Russian military reform
Lessons for India from dismissal of senior Russian military officials failing aptitude test.
Via Joshua Keating [HT: The Acorn] from RIA Novosti comes the story of reform of Russian military. It involves discharging a large number of senior military officials for failing an unplanned aptitude test.
A large number of senior Russian military officials are to be discharged over a failure to pass an aptitude test, Deputy Defense Minister Nikolai Pankov said on Tuesday.
“We are not going to keep officers who are not fit for their positions,” Gen. Pankov told journalists, as reports indicated around one-fifth of officers had failed the military aptitude test. “The Defense Ministry took a decision to carry out unplanned tests among officers and NCOs. A considerable number of senior officers have proved inapt and will be dismissed from the Armed Forces,” he added.
Pankov said 85% of senior military officials had taken the test so far. He said 50 generals and other people occupying senior positions would be dismissed from the Armed Forces. He also said 133 officials would be reshuffled.
The Defense Ministry plans to cut 130,000 Armed Forces personnel, bringing numbers down to 1 million by 2016 as part of a military reform launched under former president and current Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. The Soviet Armed Forces amounted to 4.5 million personnel in the late 1980s.[RIA Novosti]
Reform is a touchy issue in most organisations. In a close-knit organisation like the military, where the costs of failure are often irreversibly catastrophic, it is an even more touchier and trickier issue to tackle. Like individuals, organisations can also settle into a comfort zone and be lulled into a sense of complacency, based on their past records. It needs boldness of vision and some painful decisions to prepare a military for the wars of the future. Now, here is the former premier communist nation realising that you can’t make an omelette without breaking eggs.
The debate over military reform in India is visible only by its absence. And the little bits about the subject that are expounded upon, never get beyond castigating — and rightly so — the lethargic politico-bureaucratic decision making mechanisms in the defence ministry. The other aspect of reforms that also gets some attention is either the need for greater defence spending or lamentations over the unutilised defence expenditure. The need for an optimally manned armed forces, lean (not bulging at the middle and now also at the top — after the AVSC-2 — as is the case with the Indian defence services) and accountability is missing. In any case, it has become fashionable to dismiss the need for a leaner, meaner armed forces by invoking the Rumsfieldian example. However, these defenders of the status quo ignore the differences — in military technology, socio-cultural context, organisational ethos, role of the armed forces and future challenges — between the US and the Indian armed forces.
Are Indian armed forces even adept at 4GW, forget the 5GW, or are they still preparing to fight an industrial age war of the second world war vintage? What is the right balance between commitments for COIN and conventional operations for the Indian army? Should the Navy and IAF gear themselves — in equipping and doctrine — for OOA and expeditionary operations? Has there been a cost-benefit analysis for committing Indian troops and resources — alongside soldiers from other impoverished third-world countries — in UN peacekeeping operations? Where are the plans to counter and challenge the rising Chinese military might? Or is Indian armed forces’ obsession with Pakistan, while ignoring China, going to be as fatal as Pakistan army’s obsession with India, even when Taliban are at the gates of Islamabad? Why are the Indian armed forces still limiting their role to the immediate neighbourhood in their planning, whereas the changed geopolitical dynamics — since the end of the Cold War and post 9-11 — demands a more active role from the Indian defence services in the extended neighbourhood?
These are some off-the-cuff questions that the Indian defence establishment needs to honestly answer — in broad terms at least, if not in specific terms — to trigger a rethink over the way the Indian defence services are structured, trained and employed to fight the wars of the future. The related questions about the organisational effectiveness of the services being impinged upon by an archaic working culture, feudal mindset and a colonial hangover will also need to be tackled. Eventually, it is about getting the bang for the buck, after it has been identified what is the bang that this nation wants from its armed forces.



For the uninitiated – 4GW is “modern insurgency” and 5GW seems more about selling books and getting invited to deliver lectures.
Regardless of jargon – the points made by Pragmatic are valid. We do need vision and constructive restructuring to improve.
If John jumps into a well ,should Ram/Rahim also do so ? The fact that needs to be established is , why do the russians need reforms ? How many officers so culled are part of the “Political commisar” which was a part of the erstwhile “Soviet” Military ? How many such officers are cooks , painters , Washermen , dancers etc etc since the communist armies had a tendency to make officers out of cooks etc . and even now do so , see the chinese example !! So , a blanket aping of some event in a european/Foreign country should not be desirable , No ?
