Pragmatic Euphony  

Precedent of employing armed forces against the Naxals or the Mizos is not a good enough reason to employ them again now.

As far as the anti-Maoist operations are concerned, among the three essential component of any security strategy: ends, ways and means — the first one has been taken care of by a clear enunciation of the desired ends by the Home Minister. The ways — how various instruments of the state will achieve these goals — are still inchoate. And the means, the resources — both in terms of quantity and quality — remain the biggest question mark against the government strategy.

While the Prime Minister, the Home Minister and the Defence Minister have explicitly ruled out using the Indian armed forces against the Maoists, it might be worth the effort to go through precedents of past employment of army and air force against Naxals. The details enunciated below are from a letter written last year to the government, by one of India’s highest respected military veterans, Lieutenant General J.F.R. Jacob.

The Naxal movement was born in the little thatch hutted village of Naxalbari in north Bengal around 1967.
The movement spread and soon became a serious threat to governance in the state. As the police could not handle the situation, then Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi took a pragmatic decision in October 1969 to use the  army.

Army Chief Sam Manekshaw and secretary to the goverment Govind Narayan met me in Fort William, the Eastern Command Headquarters. They told me that since the police were unable to handle the Naxals, the army would have to do so.  I told Manekshaw that it was not the army’s job,  and that the police should try harder.

Manekshaw then said that that  the police were unable to deal with the situation,   and therefore  Mrs Gandhi had directed that the army should be given the task, and that I  was to be put in charge of the operations.

I  then informed Manekshaw that though we had 20 Infantry  Division near Naxalbari,  we did not have sufficient troops south of the Ganga.  I asked for two more divisions.  Done, said Manekshaw, adding that he would be good to  me and also allot the 50 Para Brigade.   I then asked for orders in writing. Manekshaw replied that there could be nothing in writing,  no publicity and no records were to be kept. Govind Narayan concurred.

By the end of 1969, 4 and 9 Infantry Divisions as also 50 Para Brigade were moved into West Bengal.

We were fortunate that the Naxalite movement was in its early stages and that their cadres were not well- equipped.  Our major concern then was the attempts by  the movement to infiltrate the left wing trade unions. We took preventive action and deployed troops in sensitive factory areas. Troops were also deployed in the Mofussil areas.

…Intensive military operations were conducted,  and by mid-1971, the Naxals were driven out of West Bengal.  During this period two elections were held and the army was deployed right down to polling booths to ensure free and fair polling.

…The army and air force had earlier been used in the 1920s to deal with the Moplah Revolt. The air force was used by the British against the Faqir of Ipi in Sind in 1940. The air force was also used to bomb Mizo rebel camps,   while the army was used in West Bengal against the Naxals. Emphasis not in original[Sify]

Prima Facie, it is difficult to agree with General Jacob’s prescription for one simple reason. A lot has changed in the Indian society, media, method of governance and even the security forces since the early 1970s to render any exact parallels between the situation then and now totally inappropriate. In any case, naxalism survived the military onslaught then and has flourished in the intervening four decades. The solution to Mizo problem also did not come from those air strikes, but from political reconciliation.

Even though one may not fully agree with the notion that using the armed forces against the Maoists is akin to using the sledgehammer to swat a fly, the government has to exhaust all other available options before calling on the army in a full-on role against the Maoists. However, there still remain ways and means to employ the armed forces in support of the security operations conducted by the police and paramilitary forces — mainly to advise, train and mentor these forces.

The decision of employing the armed forces in such a limited capacity will have to be taken by the government at the highest levels, in consultation with the armed forces, the police and the paramilitary forces. It is not an easy decision. If it was an easy one, as Robert Gates so beautifully put it, some one much lower in the hierarchy would have taken the call much earlier.