Pragmatic Euphony  

Jehad in Kashmir didn’t start in 1989. And Islamisation of Pakistan didn’t start with General Zia.

Here is Lieutenant General (retired) SK Sinha recounting an incident from the 1940s:

It was in Indonesia in 1946, as a defending officer. I had to defend Aslam Khan and Mohammad Shareef of 4/8 Punjab Regiment. They had deserted with their weapons and had been taken prisoners in battle wearing the uniform of captains in the Indonesian Army. At the summary of evidence they had stated that they answered the call of Islam and were fighting for their Indonesian Muslim brothers. They were charged with waging war against the King and for desertion with arms in war. Capital punishment is prescribed for both offences. I was at a loss as to how to defend them. When the summary of evidence was recorded they were not told that it was not incumbent on them to make any statement, but should they make one it could be used as evidence against them in a court martial. My request for a fresh summary of evidence, on this ground, was accepted. The accused now stated that an Indonesian girl had offered them cigarettes and that they had passed out on smoking these. When they recovered, they found themselves in an Indonesian Army camp. They joined the Indonesian Army so that they could get back to their regiment at the first opportunity. They were convicted and sentenced to seven years’ rigorous imprisonment, a light sentence considering they could have been executed. Little did I know that Aslam Khan, grateful to be alive, would have another role to play.

Pakistan invaded Kashmir in October 1947 but denied complicity, saying it was a freedom struggle that was raging in Kashmir. I had to collect evidence of Pakistan’s involvement to be presented to the UN commission due to visit India. I went to Yol, where Pakistani prisoners were kept. I met Aslam Khan there. He told me that after Partition he and Shareef were released from Jhelum District Jail and hailed as heroes as they had fought for Islam in Indonesia. They were reinstated in the Army and promoted to junior commissioned officers. He was prepared to depose before the UN commission that he was with his battalion fighting in Kashmir.[Asian Age]

This anecdote should dispel two misconceptions that exist in the minds of many Indians. The first one is about Kashmir, where many believe that Islamist jehad started in the state only after 1989.  Praveen Swami has written a brilliant book on the subject — India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The covert war in Kashmir, 1947-2004 — but it has unfortunately not received as much public recognition as it deserves.

This book explores the history of Jihadist groups in Jammu and Kashmir, documenting the course of their activities and their changing character from 1947 to 2004. Drawing on new material, including classified Indian intelligence dossiers and records, Praveen Swami shows that Jihadist violence was not, as is widely assumed, a phenomenon that manifested itself in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir only after 1988. Rather, a welter of jihadist groups waged a sustained campaign against Indian rule in Jammu and Kashmir from the outset, after the Partition of India. This book first analyses the ideology and practice of Islamist terrorism as it changed and evolved from 1947-1948 onwards. It subsequently discusses the impact of the secret jihad on Indian policy making on Jammu and Kashmir, as well as its influence on political life within the state. Finally, looking at some of the reasons why the jihad in Jammu and Kashmir acquired such intensity in 1990, the author suggests that the answers lie in the transfiguration of the strategic environment in South Asia by the nuclear weapons programme of India and Pakistan. As such, the book argues, the violent conflict which exploded in these two regions after 1990 was not a historical discontinuity: it was, instead, an escalated form of what was by then a five-decade old secret war.[Link]

The second myth is directly related to the first one. That Pakistan’s Islamisation started only during the reign of General Zia-ul-Haq, and that too largely because of the US support to his regime, is the myth that stands discredited by this anecdote. Farzana Sheikh’s Making Sense of Pakistan does a great job of demolishing this myth. In her own words:

With hindsight it is clear that the main impetus behind this book stemmed from my rising frustration with existing explanations about the causes of Pakistan’s long-standing malaise. Too many of these interpretations, it seemed to me, were merely concerned either to pin the blame on the nefarious role of foreign powers, especially the United States, or the failure of successive generations of leaders to live up to the vision of Pakistan’s founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Few were inclined to wrestle with the issue of Pakistan’s uncertain identity or examine the constraints created by its conflicted relation with Islam.

