliance and engage the rising powers of Asia, it is equally incumbent upon India to break free of its underdeveloped, third-world, non-aligned mindset of a previous era. The aphorism about power and responsibility is too worn out and clichéd to be repeated here.

When he was a young officer with the Pakistan army, he believed — till the mid-1970s — that the only good Indian is a dead Indian. Then, as a serving and a retired general, he was associated with a Indo-Pak Track-II diplomatic initiative called the Balusa Group. This initiative earned him the sobriquet of General Shanti in his country. He left the initiative after being nominated as NSA to President Zardari and was unceremoniously sacked for publicly acknowledging that Ajmal Kasab was a Pakistani national.

Now, General Mahmud Ali Durrani is in India and his statements on many issues concerning the India-Pakistan relationship are disheartening, to say the least.

Today there is a firm belief amongst the intelligence and security community in Pakistan that India is actively supporting insurgency in Baluchistan and some even believe that India has a hand in the turbulence in FATA. I was also assured by some friends in India that Pakistan’s security agencies are equally involved in destabilizing India.[Rediff]

On whether he agreed with Pakistan’s allegation that India was involved in the unrest in Balochistan, Durrani quipped, “I think some evidence has been given.”[Tribune]

General Durrani, very dangerously, not only establishes an equivalence between the role of ISI in India and RAW in Pakistan but almost paints Pakistani actions as reactive and of much lesser magnitude than the imaginary Indian acts. He conveniently chooses to ignore the small matter of detail that ISI’s role — in India (including Kashmir) — has been well documented and accepted not only by the international community but by many ex-ISI operatives and jehadis themselves. Whereas the world is yet to publicly see any proof of Indian involvement except for the insinuations made during  ISI briefings to the international media.

Meanwhile, the legal wizard trapped inside the politician’s garb of the Indian Home Minister is on TV channels patting his own back for preparing a legally sound case against Hafiz Saeed. It is another matter that forget a Rehman Malik, even General Durrani has dismissed Mr. Chidamabram’s claims.

Gen Durrani dismissed Indian Home Minister P Chidambaram’s allegations that Pakistan was deliberately stalling the Mumbai attacks probe. “I feel sorry he has made this statement. Our country is doing its best to move forward. They have arrested some people and you have to capture people who can later stand legal scrutiny,” he told reporters.

Gen Durrani also absolved Jammatud Dawa chief Hafiz Saeed from his alleged involvement in the Mumbai attacks. “There is zero proof to the best of my knowledge of Hafiz Saeed’s involvement in the Mumbai incident,” he added.[Daily Times]

Remember that General Durrani is as India-friendly a person as one can expect to get in Pakistan. Unlike most of the Wagah candle lighting types this side of the border (with whom he seems to share a lot of views), Durrani has been a part of the establishment at the highest levels in Pakistan even when he was expounding his “peaceful” views.

Imagine that his are the views on the positive extremity of an India-friendly relationship in Pakistan, where the other extremity of anti-India opinion is expressed in terrorist acts by the jehadis on Indian soil. If you mean the two out, you get to answer the question asked by Polaris in an email conversation. Where does the “centrist” opinion on India lie in Pakistan: that middle-of-the-road persuasion which most Indians believe is the viewpoint of the educated Pakistani elite. This elite is believed to occupy the seats of power in that country, and formulates and implements Pakistani security and foreign policies.

It is about time both countries learn to accept the stark reality. The territorial divide of 1947 is now an ideological divide, a divide which can’t be bridged by good intentions, joint statements and peace initiatives. This leaves India with few easy options when it comes to Pakistan. The Indian government can do no better than remember the 17th century English proverb: Good fences make good neighbours. Let us make good fences.

One of the world’s most prominent applied game theorists, Bueno de Mesquita, has been regularly consulted by CIA — more than a thousand predictions with better strike rate than CIA’s own analysts — and big international corporates to “predict the outcome of any situation in which parties can be described as trying to persuade or coerce one another”. His very interesting story has been profiled recently in the New York Times magazine.

While his prognostications about Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon have been the talk of the town, one seemingly innocuous observation about Pakistan merits attention.

For example, with Pakistan, his model showed that if the U.S. merely doubled its annual aid from $700 million to $1.5 billion, America’s influence in the country would significantly jump, while the militants’ would drop drastically. Why? Because with that sort of financial flow, corrupt rural officials would suddenly profit more from helping the U.S. than from helping the Taliban.[NYT]

Well, the US influence might increase but it would do little to further its strategic goals in the country or the region. If easy money is available to corrupt officials, they would not want to close the tap soon — preferably never. As the aid money can only flow if there is gross underdevelopment, it provides a perverse incentive to these officials to keep these areas in the abysmal state they are currently in. More importantly, the US interest in the region — and money via aid — will hold only if these areas continue to be a breeding ground for the jehadis. So, the corrupt local officials would want both the jehadis and the underdevelopment in the region to continue as hitherto.

As someone who started his career as an India expert, Mesquita and his computer might have got their first political prediction in 1979 on India right but this one on Pakistan doesn’t sound right at all. By the way, it seems that the prediction in 1979 was about Chaudhary Charan Singh becoming the Prime Minister of India!

