Understanding the peace talks offer
Some gaps in the understanding are filled, but more questions emerge.
Too many trees have been felled and much ether used to debate the Indian offer to recommence peace talks with Pakistan. Most of the sensible debate — not the jingoistic bit of how we have been shamed by Pakistan cocking a snook at us — is predicated on the Obama plan of starting the withdrawal of US-NATO forces from Afghanistan by the middle of next year. Combine this with the proposals at the London conference of buying out the Taliban and detractors of the Indian offer for talks are convinced that India has already ended up on the losing side.
While all this seems overtly true, it just might not be the complete truth — and certainly not the final truth. It is here that this piece in Indian Express by K Subrahmanyam assists us by filling in some of the blanks. He flags two important issues. First is the course of action followed by the US forces between the completion of the surge and start of the drawdown operation.
That depends on the course of the campaign the US will launch on completing the surge operation. The purpose of buying up the pseudo-Taliban is to pacify the Afghan territory as the US forces will move closer to the Durand line and intensify their attacks on the jihadis on the Pakistani side with their drones.[Indian Express]
The Time magazine story on Operation Moshatrak to capture Marja in Afghanistan further strengthens Subrahmanyam’s thesis.
If he and his forces prevail, it will serve as the template for the far more challenging battle this summer for the Taliban capital of Kandahar, about 100 miles to the east. Success in Kandahar, Afghanistan’s second largest city, would mean that McChrystal is on track to achieving Obama’s ultimate goal: to start sending U.S. troops back home in July 2011.[Time]
The second point that K Subrahmanyam notes was also pointed by this blogger earlier[here]. Let us hear it again in the words of K Subrahmanyam.
Faced with these alternatives, there is a distinct possibility of the Pakistani army getting yet another terrorist act perpetrated in India to provoke an Indian military response which can be used as an excuse to dodge responding to the US demand for action against the jihadis. …The most important issue for India today is not the purchasing campaign for the pseudo-Taliban, but how to deal with the likely Pakistani provocation to trigger an Indo-Pakistan war in order to dodge action against the jihadis.[Indian Express]
In no way can one argue that this makes an open-and-shut case for Indian offer of talks with Pakistan. This blogger is still not fully convinced of the case for talks but Mr Subrahmanyam’s piece does help us gain a better understanding of the reasons for this engagement. While concentrating on getting a better understanding of the situation is important, it is equally, if not more, important to explore and suggest ways in which India can make the best out of this engagement. That is the real challenge moving forward now.
While all this sounds fine and nice, it does leave us with a big question. Is it merely the US using India to further its goals in the region? Or is India also doing something to use the US to secure its own interests in the region? This is not a rhetorical question. Ponder.
P.S. — A couple of other related issues that must be highlighted here. They have been flagged courtesy a very vigorous email discussion with my fellow INI blogger Ananth.
One, it is now clear that the sudden surge in opinion pieces in the Indian mainstream media — albeit poorly-argued and hastily put together — asking for Indo-Pak talks was rather well-synchronised with the telephonic call made by the Indian foreign secretary to her Pakistani counterpart. It would be hard to digest that this was purely coincidental.
Two, Indian government has to handle its public diplomacy and strategic communication in a more professional manner. Although everything dealing with the nation’s diplomacy and national security can not be in the public domain — RTI or no RTI — the government owes the nation an explanation as to what prompted it to commence the talks now. A stony silence from the state is not an option in today’s time and age.
Connecting this Chaman-ki-Tamasha which is orchestrated by the Pakistani Elite and the for-Hire editors of the Times of India, and there is not much indication that the government is involved in this….”don’t confuse correlation with causation” etc.
But that does not mean the GoI will try to stop an event that portrays an image of Indo-Pak peace — the downside of any peace talks with Pakistan is that they will cause terror attacks. But that needs the Pakistani army to be free to focus on causing terror in India, so another way to make sure Pakistan does not direct its focus on India is to distract their focus and energies elsewhere, or alternatively, help them in making various decisions that will cause them long-term harm to themselves. They have already bled themselves to death with the “Kashmir Issue”.
This time a couple of things are different: the testing of the Agni III missile was done in preparation for any eventuality, meaning that the costs for Pakistan are being raised if they conduct another terrorist attack on India.
However, the public stance is one that disallows Pakistan to exercise their “Indian threat on the eastern border”. Pakistan’s options are narrower than they were the last time there were Indo-Pak peace talks, and India’s options have improved and are broader.
In general terms of politics, a simple way to take down someone is to force them into situations where their choices will make them less effective against you in the future — usually this means engaging such entities in a Janus-faced manner. Such strategies cannot be followed by an approach of isolation but by engaging the enemy — isolating yourself from the enemy provides zero leverage, and leverage is crucial in forcing someone to behave.
One thing I look for to determine the change in behaviour of the powers that be is to list “significant events” in the near past and how and why they could be related to an issue, Indo-Pak peace talks in this case.
Before the London Conference of Afghanisthan, things were in flux, and India’s “meek acceptance” of Pakistan having the biggest role in Af-Pak (which superficially seems suicidal) has made the Pakistani Army stretch itself too thin.
