Selling “A collapsing Pakistan”

Pakistan’s strategic assault on Obama administration.

John Kerry and Atlantic Council Chairman Chuck Hagel, the co-chairs of the Council’s Pakistan Task Force will release its report on Pakistan — Needed: A Comprehensive U.S. Policy Towards Pakistan — later today. The report:

…calls for an additional $4-5 billion dollars of immediate financial aid for Pakistan to avert an economic meltdown and suggests that Pakistan has the ability to alter its destiny, given this support. If the US and its Atlantic partners do not provide Pakistan with this assistance, the country may be placed on a downward trajectory whose consequences will be dire.

There is nothing new about this Pakistani “holding a gun to my head” approach. But the timing of the release of this report is significant. The White House has ordered as 60-day review of AfPak under Bruce Riedel, while the exhaustive study on the region ordered by General Petraeus is also in progress now.

Meanwhile NYT comes out with a report from Islamabad highlighting the dangers posed by Al Qaeda and how it continues to be a threat. It conveniently misses out on the Taliban – Al Qaeda connection, which tends to convey the impression that the real threat to the US is posed by Al Qaeda and not Taliban. While the heavyweight Pakistani delegation, comprising the Foreign minister, army chief and head of ISI among others, is meeting the officials in the Pentagon and the State department, the Taliban has displayed its large-heartedness by agreeing to an indefinite ceasefire in Swat.

Earlier this month, Richard Holbrooke had clearly identified the two opposing points of view in the Obama administration on trusting the Pak army-ISI to deliver against their own jehadi Frankenstein’s monster. All these indicators now point to a concerted lobbying offensive by the Pakistani establishment to influence Obama administration’s policy over Pakistan: to get more money, conventional military equipment and eventually try for a peaceful settlement with the “good” Taliban, that is, the Taliban that is good for certain sections of the Pakistani establishment.

More than the Zardari government, it is in the interest of the Pakistani army that some kind of negotiated settlement is reached with Taliban. It would not only prevent the sheen going off the myth of professional competence of the most hallowed institution in Pakistan and salvage the Pakistan army’s image; it would  also allow the GHQ to hedge the Taliban as an strategic asset against Afghanistan and India, while placating the increasingly radical rank and file of the Pakistan army by restoring the religious-ideological cord between the Pak army and the jehadis.

Needless to say, it would be a grave mistake on part of the US to differentiate between various types of jehadis and negotiate with “good”  Taliban as a long-term strategy. Even if the US actually negotiates with Taliban for short-term gains (say, a peaceful Presidential elections in Afghanistan), it might only end up emboldening and strengthening the jehadis further. This will entail a greater and bloodier effort when the fight to the finish between the multinational forces and the jehadis actually begins.

Pakistan has clearly demonstrated where it stands in this debate over US policy in the region. An Indian delegation is supposed to be visiting Washington next month. One hopes that they display a similar clarity of thought and steadfastness of purpose while making India’s case about the US policy in AfPak.

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8 Responses to Selling “A collapsing Pakistan”

  1. Kaps February 25, 2009 at 8:20 pm #

    Whatever the Indian response or thought process, it has to be guided by one single idea; that Pakistani society is deeply Islamicised and what connotations such deep religious belief holds. Some pointers in this direction is the appearance of Pakistan cricket team. A team earlier epitomized by such icons as Imran Khan, is today a deeply religious outfit with some players even changing appearance to look the part.

    As far as understanding Pakistan is concerned, it is amply demonstrated in this article

    …..even after 61 years, the Indian policy establishment does not really understand Pakistan….. (Link)

    Filling the Pakistani coffers is like providing money to a drug addict who is not even willing to accept that he is an addict, leave alone going to rehab. Taliban has tasted the money-power and will stop at nothing to get more and more of it. Swat is only the beginning and Zardari-Gilani-Kayani troika will not be able to comprehend the situation when soon, either Osama or Obama come knocking.

