The year-end review sucks

Because the defence ministry is still reinforcing the status quo.

At the end of every calendar year, the ministry of defence, like many other ministries in the Government of India, comes out with a year-end review of its activities. Trite, benign and perfunctory in its recounting of facts, it makes for a depressing read at the end to the year. The disheartenment is not at the achievements played up in the report — considerable by Indian standards — but at the continued insistence on maintaining the status quo: a national security setup gearing up to fight the wars of the past. There is little indication of any change in the attitude and approach of the security mandarins in this country that will allow the defence forces to successfully meet the challenges of the future.

The disgust assumes odious proportions because of Andrew Exum. The very same day, in a stark contrast to the pro forma defence ministry review, Abu Muqawama postulates that the United States and its allies  should prepare for the future by developing a Foreign Internal Defense [FID] doctrine like they did with COIN [FM 3-24] because the end of the Third Counterinsurgency Era is near.

To amplify the point with an example, let us consider a scenario where the Pakistani military-jehadi complex unleashes another spectacular terror attack on Indian mainland similar to the 26-11 Mumbai terror attacks. The Indian government has no room left for diplomatically ratcheting up the pressure on Pakistan, and even the United States can’t achieve much with its threat-laced entreaties to Pakistani military brass. The mainstream media with its jingoistic coverage puts the government under pressure, asking it to act, and this vociferation soon reaches a crescendo. The Prime Minister calls his Cabinet Committee on Security, and his team of advisers at the PMO — NSA and the deputy NSAs — and starts looking for military options. The situation that has led to rejection of full-fledged military options against Pakistan since the nuclear tests in 1998 — remember 1999, 2001 and 2009 — hasn’t altered dramatically. What new military options can Mr. Antony’s defence ministry and the three defence services present to the Prime Minister and the government of India? With its long list of achievements for 2009 — including Shri AK Antony taking over as the Defence Minister for the second time on May 25 — does this review make the nation any wiser on the future course(s) of action available to the government?

That is why this year-end review report, which will be faithfully replicated in most, if not all newspapers tomorrow makes little sense. In fact, to put it bluntly, the whole thing sucks.

It sucks not only because of the question that never gets answered, even tangentially, in such communications from the defence ministry — “why are we doing what we are doing?”. But perhaps more so because one is afraid that the answer of the defence ministry and the armed forces is known rather too well — “…because that is the way things have always been done here”.

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  3. The banalities of the review are further heightened by new doctrinal thinking of the Army, which plans to gera up for fighting two front war, while simultaneously fighting the challenges of low intensity and assymetric conflict.
    These have to be seen in the backdrop of lamnet by retired army chief Gen Roy Chowdhry, “Indian decision-making in defence planning is perhaps the ultimate case study in negative processes, the fallout of which affects the operational preparedness of forces in an extremely adverse manner. In the ultimate analysis, unless the government and its political and bureaucratic establishment actively focus on reform and refurbishment in the process of planning and decision-making, modernisation of the Indian defence forces will continue to be a nightmare in slow motion.”
    He goes on to add; Technology is the most capital-intensive component common to all three services. Defence technology has traditionally remained confined to the government sector and it is indeed a matter of utmost concern that even 60 years after Independence, indigenous capabilities for research and development in cutting-edge defence technology, along with matching, high quality production facilities in Ordnance factories remain unacceptably inadequate”.
    I am particularly happy about your scenario and the strategic choices that india want to execute in a repete of 26/11, depite the boldly declared cold start doctrine with 96 hours response time. this si because we have consistently failed to lay down strtaegic priorties and force modernization golas and what should although it does not is the fact that growing capablity gap with China and near conventional symmetry with Pakistan.
    We appear to be living in the relam of make believe and hope that “this too shall pass”

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