[This guest-post by BeeCee is on a very topical subject, something very close to this blogger's heart. When many retired generals, admirals and air-marshals lament about a lack of jointness and political dithering over creation of a Chief of Defence Staff, this is a contrarian -- and dare I say -- a more prudent view.]
There have been recent statements in the media about some progress being made towards the creation of a CDS in India. If one were to read the opinions of many serving personnel and ESMs in blogs and other media, there appears to be a pervasive sense that the CDS is the panacea to many of the problems plaguing the rarified airs of Higher Defence Organisation. (Notwithstanding Pragmatic’s assertion that it be treated only as a beginning, in his posts a while ago). I have even more fundamental doubts and believe it will do the Services and the country some good if the Armed Forces Community takes a step back rather than rush in, ‘eyes wide shut’ into this, as they did to the CPC.
Wide ranging internal debate, even if alien to the organizational ethos, may be necessary to avoid being organised into irrelevance. If not at the Staff or Operations levels, they must at least discuss it threadbare at the training institutions: from DSSC to NDC. If past experience is any indication, discussions at apex levels often lead to self promotion and turf issues taking precedence over larger issues.
Admittedly, this is a lengthy subject — much blogged — including calls for a Blue Ribbon Commission. I am neutral towards both Blue Ribbon Commission and CDS, but believe incremental changes with clear demarcation of responsibilities and greater levels of accountability may be a better approach. A few pointers to the international experience and to our two reports on the subject should be enough to raise some questions that could be discussed. A reading of the earlier posts by Pragmatic on the subject could help those unaware of the post-Kargil report. Much less information seems to be available of the Committee on Defence Expenditure [CDE] report.
CDS – The International Experience
Major international militaries having the CDS model are the UK, France and Australia. In the neighbourhood, Sri Lanka has one, with powers modified very recently. Others like the US have the Joint Chiefs/ COS Committee model. Traditionally, there was almost a clear-cut command/ staff difference between the two models. Of late, the differences have become more nebulous with each country defining it to suit their specific circumstances.
The only major conflict in which a CDS was to have been involved was the Falklands conflict in 1982. There were reports at the time that the CDS’ staff assessment was that the islands couldn’t be retaken, but Mrs. Margaret Thatcher went ahead on the advice of the First Sea Lord, Admiral Henry Leach and won the war. The CDS, also a naval officer, Admiral of the Fleet Terence Lewin had a lesser role. His being in New Zealand at the crucial time also led to some unkind comments.
I may have missed something somewhere, but haven’t yet heard of a CDS winning a war anywhere.
Studies in India
One is aware of two reports that addressed the issue, the Committee on Defence Expenditure Report of 1993 and the post-Kargil GOM report. Interestingly, both were steered by Mr. Arun Singh. The CDE report of 93 was admittedly limited in scope and little information on that is available in the public space. It may be worthwhile to bring it into the public domain for some examination. More importantly, the 1993 report reportedly recommended the creation of a Vice-Chief of Defence Staff as the Defence Secretary’s effective counterpart in the Service HQs, whereas the post-Kargil report effectively recommends the creation of a CDS and elevation of the Defence Secretary to a position above the CDS. I am curious to know what changed between the two reports to merit such drastic changes in hierarchical positions.
Unified Commands/ Joint Operations
The major operations of WW II as well as many of the expeditionary wars since then, have demonstrated the need for joint operations. This is not contested. But I suspect that too many limited operations are now being made ‘joint’ just so that everyone can have a piece of the action. A military version of Parkinson’s Law – operations expanding to keep available staff officers occupied. Major wars are hard to come by these days. Any opportunity to display perceived combat skills, or even better, to direct it from a safe distance, will be seized with alacrity.
One consequence of this approach is the escalation in costs of converting every operation into a joint one. The less tangible part is the tendency to overlook the fact that individual Services are the products of the environments in which they operate and the working ethos that comes of it. Admiral William Fallon would have been a perfectly competent CINCPAC, but as the first naval officer to command the land-centric CENTCOM, he did not seem to fit in. Differences with the Bush administration on Iran or alleged discomfort with his deputy, the high profile General Petraeus may merely have aggravated it.
Entrusting the responsibility to the one most familiar with the environment, with others in a supporting role, may be the better option in many cases, when the shooting match starts.
The irony for us is that on the one hand there is a push for tri-service action while on the other, we under cut joint training at the NDA, by the Navy opting out of a part of it. On the other hand, the rotational appointment of C-in-C Andaman Nicobar Command may have done no harm for Tsunami or earth quake relief, but what happens in a maritime environment in the fog of war may not be everyone’s cup of tea.