  2. Venkat February 26, 2009 at 12:08 am #

    JNU naivety in naked display

    Pakistan: need for smart diplomacy
    by Amitabh Mattoo and Happymon Jacob who are Professors at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University

    Quote >> Finally, and unlikely as it seems today, there still exists a possibility of a Friendly Pakistan. It would be rooted in Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s original design for the state: Muslim, Moderate and Modern. It is this Pakistan that an Indian grand strategy must systematically work towards constructing.

    Why do these JNU juntas always want to legitimize Jinnah and his demand for a separate Muslim state? How do they know Jinnah wanted it to be moderate and modern? Was it because he consumed pork and wore western clothes?

    More bulls*it follows:
    Quote >> India’s grand strategy, we argue, should include a careful application of moral, political and soft power resources; multilayered employment of diplomacy, communication and smart power; and sophisticated coordination of global, regional, bilateral and domestic means to engage Pakistan.

    HOW??? If we construct such complex sentences with fancy words, will the problem be solved?? No mention of military among the “moral, political and soft power resources” typical commie style who hate Indian military but are ok with Chinese or Pakistani aggression or nuclear proliferation!!
    “Domestic means” – does that include civilian artists travelling across borders and Mahesh Bhatt’s emotional pep talks in “We The People”??!!

    Some more

    Quote >> This grand strategic approach to dealing with Pakistan is in no way exhaustive, but we hope that it will be a step towards realizing that complex problems can be addressed only in a comprehensive manner.

    LOL. Was there any strategy in this article, which appears to have been written purely for consumption of The Hindu commie masses?
    [N Ram - Red salute comrades, can you guys write an article for tomorrow's edition. I need to fill some spaces.
    Intellectuals - Lal Salaam, will send some crap in a few minutes!!]

    Given the fact that The Hindu [and to some extent JNU] are close to state organs and apparatus, would such articles mean something to the Indian public?
    GOI should stop funding JNU ;)

  3. Sanjay February 26, 2009 at 3:00 pm #

    I think you need to move beyond just looking at “the Pakistani lobby” and also see the wider sympathetic/supporting voices coming from the Atlanticist/Euro-leaning lobby in the USA(aka “Wilsonians”). These people feel that Pakistan has always been a crucial American lever in the “Eurasian Balkans” (aka. Central Asia), to apply vital pressure against Moscow. Therefore their inclination is to view jihadism in Pakistan is a vital asset that must be protected, not eliminated. If you peruse the journals and writers of the Atlanticist community — and I do — you’ll see their thought trend at work. To simply see a “magically hyperefficient” Pakistan lobby in Washington is completely naive. You have to notice the wider entrenched interest bloc lending them support.

  4. Kimberley February 27, 2009 at 10:30 am #

    Dearest Venkat,

    A couple of quick points; I’ll try not to use “complex sentences and fancy words”, as I don’t want to confuse you. You asked some interesting questions. Let me see if I can answer them for you. I’d hate for you to remain in the dark.

    Q1: “How do they know Jinnah wanted it to be moderate and modern? Was it because he consumed pork and wore western clothes?”
    This is an easy one. Please see Jinnah’s policy speech of 11 August 1947. Wikipedia (a nice, straight forward website for you) has a lovely exert. Allow me to quote:
    “You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place or worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the State.” … Quite modern and moderate wouldn’t you agree? Probably not antiquated, backward and fundamentalist. No. So though his dietary habits and fashion sense are interesting, they are probably not what Professors Jacob and Mattoo were getting at…

    Q2: “If we construct such complex sentences with fancy words, will the problem be solved?”
    Perhaps and perhaps not. But sentences that actually articulate a coherent point of view are useful when expressing ideas. Banging your fists against your chest and making crude grunting noises is far less effective. Words are a powerful weapon. You are obviously aware of this given that you responded to this blog using the power of the written word…bravo…

    Q3: This actually wasn’t a question of yours, but you do mention the omission of military means in the article (“typical commie style”). Unfortunately I think you’ve missed the (glaringly obvious?) point: the authors are proposing alternative means of action.

