Cracking on
An asset and a liability.
Indian army has been Indian barely for 62 years now. It was the British Indian Army for at least twice that period. It should come as no surprise then that the Indian army still continues to draw most of its values and traditions from the British army.
One such quality is what the Brits label “cracking on”. Steve Grey in the Prospect magazine has defined it as an army being “good at preserving a belief in order and purpose, even in chaos and dysfunction”, of soldiers putting “their grief to one side, to deal with it later; after the battle” and it “could also mean failing to challenge impossible orders, or unwillingness to expose a flawed strategy.”
Now most people would consider this quality as a huge asset for any army. But Anthony King in the same issue of Prospect comes up with an explanation to suggest that it is an equally big liability for a modern army.
“cracking on”—the unshakeable determination of Britain’s troops. Grey is right that the ethos of “cracking on” is the army’s greatest quality; effective armies require fortitude and morale in order to endure the losses that they will inevitably suffer. Yet, as he notes, it may be the army’s greatest weakness too.
During their initial training at Sandhurst, army officers are taught to retain the initiative: when they are confronted by the immediate presence of an enemy, it is better to do the wrong thing decisively than to do nothing at all. Passivity almost always leads to defeat, while determined, concerted action— even if initially implausible—can often unhinge opponents. On recurrent exercises primarily based on conventional warfare, the centrality of activity, of tempo and offensive action—of cracking on—is repeatedly emphasised to trainee officers. At the tactical level, this prioritisiation of action and initiative is surely correct, imbuing a robust work ethic in Britain’s armed forces which is appreciated and valued by their allies, like the US. From the Balkans to Afghanistan, multinational commanders have looked to British troops to carry out tasks that other nations have been reluctant to perform.
More surprising, however, is that the same ethos of action is evident at staff college where officers are trained for operational command. Although the concept behind Britain’s Joint Service Command and Staff College (created in 1997) was innovative, the institution was imbued with traditional British military culture. It was and remains a testament to “cracking on.” Giving students little time for thought and independent reading and research, the college seems to replicate a conventional military exercise in which the speed and quantity of output is prioritised over quality—and potentially incorrect action over cautious contemplation. The result is that Britain’s operational commanders feel the need to act and impose themselves on any situation.[Prospect]
Some would say that the Indian army reflects the dilemma that the British army faces today. Would it be right to say that Indian army commanders are equally prone to confusing local tactical superiority with operational success? More importantly, is it true that for operational success, Indian army — much like its British counterpart — demands institutional reform? The answers, as well as the process of arriving at those answers, would be an interesting and enriching exercise.
In fact any quality can be put to good or bad use, depending on users inclination and needs. In so far as quality of “cracking on” is concerned it is primarily meant to help a soldier submerge his personal grief or happiness in bigger effort. Gray is wrong to equate it with `action’ in a debate on `action-vs-refelction’. That reflection does not come easy to soldier is due to the pressures of his calling. He has to be oriented to action at all times. Thus the need for the Army to create multiple think-tanks in-house.
Just an aside. Isn’t it time that we outgrew British-phobia. Why cann’t we discuss an issue just because it concerns us.
Good issue. The biggest wonder of indian civilisation is that you still find people who are ‘actually ‘ ready to die for India today. This is amazing and some social scientist must do deep research and find the cause so that this philistine society continues to find such fools. The survival of the Indian civilisation depends on finding such fools.
“Would it be right to say that Indian army commanders are equally prone to confusing local tactical superiority with operational success? ” Please refrain from attributing such serious and futurist thinking to the Indian Army. One point agenda of Indian commander is the next rank given the steepness of the promotional pyramid and the social and financial degredation of not making it to the next rank. Everything else is a bonus. This pyramid one day will undo the forces. Not rational??? Well it has the braodest rational which take care of all minor issue. Yes it is a bit astray but do bear with it
IMHO there is a clear cut distinction between the functions of junior leadership and those of the senior leadership. Unfortunately, it is the tragedy of many organisations that ‘Peter’s principle’ relating to the rise of each man to his level of incompetence plays true.
Let me make a comparison between a sub-sonic and a super-sonic aircraft. The sub-sonic is aerodynamically stable at low speeds and as it tries to attain higher speeds, the coefficient of drag increases. The super-sonic aircraft, on the contrary, is inherently unstable at low speeds but becomes more stable at super-sonic speeds. Of course, we do have exceptions like the Su-30 which can perform equally well in both conditions. But then, that is what a Su-30 is – an exception.
