Shocking revelations in the latest CAG report on Mi Series helicopters in the Indian Air Force.
While a lot of coverage in the media will be given to the CAG report pertaining to poor quality of rations for the army — as evident from this statement by the MoS for defence, Mr Pallam Raju — the real alarming story is in the CAG audit about the helicopters of the Indian Air Force. Chapter-1 of CAG Report No. 7 of 2010-11 pertains to the performance audit on Operation and Maintenance of Mi Series Helicopters in IAF (pdf here).
Here are the highlights of the findings of the report.
#1- There was a deficit of 26 per cent in the total availability of helicopters compared to the numbers required for achieving current operational projections. Categorywise shortfalls were most apparent in the case of attack helicopters where the holdings were 46 per cent below the actual requirement.(Paragraph 1.2.1.1)
#2- Despite availability of funds and a specific acquisition programme for the 10th Plan period, IAF was unable to induct even a single helicopter which has adversely affected maintenance of force levels and operational preparedness. (Paragraph 1.2.1.1)
#3- The existing fleet is ageing and nearly 78 per cent of the helicopters have already completed their prescribed life and Total Technical Life extension has been carried out on them elongating their life.(Paragraph 1.2.1.2)
#4- Serviceability levels were low and fell consistently short of the prescribed 75 per cent. Combined with high Aircraft-on-Ground levels, this was indicative of inefficiency in operations, low utilization of Mi series fleet and poor repair and maintenance activities.(Paragraph 1.2.1.4)
#5- Seven helicopters were modified for ‘VIP’ role without approval of the Government. Such modification also lacked justification as a separate specialized communication squadron with adequate helicopter for use by VIPs already existed. Modification of helicopters for VIP/OEP use affected availability of helicopters for operation purpose.(Paragraph 1.2.1.6)
#6- Manpower deployment was not rational with respect to norms fixed per helicopter as there was an overall shortage of pilots ranging from 12 to 27 per cent during 2003-07 while, at the same time, there was an excess of aircrew.(Paragraph 1.2.1.7)
#7- Achievement with regard to engine overhauls and repair in respect of Mi8 and Mi17 helicopters was considerably lower than the tasks fixed. This was due to shortage of spares which resulted from both delayed and inadequate provisioning for these spares. As a consequence, 210 engines were sent abroad for overhaul at a cost of Rs 68.49 crore.(Paragraph 1.2.2.1)
The complete chapter is worth a read. A scary and depressing read. For eg.,
Despite the fact that its own needs were not being met, IAF sent 25 helicopters abroad for participation in UN Missions, allocated another seven for VVIP use and diverted six Mi8 helicopters to the Cabinet Secretariat (Aviation Research Centre). As a result, over all availability was only 61 per cent.
And here is the concluding sentence of the chapter that should induce premature ageing in all well-meaning Indians:
The matter was referred to Ministry in October 2008; their reply was awaited as of February 2010.
Final thought. As fellow blogger Retributions always reminds us, we in India are always ready to pounce on an error of commission but are happy to completely ignore the errors of omission. An error of commission is one where the person responds — invariably with wrong intentions — where they should not. An error of omission, in comparison, is where the person fails to respond when they should.
One is just left wondering if there is any other robust modern democracy in the world which would allow its government and its defence minister to get away with such a criminal error of omission. Ponder.
Shouldn’t be surprising…DRDO and equivalent organizations like HAL are known to reverse engineer almost everything from boots to helicopters.
The methodology is simple and one could call these the “Ten Unwritten Commandments” of DRDO type organizations:-
Phase 1 – Insist on “Make” instead of “Buy” whenever the Services propose a new procurement. Forget about “Reaserch” right at the outset once the “Make” decision is “obtained” in national interest.
Phase 2 – Get initial budgetrary allocation (always in multi-Crores).
Phase 3 – Spend it on creating infrastructure (viz cozy guest rooms etc) and foriegn trips (with spouse) to scout for the best stuff available to “re-assemble”.
Phase 4- Start publishing articles in newspapers about breakthroughs and the might of the “latest” indegenous equipment being designed.
Phase 5 – Fail at re-assembling and ask for increased budget and more time.
Phase 6 – Repeat Phase 5 again and again while offering trials of the failed prototypes and continuing to publish articles in newspapers.
Phase 7 – Pressurize the Services to Buy “some quantity” at least.
Phase 8 – Ensure that the “Project Stays Alive” and “Cash Keeps Flowing” for as long as possible. Anything less then 30 years is considered bad performance.
Phase 9 – Junk the Project and take on the “next generation of equipment” once 20 to 30 years have expired.
Phase 10 – Repeat the Cycle.
We can try and apply the above template to the LCA, MBT, the ALH discussed here and several Projects not publicized in the public domain – the facts will speak for themselves.
The cumulative budget obviously is enough to save the entire motherland from whatever you wish to – hunger, global warming, recession, even an asteroid strike!
As an afterthought…the only organization which perhaps can beat the DRDO is the MES!
Wonder why these ASC ration tidbits keep coming into news when MES keeps spending crores every year on changing tiles and constructing crumbling structures that are under a zillion inquiries that never logically conclude (nobody compiled the stats perhaps!)
“defence minister to get away with such a criminal error of omission. Ponder”
Why Defence Minister ? Why not the Def Secy & other Babus responsible for these & large no of other similar criminal omisions routinely committed by them ?? ALL Babus in MOD,serving or retired,responsible must be chargesheeted & punished for such criminal lapses.
“The matter was referred to Ministry in October 2008; their reply was awaited as of February 2010.” and it will remain awaited forever.
We feel quite content and cocky when we see Kayani’s proxy rule in Pak. What about India’s proxy rule by secretaries un-accountable to anyone? The report excerpts make it sound as though IAF could have done something about these matters. Fully agree with voyager. AF has become a mode of getting funds and promotions for scientist lately turned babu. It is amazing to see the amounts spent by DRDO on infrastructure where productivity implies snazzy guest houses and conference rooms.
There has to be a way out of the double whammy of MoD and DRDO for AF to be fit.
Why did the IAF decide to withdraw helicopters from the UN mission in Congo? Here is the answer: http://bit.ly/irt90d
And the real state of helicopters with the Indian Air Force: http://bit.ly/irt90d || Why should India even worry about UN in Congo?