Why do you say that India wants to help strengthen Pakistan?

India understands that it is not in its interest to try to destabilise or undermine Pakistan’s security at this very sensitive time.[Dawn]

This is Robert Blake, the new US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian affairs in his first interaction with Pakistani media. It is a very interesting read. He said a few other things that certainly wouldn’t be music to Pakistani ears: New Delhi was ‘playing a very important role’ in Afghanistan; Pakistan would have to punish the 26-11 suspects and stop cross-border terrorist attacks if it wanted the resumption of bilateral talks with India; the US sees India and Pakistan as different challenges and different opportunities; and he dismissed any chances of Pakistan striking a nuclear deal with China modeled on the Indo-US nuclear deal.

There is no reason to disbelieve that these aren’t the considered official views of the Obama administration, which includes the State department under Hillary Clinton, and the Special Representative on AfPak, Richard Holbrooke. While Indians ought to feel satisfied by what they hear from Mr. Blake, such clear enunciation of US policy is likely to provide ammunition to most hardliners in Pakistan. And it could even have some policy implications for that country.

So, be certain that the military-intelligence-jehadi nexus will survive — dormant for the time being — but ready to flourish when the environment is less concerned about the propriety of such a relationship and consequent actions. Moreover, Pakistan will do all that is in its power to ensure that US and NATO forces neither win, nor lose, in Afghanistan in the near future. Pakistan needs easy money via multinational aid, but does not desire a non-Taliban government in Kabul. Its best chances lie with US forces still embroiled in Afghanistan, while a moderate Taliban government can occupy the seats of power at Kabul.

If the Obama administration is so clear and certain about its policies and goals in South Asia and Afghanistan, it should seek a much stronger all-round partnership with India. A partnership that just doesn’t talk about selling military platforms,  WTO and climate change, but is more focused on the real challenges that both India and US face in the region — AfPak being the top-most among them.

The Prime Minister’s speech in Parliament on the Indo-Pak Joint Declaration did little to resolve the contradictions and remove the confusion in everyone’s mind about Pakistan policy of the UPA government. The UPA chairperson, Mrs. Sonia Gandhi has further muddied the waters by suggesting that “till Pakistan shows concrete steps on anti-terror front there is no point of dialogue”. Such minor quibbles apart, Siddharth Varadarajan has gone ahead and predicted that history will see the Prime Minister’s response “as a potential game changer in India’s official discourse on Pakistan”. Siddharth has based his prediction on the four basic themes put forth by the Prime Minister in defence of his actions. Let us deconstruct them one by one.

#1 …his emphasis on the inevitability of engagement…

Engagement might be inevitable, but it is certainly not a fait accompli. This actually translates into a situation of helplessness where irrespective of whatever Pakistan does to us, we have to engage with that country. After all, it is inevitable. But what about a time, place and situation of our choice while taking that decision to engage (and with whom in Pakistan).

#2 …his clarity on the fact that the alternative to dialogue was war…

No one wants a war, unless it is absolutely thrust upon you. But having dialogue just because we are afraid to wage a war — or of its consequences — is not what strong nations indulge in. While the Prime Minister harped many time on Ronald Reagan’s favourite phrase — Trust, but verify — during his speech, he’d do well to remember the words of another former US President, Theodore Roosevelt: Speak softly and carry a big stick, and you will go far.

More importantly, the choice isn’t really that stark — dialogue or war — without having exhausted all the other instruments of state power: diplomatic, economic and military. The main diplomatic instruments available to any country are negotiations, public diploma­cy (including informational, cultural and exchange programmes), international law and organisation, and alliances.  Economic instruments include foreign aid (both economic and military), financial and trade policy, and sanc­tions.  And even the military instrument can be used for persuasive purposes (usually short of combat) before going in for outright warfare.

#3 …his fear that the absence of direct talks with Pakistan would allow foreign powers to get involved in the region to India’s detriment…

Which foreign power is the Prime Minister referring to? Obviously, the United States of America. It won’t be an Haiti or a Congo that would dare to get involved between India and Pakistan. While foreign intervention in the region is not welcome, it is something that could only work to India’s advantage. The examples of withdrawal of Pakistani forces from Kargil or Musharraf’s concessions after Operation Parakram — undertaken by Pakistan at the behest of the United States — demonstrate the advantage that India holds in such negotiations. Some one like Manmohan Singh, who has so adroitly negotiated the Indo-US Nuclear deal and the defence EUMA with the United States, ought to be confident that any foreign involvement would certainly not be to India’s detriment.

#4 …his recognition of the need to strengthen Pakistan’s civilian leaders…

Pakistan army and the ISI continue to be the makers of foreign and defence policy in Pakistan. Manmohan Singh would do well to remember the fate of Nawaz Sharif, merely a few months after signing the Lahore declaration with PM Vajpayee. More dangerously, as The Acorn has pointed out, PM Singh has unwittingly strengthened the hands of a rather hawkish Gilani vis-à-vis a more India-friendly Zardari.

