Indulge, not abstain from Afghanistan
Sending troops to Afghanistan is a valid strategic option for India.
There’s a fine line between fishing and standing on the shore like an idiot. ~Steven Wright
In two separate op-ed pieces today, former army chief General Shankar Roychowdhury and defence analyst Ajai Shukla try to find ways for India to influence the events in Afghanistan. Roychowdhury suggests that India must guard its long-term strategic interests by undertaking massive training of Afghan National Army. Ajai, in contrast, opines that India should help the US win over large parts of moderate Taliban on to its side, even if it happens to be at the cost of undercutting the current Afghan President, Hamid Karzai.
Both decry the current Indian policy and the level of involvement in Afghanistan as insufficient. But they stop at expounding timid options for India to exercise in that country. Thus they betray a lack of boldness and gumption by refusing to explicitly acknowledge that Indian strategic interests in the region can only be secured by an Indian military involvement in Afghanistan.
As far as Ajai’s argument about arriving at a settlement with moderate Taliban — different from al Qaeda and Quetta Shura — is concerned, the answer comes from Robert Gates.
…Gates plead agnosticism as to whether al-Qaeda would move its headquarters from Pakistan to Afghanistan but said “what’s more important than that, in my view, is the message that it sends that empowers al Qaeda.”The Afghanistan-Pakistan border area, Gates said, represents the “modern epicenter of jihad.” A place “where the Mujahedeen defeated the other superpower,” and in his estimation of the Taliban’s thinking, “they now have the opportunity to defeat a second superpower.”
Defining al-Qaeda as both an ideology and an organization, Gates said their ability to successfully “challenge not only the United States, but NATO — 42 nations and so on” on such a symbolically important battlefield would represent “a hugely empowering message” for an organization whose narrative has suffered much in the eight years since 9/11.[Danger Room]
The case for deploying Indian armed forces in Afghanistan has been made as a cover story in Pragati last year, well before Obama, McChyrstal and 26-11 happened. Nothing much has changed to alter the basic arguments but here is a slightly updated rhetorical version of the case made there.
The litmus test for putting a glass ceiling on Indian involvement is simple. Is India threatened less than the US by the return of Taliban to Afghanistan? The direct and indirect threats emanating from a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan to India are far graver and greater than those to the US. If the US were to contemplate only providing infrastructural aid, or negotiate with moderate Taliban or only undertake training of Afghan army, it would be decried as having let down the comity of free nations. Why should India then get away by doing even lesser and then pontificating about playing its legitimate role in bringing stability to this part of the world?
If Taliban were to succeed in Afghanistan, the jehadis will again end up becoming a diplomatic and military tool of the Pakistani military-intelligence complex to be employed against India, and on the Indian mainland. The comparison between an Indian deployment in Afghanistan and maintaining the status quo thus could not be starker. The question that ought to be asked is: Between Indian soldiers and innocent, unarmed civilians, who is better placed to tackle the Taliban jehadis? Should India allow its civilians to be massacred by these jehadis in the hospitals, streets, railways stations and hotels of Mumbai or should our soldiers be pummelling these jehadis in the barren lands of Afghanistan?
As of now, US does have a strategy in Afghanistan and it wants to stay there, but it doesn’t have the troops to resource that strategy. India can help the cause only by providing the proverbial boots on the ground, not by restricting itself to developmental works. Even if India were to run crash recruitment training programmes for the Afghan army, there will be a requirement for trainers, mentors and advisors to guide these newly raised units into combat during their initial tours of duty in Afghanistan. While that level of involvement is just a step short of sending battle-hardened Indian troops into that country, the difference in results on ground between the two will be significantly different in the short to mid-term.
As far as Pakistan is concerned, any level of Indian involvement will invoke a Pakistan veto. It will continue to raise a shindig irrespective of India’s indulgences or abstinences in Afghanistan. But who cares? From drone attacks in FATA to explicit calls about targeting the Quetta Shura, the US is dictated not by Pakistani sensitivities but solely by its own interests.
With the current media hype over the Chinese security threat, India will not be able to spare any military formations earmarked for the Chinese border. If these formations have to be pulled from the Pakistan border, it automatically takes care of the Pakistani bogey of an Indian threat on its Eastern borders restraining it from going the whole hog against the jehadis.
With the decreasing level of violence in J&K, it makes immense sense to move a couple of divisions of battle-hardened, specialist counterinsurgency force, the Rashtriya Rifles to Afghanistan. Besides meeting the internal political goal of demilitarising J&K, it will also shift the battlefield in this proxy war against Pakistan-backed jehadis from Kashmir to Afghanistan. India must not only choose its battles but also choose where and when it wants to fight them.