The stark importance of this question has been brought home to me all the more sharply in the wake of Pakistan’s involvement in the “war on terror.” As someone called upon regularly to comment on and brief policy makers about the country, I have been obliged to lay out the complexities that shape Pakistan’s response or lack of response to terrorism. In doing so I have repeatedly emphasised that, ultimately, Pakistan will not be able to “do more” about terrorism until it has clarified its vexed relationship with Islam.[ROROTOKO]

Kashmir’s Azadi talk — a  lesson in how to destroy the idea of India.

We heard this in 2008. And we are hearing this again now. India should give up Kashmir because Kashmiris don’t want to stay with India. They want Azadi. But how are you so sure? Look at your TV screens and you’ll have the answer.  But if I were to look at TV screens and seek answers, then I’d be forced to believe that Rahul Mahajan and Rakhi Sawant are the Father of the Nation and the Mother of the Nation. I know we don’t have a Mother of the Nation yet, so we will perhaps settle for Rakhi Sawant as Mother Teresa then. Of course, not to forget the impression that Arnab Goswami is India’s foremost intellectual, far ahead of Pratap Bhanu Mehta. But we have digressed.

So some emotional anchors on our TV screens, supported by selective footage, conclusively prove that Kashmiris don’t want to stay in India. This obviously means that they should thus be allowed to go. Let us leave the bit about where they should go to and return to the topic of Kashmir.

Firstly, the state is not Kashmir, but Jammu & Kashmir and unlike Jharkhand or Uttaranchal, it wasn’t created in the twenty-first century. Its geographical boundaries have been in existence for over 150 years before Pakistani army and its proxies, the tribal raiders destroyed the geographical sanctity of the state in 1948. Of course, Pakistan ceded a portion of the state to China in 1963 and seems to be in the process of following up by handing over Gilgit-Baltistan, or some portions of it, to its all-weather friend China now. Now, I can’t resist but have a dig at an all-weather friend ditching Pakistan at the first spell of bad weather. Clearly a fair-weather friend China is. But then the colour of the cat doesn’t matter as long as it catches the mice or as long as it can pin down the elephant so that the dragon can strut on the world stage. Damn, we again digress.

So the state is Jammu & Kashmir, not Kashmir. We have had very successful elections in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in 2008 and 2009, which overwhelmingly reflects the confidence of the residents of that state in the Indian Republic. But what about the Kashmiris? They want their way out. Great.

What is the smallest unit that can decide that it wants its way out of the Indian Republic — a nation, a state, a district, a village, a family or an individual. Can the city of Sopore or the Hyderpora colony in Srinagar decide that it doesn’t want to be part of India and declare independence? If there is a case for Sopore or Hyderpora, then why not a case for South Mumbai. It even has access to a sea port and has the financial muscle to survive as an independent nation. Forget it though, these guys from South Mumbai don’t even come out to vote in the elections. So the question of parents in South Mumbai hiding behind their 8 and 9 year olds to throw stones at cops doesn’t even arise. Forget the idea. But we have digressed again.

This is the contradiction that no one wishes to answer. Sopore may vote overwhelmingly for Azadi, Kashmir division may be equally divided on it while Jammu and Kashmir may be overwhelmingly against it. How do you decide the issue then? Taking it logically — even if it sounds counter-intuitive — the smallest unit that can then decide whether any part of the country can stay in the country or not is the country itself. Now that doesn’t sound fair to a few people, like the stone-pelting protestors of Kashmir. But it is fair to a larger group of people that form the unitary political entity called India — the Indians. That is what nations are about. It is a part of the social and political contract that the nation has with its people. Only Indians can thus decide in a plebiscite whether J&K or for that matter, Kerala should stay in the country or not.

Look at it in another way. Sopore and Srinagar want Azadi with the Shariah law imposed there. Logically, we are a democracy and we should accept it because a majority wants it.  Now let us go to Pilibhit and it says, hypothetically, that let us cut the hands of all Muslims residing in Pilibhit. After all, Mr Varun Gandhi won from that constituency by over 4.5 lac votes by reportedly invoking some of those images. Will we accept that? No, of course, we won’t. And we shouldn’t. Why? Because India is not merely a democracy, but a democratic republic. Even if a majority decides something (and even if the parliament approves it), it can be shot down by the court if it is unconstitutional. Indian democracy is not simple majoritianism. It is also a republic which is circumscribed by certain inviolable principles enshrined in the Indian constitution.