Similarly, we do come across very competent junior leaders who become utter failures at flag ranks. May be, there are people who will be passable junior leaders but may do extraordinarily well at senior levels. But, can the latter stand the strain of climbing a long career ladder without coming into grief along the way?
A friend of mine narrated an interesting story – most probably apocryphal!There was this GOC of a division who was so serious during his tenure commanding platoons that he missed out commanding the division entirely. The justification seems to be that he was denied the opportunity of commanding a platoon since the time he was a young officer that at the first available opportunity he grabbed the chance of commanding a platoon. It is of course unfortunate that the opportunity came to this poor gent so late in life! Are we missing a story here?
Making mistakes is part of growing up and maturing. Unfortunately, those organisations which do not condone mistakes are probably asking for too much when they keep looking for Mr Perfects, that too in large numbers. It is a statistical impossibility to produce so many Mr Perfects and hence one is forced to conclude that among those Perfects there would be a substantial number of fakes.
The problems of senior leadership starts exactly at this issue – the selection system. Any organisation, particularly the Armed Forces which aim to grow, improve and excel needs to have a healthy combination of chandraguptas and chanakyas. It will be a poor organisation which aims only for the former or the latter. We do have a substantial number of chandraguptas but does the organisational culture promote chanakyas? For example, how many of the senior officers would have come across authors likesay Edward De Bono or Taleb ? I have come across many senior officers whose level of literacy and thought is restricted to those books read for promotion exams/staff college, John Masters, the mish-mash produced by several media channels etc. How many read seriously?
It is impossible to do lateral thinking suddenly at the age of 50 but do young lateral thinkers go up the value chain? Is there space for mavericks?
I am not sure that it is correct or fair to compare the strategic thinking based on “careful contemplation” instead of “rearing for action”. Let us first separate the domains under which long-term strategic thinking and short-term to medium-term strategic thinking.
Consider that the civilian leadership in a country like India has access to data in multiple dimensions, military, economic, techonological etc., where as the military is purely looking out for political gains in the short to medium term for the state, under the assumption that the civilian leadership of all contingencies post conflict.
The civilian leadership’s view of strategic thinking must indeed be contemplative since the long-term view is taken and the space in which the govt. operates is along multiple dimensions, military, economic, techonological, etc. The military has far fewer dimensions and only has tools of coercion via force in its hands, and this is deliberate since the military can chalk out short to medium-term strategies required to ensure that the political goals of the civilian leadership are satisfied, both of which work together to push the nation/state’s interest.
I am not sure that it is correct or fair to compare the strategic thinking based on “careful contemplation” instead of “rearing for action”. Let us first separate the domains under which long-term strategic thinking needs to take place and short-term to medium-term strategic thinking needs to occur.
Consider that the civilian leadership in a country like India has access to data in multiple dimensions, military, economic, techonological etc., where as the military is only interested in and has access to tools of physical coercion. The state’s military arm is purely looking out for political gains in the short to medium term for the state, under the assumption that the civilian leadership of all contingencies post conflict.
The civilian leadership’s view of strategic thinking must indeed be contemplative since the long-term view is taken and the space in which the govt. operates is along multiple dimensions, military, economic, techonological, etc. and it needs to make wise decisions to optimize overall usage of resources in all these dimensions.
The military has far fewer dimensions and only has tools of coercion via force in its hands, and this is deliberate since the military can chalk out short to medium-term strategies required to ensure that the political goals of the civilian leadership are satisfied.
It is not the military’s problem to chalk out the post-conflict strategy, which needs to be constructive, but the military needs to be fully aware of the post-conflict strategy in order to make wise decisions in specifying its short- to medium-term strategy for the state.
In the end, the military’s short-term strategies must always reinforce the long-term strategy of the civilian leadership…which of course stresses the imperative need for a strategically-minded leadership that carefully collates and analyzes information from all the dimensions of human activity in which states cooperate and compete.
“which of course stresses the imperative need for a strategically-minded leadership that carefully collates and analyzes information from all the dimensions of human activity in which states cooperate and compete.”
I wanted to add: It is even more important to add that based on the inputs in the various dimensions, to break down “long-term strategy” into specific short-,medium-, and long-term “items” and “sub items”, essentially translating strategy to specific actions that can be committed using the considerable human and material resources in hand by the state (i.e.,government of the day.)