    Q4: “Domestic means” – does that include civilian artists traveling across borders and Mahesh Bhatt’s emotional pep talks in “We The People”??!!”
    Maybe, this is called ‘cultural diplomacy’; it’s a surprisingly successful tool when used in conjunction with other types of diplomacy. Google it. Maybe it also means mobilizing the enlightened domestic audiences of both nations (you may have heard of them? I’m not sure…) to work toward establishing a measured discourse and an acceptance of each other, in every sense of the word.

    Q5: “Was there any strategy in this article, which appears to have been written purely for consumption of The Hindu commie masses?”
    Did you perhaps only read the first part of the article? If you had actually perused the whole thing you may have noticed the (quite specific) final paragraph: Indian grand strategy. In it, the authors discuss key ideas like a more positive engagement with international and regional coalitions, a more nuanced bilateral relationship, and using South Asia’s traditionally more liberal style of Islam.

    I hope this has helped clarify a few things for you Venkat. All the best.

  5. Kaps February 27, 2009 at 3:26 pm #

    I heard the news about Qureshi asking the US for drones. This story in India Today unravels a lot of plot on how Pakis are thinking.

    They simply want to ape the formula they used against Soviets and get hardware for themselves to be used we know where. Propping up an 80 year old Sufi Mohammed against his son in law Fazalullah is tactically a good move but does it stop the hard liners from concentrating their strength? It is python against anaconda if you ask me. Both of them will eventually get together and will be only too dangerous for the common populace.

  6. Venkat February 27, 2009 at 5:17 pm #

    Dear Kimberley

    Thanks for all your points. Quite interesting to read!

    I still don’t see any grand strategy [in that article]. After 60 years, we are still talking of grand strategy, cultural diplomacy, using dialogue as a powerful weapon, non-military options – ALL to control a rogue state [I am sure you won't agree with me!!] which has collapsed politically, economically and socially!! Even after all artist exchanges and pep talks, majority Pakistanis rallied behind Pakistan Army after it raised war-mongering cries saying India would attack it anytime – while Talibans were carefully charting takeover plans in SWAT. Whose blame is it anyway? I don’t understand why a “grand strategy” doesn’t include a military option? I don’t want invasion, but why no mention of covert operations or attack on militant camps? Is there any recommendation in the article on how to control militant camps and state support for such militancy?

    I don’t offer any strategy since I am an aam admi but I look forward to “intellectuals and experts” for solutions but when they disappoint me, I have to express my disappointment.

    I have to admit that my response to that article may not have been this rude had it been from someone outside JNU and in some other paper but The Hindu :)

  7. Sandeep February 28, 2009 at 7:49 am #

    @ Venkat and Kimberley

    I want to throw my hat in the ring too.

    First Kimberley is an interesting name. I used to have a Boss by that name and she was a pain in the ass. I hope u r not a pain.

    Secondly, JNU prof, University profs, politicians and military men on both sides are good at theorising (this is a new word). But ultimately South Asian situation is such that God alone takes the decision. Now whether Pak goes Taliban way, or the asses Jihadis get a foothold, bottom line is take cover.

    Thirdly, no one in India, much less the MEA guys have any time or capacity to influence what goes on where.
    Boss, when the GoI can not control – what goes on inside, how will u control what goes on outside.
    Lastly, these articles are written to get points for Academic excellence and to signify that Mattoo Sahab is alive and kicking. Neither are they practical, nor any one takes them seriously.
    Unnecessarily, u are getting hyper.

  8. Venkat February 28, 2009 at 12:00 pm #

    Sandeep

    Apart from the goal of getting some academic brownie points, I detest The Hindu’s cunning misuse of media for generating public opinion in favour of what they perceive as “liberal, modern and secular” – include NDTV, IBN etc also in this gang.

    I know a lot of people who take The Hindu’s articles and opinions as gospels. I am disappointed this newspaper is misusing that vulnerability by publishing such zilch-value articles.

    And I agree with your point. GOI cannot take decisions which impact inside India as such so I don’t see much light in GOI taking decisions to act across borders!!! Is this a perennial problem of GOI or only of this particular coalition rag-tags?

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