Pragmatic Euphony  

If it plans to melt into anonymity, the fleeing Maoist leadership can only be neutralised by intelligence from the local police.

Sankarshan Thakur warns the Indian government of one of the fall-outs of their voluble anti-Maoist strategy.

Intelligence inputs reaching here from parts of Chhattisgarh, Orissa and Jharkhand suggest that large numbers of cadres may leave their jungle bases and “melt away into urban anonymity” over the next few weeks as part of a thought-out tactic.

“It makes good sense for them,” said a senior intelligence official based here. “They don’t have the firepower the government is in the process of employing. By vanishing initially, they will not only escape a full-blown assault, they will also be able to draw security forces deeper into their habitat and trap them in a long-drawn guerrilla conflict.”[Telegraph]

Once the security operations announced by the Home Minister against them proceeds, the Maoists will have three options: fight, flee or surrender. Only the extremely naive would expect the Maoists to fight pitched battles with the security forces for territorial control of the so called Red Corridor. Surrender, at this point of time, when the security operations have not commenced yet — even with the government’s money for surrender offer on the table — would be too premature an option for the Maoists. The only choice then left for the Maoists is to flee from the battle.

While this scatting from the scene may be currently being sold as a well-thought out melting pot strategy by the Maoist sympathisers, the real situation will only be known after a few weeks of security operations. If the security operations are successful in neutralising a fair share of the top and middle-rung leadership of the Maoists during that period, there might not be enough motivation left for the majority of remaining cadre to use the hit-and-run guerilla tactics. The melting plot could then well turn out to be a Maoist meltdown.

The success of these specific counter-terrorist [CT] operations against the committed Maoist leadership is predicated on hard intelligence. It is impossible for the majority of central paramilitary forces to develop reliable intelligence sources in the area within a few days of their deployment. Intelligence acquisition is a painstaking process that takes years, if not months, to develop, stabilise and mature. In the absence of reliable intelligence resources of their own, these central forces have to per force rely on the local policemen. Thus the relationship between the local police and the central forces assumes critical importance in these operations. The so-called lathi wielding cop, armed with a bolt-action 303 rifle, might be of little use as a frontline soldier in a pithed battle against a highly motivated and well-trained insurgent, but that policeman is perhaps the only one who can identify the overground supporters of the Maoist movement in his area for the security forces. Once they are assured of the state’s resolve to completely finish this scourge of left wing extremism, many policemen should venture out with information that could be critical to the success of  CT operations by the central forces.

It is not that there aren’t any Maoist moles inside the state police forces. Presence of such elements will lead to some botched operations but these setbacks will have to be taken in the stride by the central forces. Rather than decry the complete police apparatus in these areas as capitulated and compromised, the junior leadership of the central forces will have to take an appropriate decision about the level of cooperation and quality of intelligence at a local level. This discernment can not happen at the level of joint committees at state police headquarters or at the MHA in North Block.

Home Minister P. Chidambaram’s propagandist nature of the impending anti-Maoist operations has made many in the media and society uncomfortable about the nature of these operations. While this visible display of government’s resolve has made the costs of failure unbearably high, it has its upsides as well. Firstly, it has counterintuitively avoided a lot of needless violence with the Maoists running away from a direct fight against the security forces due to these bold pronouncements. Secondly, an unequivocal display of state’s support is liable to give the morale of the local police forces and central security forces a much-needed boost after the continued state apathy of the last many years.

These pronouncements by the Home Minister are the proverbial first step in this journey of a thousand miles. There will be many bumps on the road ahead. These security operations will not be perfect. It is the government’s assured response to these setbacks that will place the wind at the security forces’ back. It is only then that the security forces will reach their destination, sooner rather than later.

Related stories – Outlook cover story on the anti-Maoist operations by Saikat Datta and Harinder Baweja’s interview with K.P.S. Gill at Tehelka.