Why is India interested in Afghanistan?
Only one reason — ensure the security and well-being of its citizens, thereby providing them with a better life.
Amidst all the hype over Indian involvement in Afghanistan and lamentations over declining India influence in that country, here is a quick check of the possible reasons that drive India’s continued interest in Afghanistan.
Let us start with the ridiculous one first. India is coveting Afghan natural resources to fuel its economic growth and thus it seeks a presence in Afghanistan. But Afghanistan is not rich in minerals, oil or other natural resources. What the heck, even Bangladesh has more natural gas reserves than Afghanistan and it is far closer to India and far less turbulent than Afghanistan.
Next is the belief that altruistic motives such as India’s historical relations with Afghanistan, promotion of democracy in Afghanistan and well-being of Afghan nationals drive India’s engagement with Afghanistan. India has far deeper historical relations with Indonesia, Myanmar closer home can surely do with some democracy and there are enough Indians whose well-being should be a higher priority for the Indian government. Indian foreign policy has never, not even in Nehru’s time, been driven by idealism. And it is no different today.
Now the outrageous one: the enemy’s view, repeated ad nauseam in the Pakistani media. India wants to create its strategic outpost in Afghanistan to encircle Pakistan and foment trouble inside Pakistan. But except for Rehman Malik’s bombastic pronouncements, not an iota of proof of an Indian hand has been presented so far by Pakistan. Moreover, India doesn’t need to go to Afghanistan — spend billions of dollars and lose Indian lives — to merely foment trouble inside Pakistan. It can very well do it from the Indian mainland with far lesser commitment of resources.
This argument, however, is bound to leave many people unconvinced and needs a little more deliberation. Many in India wish for a tit-for-tat policy of a Battle of thousand cuts against Pakistan now, reminiscing for the days when India retaliated to Pakistan’s fomentation of the Khalistan movement by paying Pakistan back in the same coin. But the situation in the 1980s was different: Pakistan wasn’t a nuclear power then, the jehadis were not threatening the existence of the Pakistani state, and India and Pakistan were poised geo-politically by the rivalries of the Cold War era. Today India cannot afford to trigger a condition that further destabilises Pakistan because a nuclear-armed, imploding Pakistan — teeming with jehadis and a radicalised army — is the last thing India would wish for on its western borders.
Finally, the idea that India is maintaining a presence in Afghanistan to deny strategic depth to Pakistan in case of a conventional war. Sounds good, especially when General Kayani spouts it so nonchalantly in front of the international media. But Pakistan is a declared nuclear power and the flexibility of its nuclear threshold provides Pakistan as much strategic depth as it desires, both in time and space. If there is no need for Pakistan to have that fig leaf of strategic depth in Afghanistan, then the question of India denying it the same in Afghanistan does not even arise.
Does that mean that India has no reason to stay engaged in Afghanistan and should completely pull out from there? No. On the contrary, there is a very valid reason for India to enhance its commitments in Afghanistan. India has to ensure the security and well-being of its citizens, thereby providing them with a better life. If India has to secure a better life for its population in the coming years, it urgently needs to log double digit growth rates consistently. A better security environment in the country, starting from and including the state of Jammu & Kashmir, is an essential precondition for achieving those growth rates.
Our experience of last two decades clearly shows that the trajectory of jehadi violence in India, and particularly in Jammu & Kashmir, is inextricably linked to the political and security situation in Afghanistan. The exit of the Soviets from Afghanistan coincided with the rise of militancy in J&K in 1989, and the sustained high level of violence by foreign terrorists in J&K — and terror strikes in other parts of the country — coincided with the Taliban’s reign in Kabul in the 1990s. The decline in violence and the return of normalcy to J&K occurred after 2001, when the US & NATO forces had displaced the Taliban regime in Kabul. With the perceptions of a US pull-out from Afghanistan gaining ground after President Obama’s announcement of a new AfPak policy, the recent attempts by Pakistan to send highly-trained terrorist teams and to fund organised stone-pelting in Kashmir valley reaffirms that connection between Afghanistan and J&K.
The increased threat of jehadi strikes has not been restricted only to Jammu & Kashmir but has impacted the whole country, as evident from the terror cloud hovering over various sporting events being organised in India. This kind of security situation, with adverse travel advisories issued by most western countries, dents India’s image as a rising economic power and makes it an unattractive business destination.