The “Good Taliban” as defined by FM SMK in the conference matches the description of Taliban that we would all like to take home to meet mother, in the sense of they need to get peaceful and non-violent in order to be called the Good Taliban, and now Pakistan, in its leadership role, has to not stand in the way of such “Good Taliban” taking over Afghanisthan.
Now, the Pakistani army’s main concerns are:
1. Somehow turn the Indo-Pak peace talks against India via “non-state” actors
2. Somehow get US support to hold back India after the next terrorist attack when it happens
3. Pretend to take on the terrorist groups in its own soil, while actually preserving them as “non state assets” for committing terrorism.
4. Stop their relations with their jihadi groups from deteriorating any further than they currently are, as it is clear that these groups have no compunctions about taking on the Pakistani government and establishment, the Army.
These concerns are in addition to drastic economic conditions on the ground and a public that is hostile to all benefactors of the Pakistani army (a sentiment that the Army is largely responsible for, since it does not want to be seen as helping the USA even though it has given the USA a free hand to kill anyone in Pakistani territory. IMO, The question is how soon can Pakistan’s options be reduced even further. Just another opinion.
Certain developments in the internal dynamics of Pakistan need to be taken note of.
Pakistan Army has effectively replaced the civilian government as the principal interlocutor for Pakistan. The civilian government is being increasingly seen as inept, corrupt and insensitive. The US has duly recognized this issue.
The term of Gens Kiyani and Shuja Pasha are coming to an end. The situation continues to be fluid. If President Zardari does not toe the Army line, some surprises can be expected.
In addition, India’s refusal to talk unless the perpetrators of 26/11 are brought to justice has started to sound too shrill. Though India has nothing to show for as a gain since the 26/11 standoff, at some point in time talks have to resume.
All said and done, it is not in Pakistan’s interest to allow Taliban to assume power in Afghanistan. The Af-Pak border would cease to exist. With the internationalisation of terror through Al Qaeda and its affiliates, Pakistan would be foolish to forget what happened just a year ago at Swat. If she forgets that lesson, in all probability, Pakistan may yet turn out to be the most effective Jehadi factory the world may ever see.
k_ram wrote:
“In addition, India’s refusal to talk unless the perpetrators of 26/11 are brought to justice has started to sound too shrill. Though India has nothing to show for as a gain since the 26/11 standoff, at some point in time talks have to resume.”
“sounding shrill” is irrelevant and silly — India is not some hysterical harridan, and anthropomorphizing entities in geopolitics can be misleading and dangerous and completely useless in terms of analysis.
The only reason dialogue is useful now is because, post-London conference on Afghanisthan, Pakistani establishment has decided that it has beaten two superpowers, so third-rate dhoti-wearing countries like India should not be a problem — given the adventurist nature of the Pakistani Army, this also means that they will not hesitate to impose a limited conflict on India to get out of their commitments to USA/NATO.
If the London conference had not happened, there would have been no need to extend this offer of a dialogue.
@SR Murthy
‘If the London conference had not happened, there would have been no need to extend this offer of a dialogue.’
‘…given the adventurist nature of the Pakistani Army, this also means that they will not hesitate to impose a limited conflict on India to get out of their commitments to USA/NATO.’
If shrill sounds silly, how does blackmail sound?
r_kam wrote:
“If shrill sounds silly, how does blackmail sound?”
It sounds equally irrelevant even if that is the correct description of what Pakistan is attempting….unless of course one is generally clueless about Pakistan’s behavioural patterns.
To put is simpy, Pakistani society and army is operates like a criminal organization that also runs all (fauj-controlled) industries headed by the army.
While not losing wars in various theatres, Pakistani armed forces also dabble in drug running and murder for hire, and international terrorism, with 26/11 being one of the products of this industrious organization.
While not busy with international bloodletting under various excuses, Pakistani “democratic institutions” like the Parliament and courts assist in the process of this criminal organization masquerading as a country.
So blackmailing, murder, and terrorism is part of their skill set — one would think a few hundred terrorist attacks since 1990 would have given us a clue about their overal criminal behaviour. What is more interesting is the fact that you find this criminal Pakistani behaviour novel…seriously?
http://tinyurl.com/yj7agt7
This article in Foreign Policy correctly evaluates India’s responses post the London conference. These quotes hits the nail on the head:
“As India’s junior foreign minister, Shashi Tharoor, put it, “The reason that Kabul has 24 hours of electricity a day is because of Indian engineers who have actually delivered the power supply.”"
and
“What this means is that India, the only stable secular democracy in the region, is being actively prevented from helping in Afghanistan in order to appease the Pakistani regime, lest it re-enact the carnage that was visited upon Mumbai in 2008 and the Indian Embassy in Kabul in 2008 and 2009. Which raises the question: Is the U.S. objective in Afghanistan to oust the Taliban, or is it to secure the country for Pakistan? To New Delhi, the answer looks increasingly like the latter.”
The USA’s goal in this war is to strengthen the Pakistani Army, even if it means they retain control of their Anti-India jihadi groups. India’s goal is to remove all violent jihadi movements regardless of their motivation for violence.
There is a fundamental divergence between US and Indian goals in India’s neighbourhood which is going to require that India distance itself from the USA for the foreseeable future.