Churlish reactions to perceived grievances against the US betray a lack of understanding of fundamentals of the Indo-US relationship.
The Headley saga has got many commentators in the Indian media excited. Vir Sanghvi, Swapan Dasgupta and Barkha Dutt have penned pieces which allege that the US allowed the 26-11 Mumbai terror attacks to happen to protect David Headley’s identity. The unstated conclusion: US isn’t even a friend of India, forget the bit about it being a strategic ally. President Bush might have been good for us, but President Obama and his team is letting India down by placating Pakistan and kowtowing before China. Look at their Afghanistan policy, India’s nuclear safety bill and there are so many other examples of US machinations.
The Pakistan-US strategic dialogue, coming so soon on the heels of the Headley saga, has further added to the nervousness of many Indian commentators. Although C Raja Mohan has tried to dispel the many misperceptions generated in the Indian minds about the Pakistan-US dialogue and Pakistani media’s over-the-top coverage of the same, some questions about the nature of India’s relationship with the US still remain in most minds.
These questions arise mainly from a lack of understanding of the structure, framework and dynamics of the Indo-US relationship — a relationship on an upswing since 2001. Rather than react to each event or incident on the timeline with an emotional outburst — exultation or indignation — Indian media commentators perhaps need to understand the definitive nature of the Indo-US relationship. It would be instructive for them to read, or re-read, a recent essay by Ashley Tellis on the drivers of this relationship. An extract:
In Sanjaya Baru’s recent retelling, Blackwill directly challenged his interlocutors: “India wants the US to invest, India wants the US to keep its markets more open, India wants more visas for its professionals, India wants us to be helpful on Kashmir and in dealing with Pakistan, India wants US support for membership of the UN Security Council, India wants this and India wants that. Tell me what will India give in return?”[ToI]
That rhetorical question from Blackwill, the most India-friendly US Ambassador Delhi has ever seen, will get no answers here. Perhaps, it doesn’t need any for Tellis provides most of the answers in this must-read essay. But let us jump towards the bit at the end to understand where India’s interests lie in today’s geopolitical scenario.
Instead, the strategic realist approach views Washington’s concerted support of New Delhi as desirable precisely because it advances larger American geopolitical interests. And although such help will be initially asymmetrical because of the differences in American and Indian power, it expects that New Delhi would see cooperation with Washington as being fundamentally in its own interest – and, by extension, act in ways that confirm this expectation whenever possible. Such responses would materialise not so much out of gratitude to the United States but because aiding the preservation of the American-led global order, in contrast to, say, acquiescing to the rise of a Chinese alternative, is necessarily consistent with India’s own vital national interests. A generous American support for the growth of Indian power today, then, is not an irrational investment for Washington: it advances the strategic aims of both states, while creating the incentives for more robust forms of cooperation as India’s own national power increases over time.
The Bush administration, in extraordinary measure due to Blackwill’s own efforts in the early years, pursued policies towards India that embodied this strategic realist perspective. In fact, it stayed the course until the very end. Thanks both to his affection for India and his conviction about the strategic importance of the US-Indian partnership, Bush declined to shift towards a transactional approach even when some in his administration believed that the president ought to use his nuclear initiative to press India for concessions in order to secure the political prize of completing the Doha Round.
To be sure, no policy will conform strictly to just one of the three “ideal types” outlined above. Rather, US policies in practice will always remain complex mixtures of benevolent liberalism, transactional calculation, and strategic realism, with one or more of these facets dominating the others depending on the administration in office.[ToI]
In simple terms, US doesn’t owe India a favour. Nor does India owe US one. US will do what is in its best interests. India must — and should — do what is in its best interests. If the two interests happen to align, it would be dumb for India to act churlish — on perceived grievances — and damage its own interests by weakening the relationship.
Your point is well taken in terms of each country acting in its own self interest. However, the word ‘perceived’ is missed sorely in your comments, except where it comes to Indian grievances. In reality, the grievances are real, because they come against certain expectations of American actions that have not quite happened and certain that have! There is nothing wrong in Indians putting some public moralistic pressure on USA if it could result in some amount of US government oversight on American espionage activities. Clearly, these activities are carefully structured to target objects of interest to America, even if it involves dealing freely with those who would harm India. But that does not match the words of American diplomats and public officials. How does it benefit India to ‘show understanding’ of America’s interests. Is that not expecting India to be altruistic to an extreme?