In many case it only helps to have a vague “long-term strategy” that can be used as a general guideline while coming up with short and medium term strategies.
The “long-term strategy/plan” need not be strictly sequential, in the sense that it can be a set of concurrently occurring real events that can be considered “strategy in motion”. It is also possibly correct to say that the more dimensions there are to play with, the more “choices” one has while deliberating one’s actions in creating strategy, which is why technological competence of a state is paramount.
I think people are complaining about my posts. Please delete them. Will stay away from here.
@AlPeri:
Come on. Please feel free to contribute. I’ve personally been subject to much worse abuses. This too shall pass…
@ A. King
“cautious contemplation.”
if works why fix.
Jalianwala Bagh oic sorry on his deathbed. The My Lai officer is on a Yank lecture tour. Money is all. Both made it. Brit procedures better maybe.
@ashok
“such fools”
a deep subject sir. why do some birkenhead, saragarhi and so forth. OROP perhaps urges them on ?
Alagu’s comments deserve a post of their own. I have only a little to write here, gleamed from my line of work. Since the fundamentals are the same, I think the lessons learned there apply here as well.
The government is the parent organisation. The armed forces are akin to a department within that organisation (functional structure). The parent organisation (govt.) is tasked with chalking an overarching strategy for the entire org. -> Grand Strategy.
The greatest number of strategic failures occur when strategies are devised and sought to be implemented without understanding the capabilities of the various arms of the organisation to implement them.
So e.g. when Nehru decided not to involve the IAF during 62, his decision was driven by a lack of awareness of one of his department’s capabilities (in this case the relative capabilities of the IAF vs the PLAAF in that strategic theatre).
The Armed Forces must inculcate the ‘reflective’ thinking in all its ranks. These ranks must be able to visualise scenarios and identify capabilities and gaps. Only then can the men in uniform, the professionals, suitably advise the men in Khadi. Until that happens, the advice will keep coming from the men in safari suits and the professionals will continue to get a shit deal where they have to pull off silver-bullet performances and shed a lot of blood.
This reflective thinking can only be encouraged by allowing and encouraging professionals to write and publish, and open their thoughts to critical review among other professionals and non-professionals alike.
The armed forces do not need specialists in warfare only – they need renaissance men who’re suitably proficient in warfare too. That can only happen if they’re freed from regulations that require them to get permission from the MOD before publishing anything.
My 2 paisa worth.
@Shaunaq
“the advice will keep coming from the men in safari suits.”
Not always Sir,
Random Press reads also show (i) Mr Chetan Bhagat and (ii) Ravi Boothalingam as the latest strategy experts. Getting paid for it too. [RB was a school classfellow 50+ years ago then went into the Hotel Management Stratosphere; always bright so loyally must say he knows. CB ? ARMY Public School, IIT, IIM ,now on Strategy in HT ]
@Shaunak! Not 2 Paisa worth. It is each word in Gold. Wish the forces take your advice .
Shall get in touch
“My 2 paisa worth.”
quibble ji,
naye paise or paise ? anyhow worth more than face value. Please see below.
[1] http://www.rbi.org.in/currency/museum/c-rep.html
[2] http://cgi.ebay.in/12-INDIA-2-PAISE-COINS-1965-1966-1967-1968-1970-TO-1977_W0QQitemZ360152534052QQcmdZViewItemQQptZLH_DefaultDomain_203?hash=item53dac38c24&_trksid=p4634.c0.m14
[3] http://kulraj-the-numismatist.blogspot.com/2009/02/indian-one-paisa-half-paisa.html
if you wander down weekdays, daryaganj, delhi like i do (to buy piranha or goldfish feed) pl, see the coin sellers lhs. The coin with the hole is unpopular for vaastu reasons (which is why the Brits left India); wot to say about half paise coins, see [3]. Buy now.
Indians fought and died in the Boer war (for the Brits).
Indians troops helped Brits carve out Modern Day Iraq Syria. But don’t tell our “young” population. Htey must learn accent training, and java and C++
We are a “nation” of servants.
Lookat our tech parks. 1st world inside. The splendor of serving foreigners is clearly visible. Outside it is ****.
How many IIT engineers does it take to take **** off of the sidewalks and have them level. Answer: Since Inception of IITs the number of engineers produced STILL HAVE NOT MANAGED it.
The people you see around you are not “indians”. THOSE guys died out maybe 700 years ago. RIP.