One PM, two chiefs
Even if there is no connectivity gap, a cultural gap between the civil and military leadership can lead to strategic and political failures.
When Mrs. Indira Gandhi completely trusted the then army chief, Sam Manekshaw in 1971 and went solely with his advise, it led to creation of Bangladesh and her being hailed as Durga. When the same Mrs. Gandhi again trusted another army chief 13 years later during Operation Blue Star (if P.C. Alexander’s account is to be believed), she ended up paying the ultimate price herself and the nation suffered the horrors of Khalistani insurgency for another decade.
In both cases, an apolitical, professional army was completely trusted by the political leadership and unlike 1962, with no unnecessary civilian meddling in military matters. There was sufficient degree of engagement between the political and military leadership and at no stage did the political leadership improperly restrain the army during the operations. So, was it a mere tactical military failure in 1984 and nothing more than that.
Perhaps not. Because while the civilian and military leaderships engaged, the quality of debate between the two was abysmal, if not non-existent. It was manifested in the political leadership’s failure to understand the limitations of using military force in an operation like Blue Star and the military leadership’s failure to understand the political consequences of their actions. This can be directly attributed to the vast cultural gap — the difference in culture, norms and values — between the military and civilian worlds, which continues to this day in India.
While most commentators on civil-military relations in India — especially in the wake of the Pay Commission debate — focus solely on the connectivity gap between the civil and military leadership, the real challenge is to bridge the cultural gap between the two domains — to bring about meaningful dialogue and mutual understanding between them. This requires a paradigm shift in the approach and attitude of the civilian and military leadership over many years.
A practical, short-term solution is for both military and civilian elites — especially those involved in higher defence decision making — to jointly attend specialised training programmes, which emphasise military-strategic thinking, political philosophy, public policy formulation, governance and civil-military relations. There is no better way then but to immediately start with a programme — with compulsory attendance — for the military officers posted at service headquarters, civilian bureaucrats of the defence ministry and political leadership involved with national security, including the members of the parliamentary committee on defence.
Sounds like a pipe dream. Perhaps it is.
The civil-military leadership gap will continue to grow unles we take steps to stop this. There is a difference in the ethos and a desire to retain supremacy merely through strengthening an established hierarchy and not through professional attainments. We seem to be quick to co-operate with the foreigner but not with each other. The suggestion that there should be common training programmes is an excellent one.
“A practical, short-term solution is for both military and civilian elites — especially those involved in higher defence decision making — to jointly attend specialised training programmes, which emphasise military-strategic thinking, political philosophy, public policy formulation, governance and civil-military relations. There is no better way then but to immediately start with a programme — with compulsory attendance — for the military officers posted at service headquarters, civilian bureaucrats of the defence ministry and political leadership involved with national security, including the members of the parliamentary committee on defence.”
This is very right Sir. Could need more monitoring eg.
Just a thought – The level and intensity at which “Guanxi” may develop needs to be watched. So perhaps some think tank and responsible media presence too ? [pl. see Civil-Military Relations in Today's China by Finkelstein and Gunness*]
It may well happen that proximity will breed more contacts and lobbying for governor / ambassador / boards work – a seminal motility or upward mobility which shall be cynically noted by the rank and file. Not that the brass would care. Brass and civil elite did not reach levels without a ‘healthy’ interest in Number(s) 1. For as Ashok Mahajan writes in his book on Satanic verses on the Indian Army:
“General Sodhi speaks in clipped accent and in style
May deign to nod at us once in a while
But loosens his stiff neck
Before the Defence Joint Sec
Then you see him turn smarmy and servile”
*http://books.google.com/books?id=C5HsZo9xyAMC&pg=PA153&lpg=PA153&dq=pla+commissars&source=bl&ots=K2C45QP24u&sig=bYXKQdhLoZFcmCc44KTe48YoCRs&hl=en&ei=VKrqSrewCteikAWdtPGVDw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CAsQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=pla%20commissars&f=false
@Pragmatic
First time i see TOP Military Brass not solely being blamed for all the ills pertaining to Matters of Defence Services including 6th Pay commission.Chiefs can in no way tell politicians what reaction any military operation will have on political future of the party or individuals in power.Therefore , you have no point at all blaming the Chief concerned who is not there to defend himself.It would have been more pragmatic on your part if you had not blamed the Army Chief during Operation Blue star.There was no military tactical failure at all.The given task was done without causing much loss to men and material.
It is unfair to put the blame on the then Army Chief Gen. Vaidya, MVC (Bar). Army plans its operations on the basis of intelligence available on the strength and weaponry available to the opposition. We are not in the business of apportioning blame, but the clear fact that has emerged is the failure of intelligence provided to the Army. It was only after the Op Blue Star commenced, it became apparent that the terrorists were armed with most sophisticated weapons, trained men and leader like Maj Gen Shahbeg Singh, who were all well-trenched. As Jas commented, the operation was carried out professionally. Moreover, it was led by a brave and experienced Gen. Brar, who had landed his airborne battalion (he was a Colonel then) in Dhaka in 1971, leading to the surrender of Gen. Niazi.
@jas,
pragmatic may have made mistakes in claiming that Operation Bluestar failure is because of Army. There are polite ways of saying that. Moreover, you are using pragmatic.nationalinterest.in as your website, which is wrong.
@pragmatic
Don’t say that Op Bluestar failure is because of Army. Who let the situation build-up requiring for such an operation ? What I don’t like in your analysis is that you seem to blame Army also (may be my perception) ?
@Invalid:
If you read the post again, it is clearly mentioned that “if P.C. Alexander’s account is to be believed”. The assessment is his, not mine. And the point I am drawing is a much larger one than Blue Star or General Vaidya.
When a serving Colonel has to sir a tehsildar in a govt office to get his work done , then what civil-military cooperation are we talking about. The gap is so wide. Socially, military officers and civil officers dont interact at any level. This is because the levels itself are different. The places civil offcers frequent are frankly out of reach for military wallas. Anyway, which civil govt servant shows even a semblence of respect for a military officer. So, can u have cooperation without mutual respect