Stone-pelting can’t turn into a full-blown bloody militancy in Kashmir so easily.
This is how the BBC’s Soutik Biswas concludes his latest blogpost on the recent turmoil in Jammu & Kashmir:
But for the moment, India needs to show initiative and come up with some guarantees and time-bound plans to foster political reconciliation and sow the seeds of a political solution. Without this, the stone-throwing protesters may give way to Kalashnikov-wielding rebels from within the valley and across the border, in a return to full-blown bloody militancy.[BBC]
There is no disputing the fact that India needs to restore peace and normalcy in Kashmir. But return of peace and normalcy to Kashmir can not be an event; it has to be a process. The nuances of the process and the nature of its start-point can be debated but that is not the point of contention here. It is the implicit and unintended threat of stone-pelting transitioning into a full-blown insurgency that strikes a discordant note.
The armed insurgency has seen a steady decline in Kashmir since 2004 not because it was a wilful choice made by the Kashmiri populace or there was a change of heart in the Pakistani military-jehadi complex. It happened with the declaration of the cease-fire between India and Pakistan on the Line of Control(LoC) in 2003 wherein Pakistani posts could no longer provide the cover of firing to facilitate infiltration; construction of a formidable physical barrier in the shape of a border fencing on the LoC in 2004; increased availability of surveillance and detection equipment with the army; and the evolved three-tier deployment of the Indian army and Rashtriya Rifles which leveraged the institutional experience of the preceding 15 years to thwart the infiltrators’ plans.
It is also important to remember that by the mid-1990s, the insurgency in Kashmir was manned majorly (almost 80-85%) by jehadis from Pakistan, with a sprinkling of terrorists of other nationalities. The small percentage of indigenous Kashmiri youth who were picking guns also had to exfiltrate across the LoC for training and logistics before infiltrating into the Valley again. While the security forces eliminated terrorists in the rural and semi-urban areas of Kashmir, the supply line to replenish the declining numbers had turned into a trickle with every passing year. It is thus that the number of terrorists inside Jammu & Kashmir came down from an estimated high of 3500 in 2004 to an estimated 350-500 this year.
Two other points merit attention here. Firstly, stone-pelting in the Kashmir valley is mainly an urban phenomenon whereas the insurgency was — and whatever remains of it is — a rural enterprise. It will not be that easy for the urban stone-pelter to metamorphose into an AK-wielding terrorist. Secondly, post-9/11, Islamist or jehadi terror stands completely discredited as an expression of political grievances and a reversion to full-blown insurgency would only further strengthen India’s case. Moreover, the Indian state is struggling with handling the current means of violent protests whereas it has the resources, experience and the capability to take on militancy in a far more effective manner.
This endearing throw-away line that India’s inability to tackle the stone-pelters could lead to rebooting of the jehadi militancy in Kashmir doesn’t actually hold good under a closer scrutiny. That, however, doesn’t imply that Indian state can continue with the current state of drift and not make serious, earnest and even unpopular attempts to bring the situation under control. But these actions must be taken by the state for the right reason.
And that reason is simple: because it is the primary constitutional duty of the Indian state to establish the rule of law and ensure safety and security of all its citizens, including in the state of Jammu & Kashmir.
Decent analysis to support your argument. I hope however that you had in mind that the militant insurgency in 90′s started in urban areas and was preceded by heavy stone pelting.
I pray that it does not happen again, and as you say that would strengthen India’s cause and current situation is more difficult to handle for New Delhi.
It would also be prudent to get into the psyche of a stone pelter. The present 17 year old boy was born in 1993, and may have faint memories of the turbulent period. His perception is not based on memories alone but is strongly influenced by exaggerated tales and propaganda which lingers in Kashmir. He is educated and has a concept of freedom to which he has been exposed by the plethora of media. He isn’t happy with the turn of events in the world and is surely not a US fan. He knows India is emerging and Pakistan does not fit in his scheme of nationhood. But he is young, and that brings along the power to dream and to be easily led to a dream. He can dare and take risks, which meet his adrenalin requirements. Cannon fodder!
The elements of a possible renewed insurgency are there. Dissatisfaction, lack of political will, fodder for the cannon and an ever willing neighbour. The capability to deal with any insurgency in a effective and efficient manner also exists. All that is needed is a clear direction which takes the right steps, boldly if needed, else we may see another cycle of insurgency.
If India is able to prevent stone throwing from reverting to armed militancy then the next step would be to normalize the demographics of Kashmir. Resettlement of Kashmiri Pandits can followed using a carrot and stick approach. Separatist leaders should clearly understand that any attempt to use violent protests to alienate Kashmiris against India will be countered mind for mind through immigration. However if they abjure from violence the status quo will remain.
relocate (all) happy valley residents to the sundarbans in the national interest, redevelop real estate.