Back to my original comment, the Americans are acting in their perceived self interest, which do not match Indian perceptions of what is really in American interests. This is another area that I think we’re failing to get through on the diplomatic front. On the other side, however, they have had a lot of success in convincing India to re-open dialogue with Pakistan at great political cost. I think you need to give the churlish writers their due because they are actually putting much needed effort in changing a dynamic that seems to be loaded against India, even if the language is accusatory.
Blackwill asks, what do we get in return. So we allowed access to Ajmal Kasab days after the Mumbai attacks. What did we get in return? It’s quite reasonable to ask for access to David Headley before he’s well coached and invulnerable to pressure.
One major point, one minor point.
Raja Mohan’s article is excellent. But what is unusual about the Indo-US relationship right now is how popular it is — in both countries. 70+ approval ratings. Are the diplomats letting expectations rise too much? Are there other factors influencing positive feelings? Having that mutual appreciation for each other is not something for foreign policy realists to throw away so easily.
Minor point: I sometimes fear Tellis praises Blackwill too much.
Diplomats do not really influence public opinion.
Economic and cultural factors influence India’s positive view of the United States. Greater awareness of India for reasons other than poverty porn such as our democracy and economic progress attract Americans to India.
Unless the US does something to directly confront India the good feeling in India is unlikely to change. The Headley episode doesn’t help but there’s a critical mass of popular support for good relations with the US in India. As for the US, the nuclear deal debate showed that the support for good relations with India is nearly unanimous. However, while India has decided it is worth paying a cost for these good relations (risking relations with China, Russia and Iran), it’s not clear to me that the US thinks India is important enough to risk worsened relations with China or Pakistan.
“In Sanjaya Baru’s recent retelling, Blackwill directly challenged his interlocutors: “India wants the US to invest, India wants the US to keep its markets more open, India wants more visas for its professionals, India wants us to be helpful on Kashmir and in dealing with Pakistan, India wants US support for membership of the UN Security Council, India wants this and India wants that. Tell me what will India give in return?”
Touche! If some one deserves the fullest credit of raising the Indian profile at Washington, it was Mr Robert Blackwill. The short term asymmetry in the Indo-Pak-US tangle in favour of Pakistan is not likely to affect the long term symbiotic relationship between the US and India. The nuclear bill favouring India enjoyed bipartisan support in the US legislatures which is unlikely to be the case if a similar bill is proposed in favour of Pakistan.
If the US can pull the proverbial rabbit out of the hat in terms of repairing its severely damaged economy, there cannot and should not be an alternative to a US led global order in the foreseeable future, especially if the alternative is a Chinese led global order. There is no place for India as a regional power in Asia if the latter eventuality happens except as either a surrogate of China or as an adversary with no friends about.
Russia is in the phase of a terminal decline due to an impaired demography and uncontrolled immigration of ethnic Chinese in Eastern portions of Russia. There is also a rising disquiet in ASEAN as a severely undervalued remnimbi is stealing jobs and wealth out of them. These nations also have to depend on the US as a major countervailing force in Asia.
It is in India’s interest to look at the long term imperatives and not allow short term irritants. And, I am convinced that the higher political leadership of India is not over reacting to these irritants precisely because of the same reasons.
“In simple terms, US doesn’t owe India a favour. Nor does India owe US one. US will do what is in its best interests. India must — and should — do what is in its best interests. — and damage its own interests by weakening the relationship.”
Best to trade warily when dealing with an historically amoral corporation.
Pesky Red Indians, Iroquois, Irakis, Muddy Brown Indians what’s difference ?
Good analysis. One question. Do USA has a vested interest in a spiralling arms race in the sub continent as it is a main supplier to both Ind and Pak?
Firstly, sovereign nations will put their self interest first before they go out and help any other nation. That is what US does, Pakistan is doing and what India should be doing.