What does the Constitution of India say about secularism? And what does the separatist Kashmiri leadership say about role of religion in Kashmir? Because most of our star-journalists develop partial amnesia when talking about the fundamentalist-religious angle of the separatist movement in Kashmir, it is necessary to remind them that the separatist movement is underpinned by communal principles which violate the fundamentals of Indian nationhood. If India is willing to make compromises with one shade of communalists, it would then be willing to do so with others of the same shade — the Bajrang Dal and the Ram Sene types, leave alone the likes of Varun Gandhi and Narendra Modi who have won popular elections with dubious messages. Where does it leave the idea of India then?

If you care for the idea of India, ponder for a moment before peddling this notion about Kashmir and Azadi. India exists because of the idea of India. Let us not destroy it, inadvertently or otherwise.

Additional Readings — The Acorn on Liberal Nationalism and Swaraj on Republicans or Democrats

Statecraft is the strategy of power.

Statecraft translates national interests and concerns into national goals and strategies. It accumulates and applies the power of the state to other states and peoples to achieve these goals and strategies. Statecraft is the strategy of power.

Power is the capacity to direct the decisions and actions of others. Power derives from strength and will. Strength comes from the transformation of resources into capabilities. Will infuses objectives with resolve. Strategy marshals capabilities and brings them to bear with precision. Statecraft seeks through strategy to magnify the mass, relevance, impact, and irresistibility of power. It guides the ways the state deploys and applies its power abroad. These ways embrace the arts of war, espionage, and diplomacy. The practitioners of these three arts are the paladins of statecraft. They provide statesmen — the men and women who practise statecraft — with their reach and impact abroad. [Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy by Chas. W. Freeman, Jr.]

More on the landing of Vijaya in Ceylon here. And now consider some bare facts about India’s maritime reach (via @sunbyanyname).

India has a coastline of 7516 kms. It translates into an EEZ of 2,013,410 Square Kms, and an extended EEZ of 3.1 Million Square Kms. Moreover, India also has 1197 islands (572 in Andaman & Nicobar, 27 in Lakshadweep, 447 on the West Coast and 151 on the East Coast).

While India has six neighbours on land, it has seven neighbours at sea. And if you didn’t realise it, India also has 36  maritime neighbours in the Indian Ocean. Of course, all the extra-regional powers are also India’s maritime neighbours.

A lament to end with: If this be so, why do we pay so little attention to such an important dimension of our national security?

The recent incidents from J&K again bring home the pressing need for police reforms in India.

Shouldn’t the Jammu & Kashmir police and the CRPF handle the protests by stone-pelters far more professionally than they are actually doing today? Of course, yes. They should. No one will deny that they can employ more non-lethal means (although there are no truly non-lethal means as this fatal incident with rubber bullet amply demonstrated) to prevent mobs from gathering in the first place, could have used better intelligence to nab the ring leaders and kept the casualty figures down.

So why did this not happen? Because the threat of jehadi terror still visibly exists in Kashmir (remember the incident in Sopore where three policemen were shot dead by terrorists); the mobs have been violent and murderous in their intent setting alight police stations, CRPF posts and armouries; the police and the CRPF have been attuned to dealing with violent jehadi terrorists for two decades and could not adapt to the new tactics by the separatists; and the non-lethal means of mob control do not exist in sufficient numbers with the police in the state (although some equipment has been introduced in recent weeks).

How can the reaction of the police then be improved? This means that the police force must possess the ability to seamlessly operate across the complete spectrum of public safety and security to establish law and order. The only way to ensure that capability is by making the police more professional. And one thing that will bring in professionalism in the police force is what no one in this country wants to talk about: police reforms.