Thus India has no option but to do all it can to deny the Taliban and other jehadis a stable base in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, India cannot do that by shovels alone.
The military-political situation appears to be converging to an end state that is not going to be satisfactory to either the United States/NATO, India, Afghanistan (less the Taliban) in the short to medium term and to China and Russia in the longer term. The only sides that appear to be winning are the Taliban and the Pak Army. Several incidents of the past few months are worth noting.
Arrest of some members of the Quetta shura including the prospective interlocutors between the US and the Taliban, the slow but sure take over of Pakistan’s Afghan Policy by Pakistan Army, the approaching implosion of the US economy due to excessive deficits and debts which have the potential to undermine the almighty dollar, fault lines that have started developing once again between ethnic pushtu leaders and the Taliban, efforts of President Karzai to free his administration atleast partially from US control due to the increasing possibility of US striking a truce with Taliban are all contributing towards the increasingly confused state of affairs.
It also appears to be a strategic mis-step for India to be soliciting the offices of Saudi rulers for stabilising Afghanisan. Saudis make a clear distinction between the Taliban and the Al Qaeda. While the latter are ideologically close to the type of Islam practiced by the Saudis, Al Qaeda still remains an enemy of the Saudi State.
It may yet be the case of enduring regret of India to have reduced its linkages with the Northern Alliance who still command the ethnic loyalty of the non pushtu population who are a majority in Afghanistan, abandoning the stable relationship with Iran and most of all, the distinct cooling off towards the Russians. IMHO in retrospect, India may have made a blunder in trusting the US to stabilise Afghanistan for us whereas the Russia-Iran-Tajik-India axis may have been the best bet.
Really good analysis with counter arguments. There is one thing that I am not sure about.
“Our experience of last two decades clearly shows that the trajectory of jehadi violence in India, and particularly in Jammu & Kashmir, is inextricably linked to the political and security situation in Afghanistan.”
Can we have some stats to support the argument. What about the violence which existed prior to 1980s. I don’t think that the violence in India is a directly proportional to political instability in Afghanistan, but I completely agree that politically stability in Afghanistan would radically affect terrorist influence in India.
Our experience of last two decades clearly shows that the trajectory of jehadi violence in India, and particularly in Jammu & Kashmir, is inextricably linked to the political and security situation in Afghanistan.
Are you saying we need to distract the Pak MJC in Afghanistan to cool down the Kashmir front? It’s the same 80′s and 90′s strategy then. Also it’s heavily premised on Uncle Sam staying interested – not a likely event. Afpak is a black hole – let’s exorcise this ghost and move on with our lives the best we can with these mangy folks in our backyard.
Our experience of last two decades clearly shows that the trajectory of jehadi violence in India, and particularly in Jammu & Kashmir, is inextricably linked to the political and security situation in Afghanistan.
IMO these changes the levels of violence that can really impact the lives of ordinary Indians occurred for reasons not necessarily tied to Pakistan’s control of power structures in Afghanistan. For example, ISI supported the Khalistan movement in early- to mid-1980s when it was not clear when (or if) the Soviets would withdraw. More recently, the terror attacks of the mid- to late-2000s (Mumbai being the most visible) in the Indian hinterland occurred when US troops were fighting the Taliban. A supposedly India-friendly regime in Kabul was in place, India was deeply engaged, and Afghan polity was seemingly getting better…
In the scenarios you mention (like in 90s), the ISI wanted to reproduce the Afghan jihad in J&K (and elsewhere as well). Having readily available patrons and infrastructure (courtesy OBL) only helped streamline operations. In recent years, ISI has found both radicalized freelancers (like Headley) and “native” folk (like SIMI or Kasab-types) to do the dirty work. So these whackos will keep coming, no matter what happens to Afghanistan.
Afghanistan has a long – and at many places disputed – land border with Pakistan. It is in India’s national interest to have a strong presence in such a country, should the Indian government want to raise the cost of ISI’s jehadi violence directed towards India. As Zia-ul-Haq said, the water must boil at the right temperature…
The policy of interference in the internal affairs are not acceptable to all
nations.The collective security of the region need to be formulated on the basis of share interest goal orientation with combine liabilties.