Finally, if the US is expected to unshackle itself from its traditional mindset of an Atlantic alliance and engage the rising powers of Asia, it is equally incumbent upon India to break free of its underdeveloped, third-world, non-aligned mindset of a previous era. The aphorism about power and responsibility is too worn out and clichéd to be repeated here.
Normally, I agree with many viewpoints on this blog but I disagree with this one.
Af-Pak is not our war and we should not send our troops to die there. It would be better to focus on our borders with Pakistan and China and take decisive action there.
The more we gain economic and geopolitical strength, the more important it is that we not fall into the trap of behaving like some imperial/colonial power that needs to send its troops any and everywhere to maintain our interests.
Also, we risk great damage to the goodwill created with the Afghan people by ruling over them. The US invasion of Iraq should serve as a reminder of how quickly local opinion can change against incoming military forces.
The lessons learnt from Sri Lanka and the IPKF should not be forgotten — charity starts at home.
“should our soldiers be pummelling these jehadis in the barren lands of Afghanistan ?”
[1] R. Singh’s soldiers:
* In 1838 he agreed to a treaty with the British viceroy Lord Auckland to restore Shah Shoj? to the Afghan throne at Kabul. In pursuance of this agreement, the British Army of the Indus entered Afghanistan from the south, while Ranjit Singh’s troops went through the Khyber Pass and took part in the victory parade in Kabul.
[2] MM Singh’s soldiers:
In 2009 he agreed to a treaty with the US Viceroy H. Clinton to restore Crown Princess Bilquis Begum or other to the Afghan throne at Kabul. In pursuance etc etc, Chidambaram on a Pale horse took part in a V day parade as Sheila was stuck in a BRT jam on Babar Road.
* http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/491193/Ranjit-Singh
@John K:
First, IHO that you have derived wrong lessons from our experience in Op Pawan.
Second, I am going to try and explain in very simply terms why India must deploy forces to at least contain if not defeat organisations that pose a very very dangerous threat to our nation’s progress and development.
I (The Mango Man) want to make my life better. I want to feed my kids better. I want them to go to good schools, get educated and contribute to making this land prosperous and peaceful. So, I need to make more money. My life needs to develop. The people of our country can develop if they were to invest in sound economic programmes or pursue meaningful professions successfully. Such programmes (at the very least) have a better chance of success if they are not weighed down by additional expenditure on security and protection. A secure environment will attract investment both foreign and domestic. So How was that ??
What are the obstacles in this path of providing a secure environment?
There are some farsighted, mature and thinking personalities like Marathi Manoos, Didi Moni, BMW of UP etc who do pose some obstacles, but to keep our discussion manageable let us take two principal villains, the LWE and the Pak supported terrorist agenda. Both these threats pose a danger that will seriously destabilize our nation.
How do we do it?
CHB, the darling phrase of our CI (or COINS as PE prefers) experts these days! Something, the Ind Army has been practicing for decades. This provides an environment for successful negotiations and further developmental work, wherein the root cause of disenchantment or enmity will be addressed by policies and developmental work. Off course in our great land, the Build part rarely gets tackled because of the steel frame (up) and the Pol leadership.
Now is this Utopian? Ummmm..there are precious few insurgencies that have been successfully resolved. The Indian experience with Khalistan is one such case. It supports this theory in parts.
So whether we call it “force projection”, or “sorting out the jihadis”, or “tackle the fountain head of terrorism”, offensive action is mandatory.
Off course, the devil is in the details!
@PE: “…. it makes immense sense to move a couple of divisions of battle-hardened, specialist counterinsurgency force, the Rashtriya Rifles to Afghanistan. “
“…a couple of divisions”. No offence, but that doesn’t sound well researched. A division as you know is the smallest combined arms formation capable of conducting independent operations. So the two infantry divisions (terrain and task rule out armoured divs) will mean deploying upto 60,000 troops with a gadzillion tons of eqpt (vehs, supplies, heptrs I couldn’t do the math) a thousand kms by air.
Moving a division, inter theatre within our borders is planned by rail, road and air. Quite frankly, the Indian armed forces does not have the where-with-all to do this across borders. They are not structured, equipped or trained to undertake such missions. Building such a capability is extremely desirable. But it will take time, efforts and money, and lots and lots of it. That could be found, but the political will ….???
BTW, a Kagan report talks of a surge of between 3.5 to 6.5 Bdes (combat tps only) for the entire AOR. Using accepted norms, that’s nearly your couple of divs.
@kat:
Thanks for the comments.
“…a couple of divisions”.
The correct term, rather the exact one, would be Two RR Forces. Now that you raise it, an armoured and light artillery component might not be strictly undesirable for a theatre like Afghanistan.
The political will is in asking the defence services to do it. How to do so is the baby of the services & MoD?