Strengthening the hands of Pakistan’s civilian leaders or bringing democracy to that Islamic Republic is none of our business. We should not try and change the cards we are dealt with but make the best use of our hand. If that means negotiating with — or pressing — the Pakistan army and the ISI over dismantling the terrorist infrastructure in that country, then we should not hesitate to do so. Talking to an ineffectual democratically elected leadership makes little sense when the levers of diplomatic and military power are controlled by those in uniform.

# 5 …Balochistan [Something that Siddharth forgot to mention in his piece.]

The Acorn has already expounded on the Balochistan factor in the joint statement. There is an additional point about Pakistan’s gloating over Indian ’support’ to ‘freedom-fighters’ in Balochistan. It allows Pakistani state and intelligentsia to avoid the real debate about the role of Islam in Pakistan and how Islamic the state should be. If the militants fighting the Pakistani state are not warriors of ‘real’ Islam but merely Indian agents, it is far easier for the state to justify the fight. And this even helps a Brigade Commander in Pakistan army to easily motivate his troops to join the battle against the Taliban. Lest we forget, it doesn’t help India — even in a counter-intuitive manner — because it only reinforces the image of India as an arch enemy of Pakistan and its citizens.

Manmohan Singh is a mild-mannered, patriarchal figure with a professorial demeanour. His track record as a Finance Minister, and as a Prime Minister on the Indo-US nuclear deal, has earned him this nation’s trust. This trust — along with the backing of Mrs. Sonia Gandhi — has probably given him the confidence to go for the jugular here. He would do well to remember that more illustrious leaders in India, before him, have foolishly trusted India’s neighbours and realised, to their chagrin, that history doesn’t remember them all that kindly now. Nehru, with his China policy, is a case  in point. By any stretch of imagination, this is a huge leap of faith by the Prime Minister. The consequences of its failure will be borne not only by him, but also by this nation.

Thus there is only one thing that the nation can do when it comes to Manmohan Singh (and his Pakistan policy): Trust[him], but verify[his actions].

In economic terms, middle powers have been overtaken by the big emerging powers. These economies are garnering significant attention from the great powers, not to mention institutions like the G8. Whether all the optimism surrounding the projection of the structural weight of the BRIC states — an invention of Goldman Sachs — is warranted or not, these states nevertheless have huge ambitions as well as the capacity to back those ambitions up. Throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, states such as India and Brazil were self-identifying as middle powers. Yet this is certainly not the case in the 21st century, as these states have come to see themselves as much more. A good indication of this transformation is the way that each of these BRIC states has re-branded itself through public diplomacy.

As an emerging power, China’s government has begun restructuring its own understanding of what it means to be a socialist state in the 21st century and how that image is presented abroad. The state’s leadership under President Hu Jintao has capitalized on its growing power, focusing on the fostering and maintenance of solidarity within the developing world. In this capacity, China’s impact has been felt throughout Africa and much of Latin America.

Brazil has retooled its foreign policy priorities under the government of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Since his coming to power, Brazil has sought to present an alternative to what it views as a hegemonic United States. Through its support of forums and organizations such as MERCOSUR, IBSA and the G20 focused on the international trade system, it allows Brazil to act as a protector of the global south in the face of the traditional pattern of domination imposed by the U.S. and the North more generally.

Meanwhile, India sits at the forefront of technological advancement and cultural promotion. Both the rapid progress it has achieved in science and technology and the creation of a tech-savvy work force have worked to elevate India towards a brand of leadership in telecommunications. This is specifically true in the city of Bangalore, which has been coined the “Silicon Valley of India” by the New York Times and Business Weekly and is the host of companies such as Infosys Technologies and Wipro. This entrepreneurial spirit within the field of information technology is succeeded only by India’s other great industry: Bollywood. Although currently suffering from its own economic difficulties as well as heated disputes between producers and theater operators, Bollywood continues to be a diasporic force; its popularity is seen in the Middle East and Africa, throughout Asia and in the growing market in the United States — notably witnessed through the success of Bride and Prejudice.

The case can therefore be made that from a diplomatic perspective, the space formerly occupied by middle powers is becoming more crowded. BRIC states are already giving way to a greater number of emerging economies. The publicity given to the concept of the Next 11 is one way of looking at this, but so are the actions by select smaller states on an individual basis — that is, using resources or roles that have long been the hallmark of middle powers. Small or micro states like Trinidad and Tobago, Qatar, and Singapore have all pursued national branding strategies pursuant to an international course of action dedicated to eroding the vulnerabilities associated with their geographical space.

Is India’s case really a success story of rebranding itself through public diplomacy as Andrew would like us to believe? For those who strongly disagree, Andrew hedges his bets in the conclusion.

Middle powers can be squeezed hard by the prevailing forces of power in the world. By their very nature, middle power states are sometimes seen as floundering or in decline. Certainly each state can differ on where the middle is as well as their place within it, but all have a high degree of aptitude as well as a sense of safety associated with being in the middle. It is identities such as these that play well for how middle powers project themselves in the world.

Read the complete piece here.