Allocation of Responsibilities
As seen from international experience, the designation or protocol is much less important than the duties and responsibilities assigned. Surprisingly, the post Kargil report makes no reference to the ‘Rules of Business of GOI’ or to the ‘Manual of Office Procedure’, both relevant to the allocation of such duties and responsibilities. With the result, the Joint Staff and individual Service HQs have since been jostling for space or to hold on to what each had. Little has moved from the DefSec to the CISC.
Of course the other interesting part of the report, much less commented upon, is the ‘elevation’ in the role of the Defence Secretary. In keeping with the colonial hangover, the roles of CDS and DefSec were borrowed from UK. The CDS, as in the UK, is recommended to be the ‘Principal Military Advisor’, but the DefSec’s role from being the ‘Principal Civilian Advisor on Defence’(as in the UK) has been enlarged as ‘The Principal Defence Advisor’, implicitly placing him above CDS. Another key aspect that seems to be missing in comparison to the UK model is that there is no mention of the Chiefs of Staff and CDS having direct access to the PM.
While the UK model may or may not be suitable, an explanation for the changes made from the chosen model as well as reasons for not including the Service HQs in the Rules of Business/ Manual of Office Procedure could be enlightening.
Perhaps formal direct allocation (rather than whimsical delegation by MOD) of responsibilities/ accountability to the Service HQs and CISC(as applicable to other arms of the government) may be a better option in our circumstances.
Also, all UK reorganisations in the recent past have been to cater for a diminishing role in world affairs. Is that the route India wants to take now ?
Editor’s Note – Here is what K Subrahmanyam had to say about the institution of CDS in the Indian context:
Now there is talk about the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) model. It pains me to hear this. The British adopted the CDS system, as they would never fight a war on their own. CDS is not an institution for us. Ours should be the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staffs and theatre commands below him.
The vested interests of the entrenched bureaucracy in the country are perhaps far stronger than is generally realised. So whether it is setting up of the office of CDS or defence reforms, those are unlikely to see the light of the day anytime soon.
Coming to the specific aspect of the desirability of having a CDS or a Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, nothing is liely to work unless a detailed blueprint is drawn up after open debate within the strategic community, such as there is, within the country. Creation of Defence Planning Staff in mid 80′s and CIDS in early 2000′s and their inability to contribute in any meaningful manner should warn us of the dangers of rushing in to set up offices/create posts/organisations without adequate thought and preparation.
And that the malaise is wider and deeper can be seen from the knee-jerk reactions to 26/11 in Bombay. One is fearful that heavens forbid, were another such event to take place, similar consequences may well be seen. Because unless bureaucratic and political accountability is built into the system, we would keep on wasting our time. One fears that the words of Mr Guruswamy- said in a presntation at DSSC- that India may miss the bus of demographic dividend like Indonesia did in 60′s, may come true unless a shake up of the entire entrenched system is undertaken.
But who will bell the cat? Not the government under Mr. Manmohan Singh because he is a bureaucrat turned politician-the most dangerous of the breed.
Regret this apparently rambling post but it sums up one’s disillusionment with the way the things are going in this country.
We need not have to take any example of any country,and consider for our purpose whether it will serve or not.No country will have a bureocracy as much prejudicial as that of Indian bureocracy.The Indian bureocracy intentionally,and purposefully saw that Armed forces are subjected to degradation in status and pay.See what happend in scpc.They not only disobeyed the orders of Defence Minister,they tried to twist the scpc recommendations to the disadvantage of armed forces in the recommendations of Committee of secretaries. Armed forces were never made party to any discussions after a war was won by them.It is pathatic to see all advantages and leverages are just surrendered to the enemy,at negotiting table.This will not happen if CDS is appointed and made to be part of negotiations.The defence secretary need not be upgraded to a higher level.As on now also he is junior to the chiefs.Let the interactions between armed forces and the elected representatives be through the Armed forces only(CDS).Appointment of CDS will sort out a lot of burning issues with Government,since the interacion is direct.While three Chiefs are directly responsible for planning and executing Field operations,the CDS can be responsible to equip the armed forces with latest weapons and equipment and ensuring the over all strategy in consulting with the three Chiefs and the elected Government. There should not be any dominance and interfering of civilian bureocrats in Military matters which they are unaware of. The defence secretary should be restricted to the welfare activities,of armed forces like redressal of grieviences,civilians welfare pay and allowances,civilian’s descipline.On the issue of seperate pay commission to the armed forces, people must be happy, I am sure, but when it happens, the commission will be full of bureocracy and no representative will be there from armed forces.CDS may stop such things happening.