The challanges are not religious in nature but economical some disperate
state see the solution in expentionism and seeking sponsore state for such
adventurism,because they are bankrupt for such expenstionism.
Central-Asien State need peacfull relations in broad spectrum of regional
securities. India is emerging big economies in the region they shall come
with bold intiatives adressing the cour question of security in our region.
@Chaitannya Mahatme/ @libertarian/ @photonman:
Perhaps a slight misunderstanding in what I said. I never said that jehadi terror in India [and J&K] is exclusively owed to Afghanistan. There is a linkage, a strong one, is the exact point I made.
The debate on the degree and the type of Indian involvement in Afghanistan, is being carried out in PE and some portions of the Indian strategic establishment in a spirit of splendid isolation from what has been happening in Afghanistan during the past few months. Apropos my previous comments on the same subject, it still remains my considered view that though Indian involvement in Afghanistan is desirable it is not feasible due to a number of geographical and political reasons. India needs to be engaged with Afghanistan at the political and economic level but only to the extent desired by the Afghanistan leadership.
A new great power play is developing in Afghanistan with multiple angles – US push into Central Asia under the guise of NATO, Russia determined to do all possible actions to stop the NATO expansion, China taking a keen interest in the proceedings with a wary eye on developments that will impinge on its troubled North-Western portion, Iran pushing its way inside to have some say especially due to its troubles with Jundollah with the gas and oil politics of Central Asian Nations duly thrown in.
It will be better for India to stay away from this mess, do all that is possible as a friend of the Afghan people, ratchet up its own internal law and order machinery to nip trouble in the bud within India, initiate statesmanesque politics of reconcilation with disgruntled elements which are opposed to the Indian State. Let us take a leaf out of the Chinese model of development under their legendary leader and survivor, Deng Xiao Ping, especially during the period 1989 to 2008, a period of almost 20 years when China applied itself to the most challenging task of building its economy. In many ways, the Beijing olympics of 2008 was something like a coming out party for them. India, and Indians also need such attitude and application if we wish to be counted as some power in the world by 2030, still about 20 years away. It will take that much time for the erstwhile economic powers to wither, yield space and take the backstage in global affairs. If we start today, we may probably be ready in about 20 years.
Presently, India is just trying to throw her weight around, inspite of having little or no strategic weight. For those who are interested, I have posted a link below containing an interesting article that appeared in Asia Times online edition today.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LC12Df03.html
In continuation with what I said earlier, let us see a small example of national will and national power relating to say conduct of a sporting event. The United States has conducted a number of Olympic events with minimal government involvement and maximum done by private enterprise with excellent results. The Chinese organised the spectacular Beijing Olympics with complete government funding. As a nation we are all at sea, trying to organise the Common Wealth Games where the entire national effort appears to have been applied with mediocre results. Yet, after the Games are over, we will be the first to pat ourselves on our backs, make absurd claims that India has arrived and bear witness to umpteen television journalists gushing with puppy pride about the excellent conduct of the event. Most probably, the world will humour us with an indulgent smile coupled with a hidden smirk. Idea was not to deride our nation but just to point out the reality that we still have a long way to go before the World takes us seriously.
you have raised many question at a time i was concentrated on the regional
security issue and the india role in Afghanistan and central-Asiens State’s.
Taliban are unfortunatly Pashtoon but the absolute majority of Pashtoon are
not Taliban,India must have a good relation with Pashtoon/Afghan Nation
inside Afghanistan and in Pakistan,our relation are streched from Zoroaster
Hidoisim,budheisim and Islam Ghandahara culture are the living common
heritage.
As any proposed move of N.A.T.O in central Asien’s will consolidate the
regional security and will be more benifical for India as other State or Nation
The peacfull development of present Afghanistan in sphere of infrastructure
economy,education will be in the best interest of our region.Any political
adventurisim will destablised the whole region.
Afghan, I agree with your views. You are correct that India has to work for the benefit of the Pushtoons and the Afghan peoples. There has been enough mindless bloodshed created by foreign powers in Afghanisthan for too long. Political adventurism by any more powerful countries in Afghanisthan is the reason Afghans are still unsafe and exposed to terrorists on a day-to-day basis. Peace can only come when Pakistan understands that it cannot be always be in conflict with its neighbours, India and Afghanisthan.
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