We are all hawkish now
Think through. Bolder options. Rich dividends.
In today’s Indian Express, Professor C Raja Mohan charts out the course for Indian engagement with Obama administration over AfPak, to coincide with Richard Holbrooke’s visit to Delhi starting today. Two points from his prescription merit special attention. The first one.
Short of sending troops, New Delhi can to contribute in a variety of other ways to stabilise Afghanistan — from large- scale training of armed forces to assistance in the creation of an Afghan air force, from supplying non-lethal military equipment to sending volunteers for local reconstruction in Afghan provinces. Instead of begging its feckless European allies for small, symbolic and ineffective contributions, the US could find in India a valuable partner to devising credible security structures for Afghanistan.
The Telegraph [HT: Nitin] reports that it was this threat of greater Indian involvement in Afghanistan that led Pakistan to acknowledge that the terror attacks originated from Pakistani soil.
Qureshi’s unexplained reference to “irreconcilable elements” is said to be an effort by Holbrooke to hold Zardari to account on his statement to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New York last September that Pakistan would not object to Indian presence in Afghanistan if it is for stabilising that country.
India has so far made no public mention of Zardari’s remarks to Singh, but it is clear that New Delhi briefed Washington on the New York talks between the two leaders. It is most likely that Zardari did not mean what he said, but was trying to better the atmosphere at his meeting with Singh: Benazir Bhutto’s widower is famous for such tactics.
What Zardari told Singh will be red rag to the Army General Headquarters in Rawalpindi, but Holbrooke appears to have used it to get the Pakistani President where he wants him to be in order to secure concessions and easing tension with India. Sources here said the attack on Mumbai figured only in passing in talks between Holbrooke and Pakistani leaders, but the US envoy made it plain that he was not averse to greater Indian activism in Afghanistan as Zardari proposed and also in association with Nato.
This is the impact of merely some suggestions being made about increased Indian involvement in Afghanistan. Imagine, if India were to boldly enunciate a policy of sending its troops to Afghanistan. The reasons are self-explanatory and were well-articulated by the Pragati and INI team in this proposal in August 2008. Afghanistan desperately needs more soldiers on the ground and India has the numbers. It is disappointing that the idea of Indian troops being relocated from toothless UN peacekeeping missions to Afghanistan has not even been considered. The move of specialist counterinsurgency force — Rashtriya Rifles units and headquarters — out of J&K could have been easily anticipated by Indian government. Alas, all this when Indian armed forces boast of greater experience in COIN operations than any other armed force on this planet, and would be ideally suited for similar operations in Afghanistan.
This points towards the larger malaise gripping the policy makers (and analysts) on Indian foreign policy and national security. The Indian diplomatic and security policies are reactive, responding to events — whether it be the attack on Parliament or Mumbai terror attacks — hoping for fortuitous circumstances to succeed. It should not need a Mumbai terror attack to expose the real face of Pakistani military-jehadi complex to the Indian government and security analysts. Now it seems — to paraphrase a worn-out cliché — that all analysts in India are hawkish now.
A coherent Indian policy over AfPak is noticeable only by its absence. All self-respecting analysts, and mandarins sitting in South Block, should answer the following questions. What are the immediate or short-term goals for India in the region? What are the long-term Indian interests in the region? What is the strategy in the medium term that will bridge these short-term goals with the long-term aims? The answer to these questions will give out the options and the most effective course of action available to India.
There is another significant point raised by Professor Raja Mohan in his piece.
The most difficult regional task is about ending the army’s power to define Pakistan’s national security objectives towards Afghanistan and India and its more than three decade old alliance with extremist groups to achieve its aims.
While the Professor is absolutely correct in its diagnosis, there is more to it than merely defanging the Pakistani army. Defanging the Pakistan army by weakening them vis-a-vis Zardari will automatically lead to a rise of Taliban. If the Pakistan army loses its pre-eminent role in the state, it has an even lesser reason to fight the Taliban. It might eventually trigger a split down the middle in the Pakistan army with the possibility of nukes falling into the hands of the Taliban. So, it is a very tricky and difficult situation unless there is an alternative to keep the Taliban at bay. How do you resolve this? That solution is what the INI prescribed in the latest issue of Pragati – Pakistan needs a MacArthur.