Sir,I am not aware of the qualifications and or of expereince of the writer about defence. In India armed forces are the only organisation which is not only trained but tested regularly unlike any other service in India. From the Jargan used by the writer, it seems that he belongs to the cerquit of Seminar hoppers who are only interested in presenting their own paper but lesat interested in listening to any one else. The ills mentioned by him are due to the controls exersised by the babus of MOD who are least trained about the defence matters. There is the need for specilists to be the decision makers not the IAS generlists who hop from irregation to health to defence and so on.
There is urgent need for higher echolon of Army to discard pomp and show and routhlessly deal with curruption and wastage. Fuedelism and false preistage should be curbed to a great extent. Care and love returns loyalty and respect.Bossism and authority returns fear and hatred. The soldiers are well educated, they should be handled properly, not routhlessly. We have the best soldiers in the world, we should treat them tenderly but train them thoroughly. Good luck. Jai Hind . I D
On reading this post, I was reminded of “Red Storm Rising” (Tom Clancy) in which, an almost identical event was the precursor to a NATO-WARPAC war. This one may not result in a similar disaster but considering the immense flux that Russia finds itself in these days and with its heightened tensions with NATO, it might be one more sign of Russia’s new, post Georgia assertive stance. Good for them. About time a new pole emerged to prevent the world from precessing about its centre like a tumbled gimbal. Kharasho.
@Prags,
Why, but oh why do you have to get in that, by now, PE’s ubiquitous phrase -archaic working culture, feudal mindset and a colonial hangover – whenever you criticize the Indian armed forces( may I abbreviate it to AF for the singular and plural both)? Really, most of your critiques about the AF are rational and sensible, if lacking in providing solutions to problems. But the moment you use this phrase, you reveal, if I may, your relative ignorance about the AF’ environment and more tragically, considering the otherwise excellence of this blog, the underlying bias against the AF. I am a member of the AF but have never been part of the back-slapping pro-fauj jingoism. Neither am I an AF basher. I know the merits AND the demerits of the AF pretty well by now. The work culture is a unique mix of Brit and Indian military ethos (the pros and cons both). But a feudal mindset ? A colonial hangover? I have not understood as to exactly where these two phenomena are to be observed; Hodson’s Horse type of examples a la Gen Sinha(great man, full respects) are correct in context but not all encompassing. I will write a detailed remark later; I feel very strongly about this issue and will be grateful if you will allow me the space for it.
The AF must work to reduce the flab and atrophy (conceptual, mental and physical) before the sheer weight of circumstance forces them to do so. Regulations prevent me from further amplification/recommendations but, God, a complete overhaul is needed by this organization like a renal dialysis patient needs a donor: he can carry on with the tubes but it is a mixed bag: the tubes are keeping him alive but are also slowly killing him. The permanent cure has to be a new kidney. A Blue Riband Commission (colonial feudal throwback, Prags?;-)) whatever one calls it. I don’t know about the civilian composition of such a project but a good reading of ” Crisis in Command” by Gabriel and Savage and more importantly, its recommendations should be able to guide the convening authority about the military component.
@ Col ID Sharma, Rem No 3
The very least, absolutely the very least , sir,( and mind you, here the epithet of “sir” signifies adherence to norms and customs rather than a military “sir”) would be for you to check for typos before allowing your POV to go out the way it has. Every single net enabled person on Earth will be able to see your comment and derive his/her conclusions about the intellectual plane of the writer. And considering that the vast majority of Indians are not exactly aware of the Army, well, I am sure that YOU will be able to arrive at THEIR conclusions and the deductions thereof. Remember FM Cariappa’s Aide Memoire for YOs, specially the bit about trusting one’s clerks? Solution: simply enable spell check in your browser. If you are on IE/Opera/Chrome, I suggest you try Firefox. Get it for free at http://www.mozilla.com/firefox. You will not regret it. About your contents. The direction is correct, you may ponder using more than one compass and many more pacers and recorders for your route chart(as per SOP?)
@ Amit Rem No 2
Bang on, old chap!
Col ID’s msg is clean, clear. Mathew Gloag and son e/affects if any ignore.
[...] the industrial-age armed forces of a welfare state undergo reform and restructuring, the pain is felt by the large number of officers made redundant by the exercise. [...]