And about the number of troops. McChrystal, the man on ground, is asking for additional 40k troops. Nearly 3.5 to 4 divisions. I am only suggesting half that number from India.
With due apologies to Prag
The Afghan quagmire may turn out to be the Vietnam for the current US President. ‘To commit more troops or to withdraw?’ is a question that is haunting the US Administration. Drone attacks, employing the Pak Armed Forces etc etc are not yielding the desired results as of now but a number of articles have emanated from well respected Pak newspapers that a major offensive is to begin in North and South Waziristan provinces. In short, a ‘buggar’s muddle’ is already on and it remains to be seen as to how it will all turn out. Will it be the ‘mother of all wars’ or will it be yet another engagement without result, only time will tell.
Coming to the involvement of Indian troops, deployment of a ‘couple of divisions’ without having the logistic capability to maintain them would be unwise – both tactically and strategically. Perhaps the only circumstance under which Indian combat elements can participate in the ‘Pacification of Afghanistan’ would be as part of a multi-national force sent with international legitimacy and not as part of NATO or the US.
Post 9/11 disregarding international opinion, Americans created instability in Iraq and are now pushing Iran into a corner; they have a lousy relationship with Russia and are suspicious of the Chinese. Afghanistan will remain a land locked country and the NATO forces need to funnel logistics through either Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan or China. Other than Iran and Pakistan, none of the other countries are viable alternatives currently as most of them are also land locked or are unwilling to help or the ‘bloody’ sea is just too far away. In addition, the Central Asian countries will not be of much use unless the Russians are brought in. China would try to keep their Uighur dominated backyard quiet. Iran, for obvious reasons has no incentive to help and that brings the issue back to Pakistan. Like it, leave it, hate it or grumble, Pakistan holds the logistic cards for Afghanistan.
Taking a long term perspective, none of the neighbours of Afghanistan would like to see it implode and allow the ascendancy of Al Qaeda – neither the Central Asian republics, nor the Russians or the Chinese. As regards Iran, the ancient Persian and the current Shi’ite Islamic Republic has all the reasons to be glad to see the demise of Al Qaeda. The Coalition forces searched in vain for the WMDs in Iraq and the world is now being sold the same story about Iran and foundation is being laid for yet another wasteful war. It would have been infinitely wiser to have enlisted Iran to serve the Afghan cause which would have blunted the ‘indispensability’ of Pakistan.
Finally, entry of Indians may achieve the elusive pan-Islamic unity that the Americans interference has failed to achieve so far and even that failure is not for want of trying. Reiterating my view, participation of Indian troops would be extremely unwise under the NATO dispensation. Instead, it would make better sense to push for a regional grouping that would lend the effort greater credibility. If India needs to take care of its strategic concerns in Afghanistan, it would need to work towards a multi-lateral engagement in Afghanistan in preference to a US centric engagement.
Finally, are Indian troops needed there? Ask the Americans and you may be surprised by the answer!
@kat!!!
Are you prepared to be a part of this kind of force which you vehemently advocate. Or will your son will form part of this team to get killed or maimed in a foreign land?? If you have a son do send him to the OTA chennai. He will be a ready canon fodder in 10 short months. Or are you there only for picking up good carriers and making money and having a good life?/
@k_ram:
I value your comments and we have gone through this discussion before as well.
We both agree [to an extent] that India needs to scale up its level of military involvement in Afghanistan. The difference is in whether it should be as a part of an international or regional stabilisation force or as an ally of the NATO & the US. Only if some one was willing to exercise the first option seriously, we should have looked at that. Although I personally think that working with US, Iran, China, Russia and Pakistan might not be the smoothest prescription. Ponder.
First of all. India does not have the capability to conduct the kind of operations being discussed here. Period. How you gonna get them there? Supply them? ISAF is having enough difficulty with logistics and has OVERLAND ACCESS THROUGH PAKISTAN (and the Northern network). India does not have this kind of expeditionary capability and the tooth-to-tail ratio is not up to modern (RiMA) standards. In 20-30 years India might have acquired the necessary capabilities and undertaken the necessary modifications to force structures and doctrines to be able to undertake such a deployment.
Deploying forces to perform the requisite combat and stabilization operations is beyond India’s current capability. A symbolic small-scale deployment is not worth the political cost/risk. Pakistan will undoubtedly intensify its aggression which could force the political leadership in both countries towards full scale war.
Furthermore, the last thing India needs to do is dedicate forces to a quagmire and or risk a wider war with Pakistan when it faces a variety of internal threats and intensifying geopolitical competition with China.
Put simply. Such a deployment is beyond the capability of India’s armed forces. The downside risks are potentially enormous and the prospects for “success” seem dim. India must husband her resources, focus on economic development, domestic stability, military modernization and the emerging competition with China.
