Pragmatic Euphony  

Deconstructing the major themes in his speech.

The Prime Minister’s speech in Parliament on the Indo-Pak Joint Declaration did little to resolve the contradictions and remove the confusion in everyone’s mind about Pakistan policy of the UPA government. The UPA chairperson, Mrs. Sonia Gandhi has further muddied the waters by suggesting that “till Pakistan shows concrete steps on anti-terror front there is no point of dialogue”. Such minor quibbles apart, Siddharth Varadarajan has gone ahead and predicted that history will see the Prime Minister’s response “as a potential game changer in India’s official discourse on Pakistan”. Siddharth has based his prediction on the four basic themes put forth by the Prime Minister in defence of his actions. Let us deconstruct them one by one.

#1 …his emphasis on the inevitability of engagement…

Engagement might be inevitable, but it is certainly not a fait accompli. This actually translates into a situation of helplessness where irrespective of whatever Pakistan does to us, we have to engage with that country. After all, it is inevitable. But what about a time, place and situation of our choice while taking that decision to engage (and with whom in Pakistan).

#2 …his clarity on the fact that the alternative to dialogue was war…

No one wants a war, unless it is absolutely thrust upon you. But having dialogue just because we are afraid to wage a war — or of its consequences — is not what strong nations indulge in. While the Prime Minister harped many time on Ronald Reagan’s favourite phrase — Trust, but verify — during his speech, he’d do well to remember the words of another former US President, Theodore Roosevelt: Speak softly and carry a big stick, and you will go far.

More importantly, the choice isn’t really that stark — dialogue or war — without having exhausted all the other instruments of state power: diplomatic, economic and military. The main diplomatic instruments available to any country are negotiations, public diploma­cy (including informational, cultural and exchange programmes), international law and organisation, and alliances.  Economic instruments include foreign aid (both economic and military), financial and trade policy, and sanc­tions.  And even the military instrument can be used for persuasive purposes (usually short of combat) before going in for outright warfare.

#3 …his fear that the absence of direct talks with Pakistan would allow foreign powers to get involved in the region to India’s detriment…

Which foreign power is the Prime Minister referring to? Obviously, the United States of America. It won’t be an Haiti or a Congo that would dare to get involved between India and Pakistan. While foreign intervention in the region is not welcome, it is something that could only work to India’s advantage. The examples of withdrawal of Pakistani forces from Kargil or Musharraf’s concessions after Operation Parakram — undertaken by Pakistan at the behest of the United States — demonstrate the advantage that India holds in such negotiations. Some one like Manmohan Singh, who has so adroitly negotiated the Indo-US Nuclear deal and the defence EUMA with the United States, ought to be confident that any foreign involvement would certainly not be to India’s detriment.

#4 …his recognition of the need to strengthen Pakistan’s civilian leaders…

Pakistan army and the ISI continue to be the makers of foreign and defence policy in Pakistan. Manmohan Singh would do well to remember the fate of Nawaz Sharif, merely a few months after signing the Lahore declaration with PM Vajpayee. More dangerously, as The Acorn has pointed out, PM Singh has unwittingly strengthened the hands of a rather hawkish Gilani vis-à-vis a more India-friendly Zardari.

Strengthening the hands of Pakistan’s civilian leaders or bringing democracy to that Islamic Republic is none of our business. We should not try and change the cards we are dealt with but make the best use of our hand. If that means negotiating with — or pressing — the Pakistan army and the ISI over dismantling the terrorist infrastructure in that country, then we should not hesitate to do so. Talking to an ineffectual democratically elected leadership makes little sense when the levers of diplomatic and military power are controlled by those in uniform.

# 5 …Balochistan [Something that Siddharth forgot to mention in his piece.]

The Acorn has already expounded on the Balochistan factor in the joint statement. There is an additional point about Pakistan’s gloating over Indian ’support’ to ‘freedom-fighters’ in Balochistan. It allows Pakistani state and intelligentsia to avoid the real debate about the role of Islam in Pakistan and how Islamic the state should be. If the militants fighting the Pakistani state are not warriors of ‘real’ Islam but merely Indian agents, it is far easier for the state to justify the fight. And this even helps a Brigade Commander in Pakistan army to easily motivate his troops to join the battle against the Taliban. Lest we forget, it doesn’t help India — even in a counter-intuitive manner — because it only reinforces the image of India as an arch enemy of Pakistan and its citizens.

Manmohan Singh is a mild-mannered, patriarchal figure with a professorial demeanour. His track record as a Finance Minister, and as a Prime Minister on the Indo-US nuclear deal, has earned him this nation’s trust. This trust — along with the backing of Mrs. Sonia Gandhi — has probably given him the confidence to go for the jugular here. He would do well to remember that more illustrious leaders in India, before him, have foolishly trusted India’s neighbours and realised, to their chagrin, that history doesn’t remember them all that kindly now. Nehru, with his China policy, is a case  in point. By any stretch of imagination, this is a huge leap of faith by the Prime Minister. The consequences of its failure will be borne not only by him, but also by this nation.

Thus there is only one thing that the nation can do when it comes to Manmohan Singh (and his Pakistan policy): Trust[him], but verify[his actions].