Trust the Brits to get it right. Recall them ?
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/theroyalfamily/5921925/Queen-snubs-Bermudas-400th-anniversary.html
Dr Brown, a Black nationalist, left Bermuda at the weekend to go on holiday, a government spokesman said, insisting that the timing was just a coincidence…. right on/
My response to Bee Cee’s post is both supportive and critical. Supportive part first. I totally agree with Bee Cee that creation of CDS India without correctly defining his relationship with the entrenched civilian bureaucracy (headed by Def Secy) would be counter productive because the Kargil Report, which was essentially written by Mr K Subrahmanyam (a retired Joint Secretary) has in a very ingenious manner (reminiscent of working of HM Patel post 1947) recommended huge increase in the powers of Def Secy without ascribing any reasons thereto. Hence Bee Cee is right that we need to rewrite the Rules of Business of GOI’ and the ‘Manual of Office Procedure’ to bring balance in civil-military realtions before tinkering with existing system.
Now the points of difference. I totally disagree that CDS is not going to contribute towards operational success. Bee cee cites the UK example where the incumbent CDS made wrong assessment of outcome of Falkland war and Ms Thacher was right in rejecting his advise. I can cite numerous examples to the contrary. First the German General Staff opposed Hitlers plans to initiate WW II. Hitler rejected them and had initial successes. But ultimately Germany as a nation paid for his follies. Even in case of India the present system where is the wars are managed by some opaque method, none of the conflict has resulted in outright victroy exepct the 1971 War when Sam was de facto C-in-C. So here is the valid reason for introducing C-in-C system.
@ Yogi
Though the title may have been made to draw attention, I am neutral to the idea of a CDS as explained in the post. As you too have rightly said, it is ‘what he is entrusted with’ that makes or breaks the orgn.
To be fair to Mr. Subramaniam, I think he has given his rationale for his line of thought. We may agree or disagree, but his ‘ having been a Jt. secy has little to do with it’. My guess as a reader. Don’t know him personally. Also he was only one, there were Serving offrs/ Veterans in the study group. What was their opinion?
The German example may be incorrect. Hitler overruled his Generals with the ‘ Hitler Plan’. Military historians have since identified it as the ‘Manstein Plan’ to which Hitler put his stamp. I don’t kow if our colleges sufficiently study Field Marshall Manstein, accepted as the most brilliant General on either side of the war. He was also known to be barely tolerant of fools even those above him, including Hitler.
The theatre command also may be ok, my point is that the Theatre Commander should be familiar with the environment, not somebody parachuted in because it was his turn in a rotational division of spoils. Sam’s is a good example, but would 1971 have worked as well if ACM Lal or ADM Nanda(Not doubting the professional competence of either) were given overall charge. I don’t know, but do we need to experiment with such high stakes.
My point is merely this. Don’t throw away what you have without sufficient study of the alternatives.
@ Bee Cee 31 Jul 09. I mentioned the stand off between Hitler not about plan for invasion of France but fundamental differences about the `integration of German majority of Polish areas’ buy Hitler in the Year 1939 which ultimately led to WWII. The General Staff had opposed the venture.
In so far as Mr Subramaniam is concertned let me quote only one of his many utterances. I quote `The tenure system of appointment to senior positions in the armed forces and the comparatively rapid movement of officers through the senior ranks were designed to avert the development of any Bonapartist tendencies or warlordism among the senior officers.’ That is ‘K. Subrahmanyam, Commentary: Evolution of Defense Planning in India, ed. Stephanie G. Neuman, Defense Planning in Les-Industrialized States, Lexington Books, Toronto, Canada, pp 266.
Sir, I think we need to push for a system of Theater Commanders conducting operations under C-in-C with forces specifically placed under command for particular operations, while the Defence Minister manages (training and administration) Services through resepctive Chiefs.
@ Yogi
Point taken. Guess my thoughts on Manstein got the better of me.
Anyway, my point on Falklands was of the Political head making an informed choice between the advices of two equally qualified professionals, but with differing institutional support systems. In this case she seems to have made the right choice.
Also the theatre command model you refer to seems to be closer to the US JCS model rather than the usual CDS model. I don’t have a problem with that either.
My issue is fundamentally two-fold. One, we need to grow out of the tendency of rushing into serious matters without adequate intellectual application. Two, in a complex world, those well-informed(induvidual or institution) on the issue at hand must take precedence over generalists and amateurs.
Bee Cee@ 1 Aug
I agree. Let us go to your blog