US’s current obsession is withdrawing from this War on Terror & “Nation Building” efforts in Afghanistan, because that was one of the main planks on which President Obama was elected. If he has any chances of a second term, he should at least be seen to deliver on this. From the US’s sovereign interest they will do whatever is necessary to achieve this objective, even if it means they have to sleep with the Pakistani estabilshment. Now one could argue that this is a short sighted approach, but my friends, Obama doesnt have much time left.
So where does India figure in the list of priorities. Go back to why India rose in stature in the eyes of the US. US started focussing on India as a counter-balance to China’s overwhelming role and size in Asian regional affairs. From their perspective, it was not as much the new-found love for India, as much as it was their need to contain and limit China’s ambitions that they cozied up with India.
At the same time, the US will also be sensitive to balance the regional balance of power in South Asia, particularly vis-a-vis India & Pakistan, and in effect limit India’s ambitions. They cannot be seen as tilting decisively in favor of India since their immediate objective is to get out of Afghanistan, where they need the Pakistani support so badly.
So in my humble view, as a sovereign nation, without outsourcing our foreign and defence policy to America, we must learn to fight our own battles ourselves and equip ourselves to counter any pressure that is exerted upon us. This can only come when we have the military, financial and political strength and unity of purpose.
Madhusudhan, your statement “it’s not clear to me that the US thinks India is important enough to risk worsened relations with China or Pakistan.” is a bit misleading. US-Paki relations are going to remain transactional. India, in the US view, will never be a rival to China, but India could be part of system that would rival China. But US thinking on that front is very muddled, and less of a balancing approach as you suggest.
Krishna, US-Pakistani relations are not transactional alone. Pakistan is a strategic partner of the US for the long term and has been for decades. They have a very strong desire to retain parity with India which they see slipping away. Relationship with the US is an important part of this parity in their view. Similarly China has a desire to maintain their current advantages, strategic, military, geo-political, economic, over India. US relations with India is a balancing game if only because that is the line in sand these two countries will draw. It’s only for public consumption when they say that each relationship is independent of the other because whether the US likes it or not, there will be a cost imposed for better relations with India. In fact, the corollary to this is that as our relations with the US improve, we are likely to start imposing a similar cost on American relations with those two countries!
-The Chinese irritation with the nuclear deal last year,
- now Pakistan’s insistence of getting the same.
- The fact that the Americans haven’t directly approached India for help in Afghanistan
-India’s annoyance at talks of US navy ties with the Chinese navy in the Indian ocean.
List goes on. Irrespective of what we’d like to believe, I don’t see how they can develop these relations independent of the other without at some point making hard choices.
Pragmatic,
A post based on your post at csspeak. We don’t need to undersell ourselves on Hadley.
Madhusudhan, I think we would disagree about the nature of the US-Pakistan relationship. I would say strategic until the end of the cold war, and in a difficult place since them. The pakis would love to move back to the good old days, but given the extreme dislike the US now has for them it will be hard.
In terms of the main point, again, I see the possibility of the US developing very independent India and China policies that work, rather than your zero sum game, but the problem there is the lack of strategic thinking on engaging Asia. If US policy is just build alliances against China, then your model is more likely. If
If the US was acting only in its own best interest, they why does it continue to sacrifice thousands of jobs to other countries for that country’s growth – allowing its own citizens to suffer?!?!?!?! INDIA IS A CURSED COUNTRY AS YOU WILL SOON SEE – YOU WILL PAY FOR YOUR GREED AND IGNORANCE.
Chanced upon this piece a wee bit late. There is a quid pro quo and that passes through a different route – China. The reason US must invest in its relationship with India without sounding too condescending.
More at http://southasianidea.com/foreign-policy/strategic-dialogue-and-beyond/
@primary_red Read this dated blogpost Sir: http://bit.ly/kAdXPO
That last tweet was a quote from Ashley Tellis. My blogpost from March last year: http://bit.ly/kAdXPO
US will do what is in its best interests. India must — and should — do what is in its best interests RT @pragmatic_d http://bit.ly/kAdXPO
@seemasirohi See this: http://bit.ly/kAdXPO || Check out the Tellis essay linked there in full again. It answers the question to an extent.