It is immodest to blow your own trumpet and say – we told you so. At times like these, however, there remains little option but to show that bold prescriptions exist; only if the government mandarins and analysts would think the problems through.
“Imagine, if India were to boldly enunciate a policy of sending its troops to Afghanistan.”
Seems very right to force the issue as suggested.
However, traditionally tribals of that region have always ignored Geneva Conventions. So non trivially, for a level playing field, must issue scalping, skinning, slicing, dismembering, decapitation materials also to our footslogging predators to increase mutual comfort levels. Saw one Indian executioners sword in a Brit collectors den in Harrow. One per section reqd.
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Nothing will be achieved by sending troops to Afghanistan unless there is a visible SOS from the Afghan people and its duly elected government.
It is stupid to send your military to a country without measurable, verifiable and desirable military objective in mind.
Armies are patently unsuitable to counter insurgencies and cause more problem than that they can solve. If you do CI inside your own country – at least there is political sanction and therefore public approval for the stupidity.
But to go out and do CI in a third country – with nothing to conquer, no known enemy to decimate, no cities or industries or war machines to be annihilated, nobody to be forced on to the negotiating table – is a disaster of collosal proportions in the making.
The correct way to tackle such a situation is the UN way with funds being provided by the rich countries, objectives being set by the Security Council and with option to withdraw being firmly in our hands.
I am amazed at the lack of analytical ability in our military analysts who want to engage our forces in Afghanistan for devicing a ‘credible security structure’ in Afghanistan. What is there in it for us may I ask. Nothing!The risks of such a misadventure far outweigh the benefit of ’stabilising’ Afghanistan.
We must not be proactive in this Afghanistan issue. We must examine what could happen if the US succeeds and what could happen if it did not and then, plan for both the eventualities.
It is far too early to conclude that nukes would fall into taliban hands. And nukes are not hand granades that can be used if they ‘fall into’ your hands. But then you have to know how nukes are employed, used and made safe. A trouble most analysts do not bother to research.
India should not bother to have short term or long term objectives in the region as suggested. We are too poor and too undeveloped to afford policy direction to foriegn countries. We should use the UN route to achieve whatever we can in foreign countries’ politics and governance structures.
Concentrate on development – economic, military and industrial. Once you have eradicated poverty, malnutrition, illiteracy and internal disturbances – harbour dreams of effecting your neighbourhood and the world at large using military power.
we have to just supply full and as much as possible intel to usa regarding afghan and taliban as well as pakistan .
2nd is we have to secure our borders air,sea and land in such a way that
not a single talibani or pakistani can enter india .
3rd is we have to show usa and world that pakistan is makeing them fools and getting money from them by faking to fight with taliban.
last and most imp very trickfully usa should destory all nukes of pakistan as well as all capacity of pakistan to launch nukes.
and in this way pakistan army and taliban will fight with each other and later
united nations can restore parkistan .
Great recommendations and if India wishes to turn the equation, participation in development and more important intelligence mechanisms would be the key.
Sending in troops after preparing the basic intelligence net work is a viable option …but very pragmatically..they should be employed for a variety of roles but not direct COIN operations..at least till we have a viable mechanism in place to ensure equipping training and other operational activities…and a wider understanding of delineated areas of operations between the Indian and Pak Army.
We could form an important part of the ideological struggle and help revamp the fissures in the society by providing a regional face to the Anaconda operations, but once again more ideological then physical operations.
Blindly puttting troops in operations may result in strong retaliation and non acceptance by Taliban. That would make the slog difficult.
This should be the best opportunity for exploiting the military thinkers and psy ops operators to develop regional themes based on trust and understanding of the basic needs of the Afghanistan people rather than fighting a war. This would not be a batttle of brute force but brains..remember the Afghan history? Nestanabood ho jaenge par apni jidd nahi chorenge!
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“Afghanistan desperately needs more soldiers on the ground and India has the numbers.”
What is this- The Afghan Moon Mission? (along the lines of Chandrayan). This suggestion means spending scarce resources for trying to solve a problem that the one of the biggest economies in the world, the US, is
I suppose an Indian soldier’s life is cheap as well?
Also did I not see a solution offered here about promoting jawans to officers? Can’t we use these soldiers to fill up the resulting shortfall instead of sending them in harm’s way unneccessarily?