India needs an environment of geopolitical stability to continue to develop and hopefully emerge as a major power. Deploying troops to Afghanistan would result in less geopolitical stability rather than more.
@ kat:
I’m not totally ruling out military options. I would support it for surgical operations to root out terrorists and their training camps in Pakistan, just as Israel does in the Palestinian territories.
But taking our war to another country is a whole different ballgame. I don’t think we have the resources for it. As reader ‘ashok’ alluded to, I don’t think the Indian public would support such a mission when their sons start coming home in body bags. Also, the Indian public (media?) was quick to refuse Indian involvement in Iraq when the then BJP-led government floated the idea of sending Indian troops as a mark of solidarity with the US.
My reference to Operation Pawan (ie the IPKF mission) was not to draw similarities with the objectives of that mission or its manner of execution. I wanted to draw attention to the fact that we got involved in someone else’s war and had to pay a heavy price for that.
Your reference to the Khalistani movement is not entirely appropriate as this was a home-grown movement that directly affected India (ie a part of India that would have seceded). That is not the case with Af-Pak. I agree that force was used in Punjab but that was used against our own citizens that wanted to break away. India going to Af-Pak will not lend us the same credibility as we’d effectively become a foreign occupying force.
In summary, I agree that military options need to be considered but that they should be limited to surgical operations to root our terrorists or their training camps but going on tours of duty to other nations is a recipe for disaster and will ultimately become unacceptable to the public once the losses start to mount.
The short term interests of the US in the region have coincided with India’s long term interests in the region, but I still think you have to ask yourself “what can/should India expect from the US.” This is a major point which needs to be discussed before sending any troops.
@Ashok:
A request- discussion on a serious issue like this will loose focus if you make it unnecessarily personal. What I do for a living may surprise you. The son, a 9 yr old currently wants to fly the Su-30 MKI and play football for Man U. (I told him the MKI will get phased out by the time he tightens his anti-g suit.)
If you read my post carefully, you will find that I have not recommended deploying to Afghanistan. That was reserved for taking up with PE. But since you have attributed this to me, let me clarify.
Since deployment of forces ( Ind Army & IAF heptrs) to counter LWE has commenced, let us restrict our discussion only to the Pak sponsored terrorist threat.
The fountainhead of our cross border terrorist attacks is not Afghanistan but Pakistan. Ideally, we should do our version of Op EF in Pakistan and then engage in an exercise of nation building a-la Iraq or Afghanistan. I know it sounds like I have been “smoking something”.
Now we know that we (on our own) don’t have the capability to legislate to GOP . So, the next best thing is to align with forces that share our views and exert mil, economic and diplomatic pressure. That is the rationale behind PE & Acorn’s proposals on deployment options to Afghanistan.
The spectre of US led MNF failing in Afghanistan with the Taliban taking over is terrifying. It is just the sort that preceded WW-II when many nations did nothing till very late.
@John K:
#On Op Pawan – The execution of a plan is more important than the plan itself.
IHO that the aim was lofty and in keeping with our aspirations of regional leadership. Granted, it all went horribly wrong. But does it take away from the aim??!! Wasn’t Op Cactus a resounding success?
#On surgical strikes – A funny thing about the so called surgical strikes. As the discerning would know, wpns are matched to tgts. So if you need to surgically take out Markaz-e-Taiba you’d need a 6 to 8 ac strike (single pass) with EW & AD escorts under cover of AWAACS (also protected by AD escorts). The wpn would be most probs a KAB 1500. That’s like brain surgery with a hack saw. My POV is that surgical strikes is a term invented for media by an astute Staff Offr.
#On Khalistan – All insurgencies are home grown affairs sir, and they always have foreign support. A brief diversion and apologies if it sounds like yet another discourse.
Analyse an insurgency as you would analyse a threat. You work out the vulnerabilities and the strengths. You then pit your strength against the C of G, an action that would yield maximum payoff. Quite similarly, if action (political, developmental and military) against home grown elements is being prohibitively hindered by foreign elements, proceed against them.
#On body bags – Since 9/11, our nation has been attacked several times. Contrast this with the number of times that the US of A has faced an attack on its soil. Even if planning is not perfect and execution quite flawed, affirmative action pays. The truth is out there.
May I end with a couple of adapted quotes.
@kat:
Brilliant, you are in great form. [Applause... applause... applause]
Sire, take a bow.
Bahukutumbi Raman’s view – is osama nicer for india than obama medium term ?.
well said…..keep up the good work
@kat!! Pt taken.
Predictions for 2010
a) One division str (30000 troops) of Indian forces in Afghanistan.
b) India would sign Copenhagen.
Predictions for 2012
a) US forces will leave Afghanistan.
b) US still to ratify Copenhagen (or its sequel).
Do I smell Hot Potatoes?!!