From Manipur to Maoist areas to Gujarat to Delhi, the pressing need for police reforms has been continuously driven home. While the politicians have avoided listening to the message — despite a Supreme Court ruling to this effect — public apathy towards this critical subject of national importance has allowed the governments, at centre and states — and of all political hues — to get away with studied inaction on initiating police reforms.

The poor cop on the ground, being forced to open fire on violent mobs, more out of a sense of self-preservation and self-defence than any murderous intent, is not to be blamed for what many perceive to be a high-handed reaction by the police. Should that policeman not train his lethal weapon on the mob because he or she has not been provided with a non-lethal option and thus allow the mob to run rampage? That expectation is unrealistic for the policeman is trying to make the best use of resources, training and leadership made available to him, while still enforcing the writ of a fumbling state.

Perhaps we can be satisfied by blaming the ubiquitous system and the executive for lacking the political will to undertake police reforms. But that might not hold completely true either. The civil society has equally failed in its duty by not generating enough public will to force the politicians to act.

In 2008, it was Mumbai on 26/11, then it was Dantewada earlier this year, now it is Srinagar and Sopore in Jammu & Kashmir; tomorrow it could be Commonwealth Games in Delhi or some other violent protest elsewhere in the country. The choice is ours. Either we can continue to lament at the inadequacy of our police force. Or create enough public pressure to force the governments and political parties to undertake police reforms. The choice is indeed ours.

Related posts:

A starting point — Police reforms

Unanimity among Indian politicians

The missing police

The quality of police capacity

To tackle Maoists, begin with police reforms

Kick-starting police reforms

Frankly, we don’t give a damn

Law, and order

Differentiating between the Independence Day and the Republic Day.

Having read the usual fare — a plethora of outstanding, standard and sub-standard pieces in the media — this Independence Day, one is left wondering if there is anything left to differentiate between the  Independence Day and the Republic Day. The two national days may be similar, but they are not the same. What is the difference between the two then?

Independence day is a day of the past, of celebrating what we have inherited from our previous generations. The Republic Day, in contrast, is about the present and the future — about pledging and working towards making the Indian Republic stronger.

My fellow blogger Dhruva Jaishankar reminded me today that August 15 was a date set by the British, and was not of our own choosing (not coincidentally, it also marks the date, two years earlier, of the Japanese announcement of surrender during the War). January 26 was however selected because it was the day the Purna Swaraj declaration (Declaration of the Independence of India) was promulgated by the Indian National Congress at Lahore in 1930. In fact, the Congress had then asked the people of India to observe January 26 as Independence Day. Moreover, Republic Day is also about the Indian constitution, which was a wholly Indian enterprise.

So, Independence Day should ideally be about symbolism, pageantry and celebrations of a date, a date not of our own choosing but a hugely significant historical date nevertheless. Whereas Republic Day, on a date we ourselves chose, ought to be the more solemn occasion  — a day of promises to make and pledges to keep. Independence Day is about the legacy bequeathed to us while Republic Day is not an occasion for the legacy — positive or negative — of past generations to either be lauded or condemned. If Independence Day is about the remembrances and retrospection, Republic Day ought to signify how we can preserve and improve the fate of the country, and how that task falls upon us, each one of us.

Finally, we have come a long way since 1947. India’s independence is not in danger today; it is the Republic that is being threatened every single day. If we can strengthen the Republic, we will automatically safeguard our independence.

Let us take care of the Republic so that we can continue to celebrate our independence.

Post Script: This blogpost at Swaraj on whether India is a Democratic Republic or a Republican Democracy is a good primer on the subject.

We owe it to many Indians like these.

Painting  by Krishen Khanna (Courtesy: The Indian Express)

In the words of the 84-year artist himself:

The series begins with an oil drawing of Gurbaksh Rai, an old homeopathic doctor saying goodbye to his family after being arrested by police. He was an ardent Congressman. I have used monochrome because if there is something I want to say, it is best to avoid the dynamics of colour. Then you are not dealing with the man – the subject matter – any more.[Link]

And the aptest Independence Day wishes captured by this tweet:

Happy Independence Day India! Proud of my status in the world and humbled at the enormity of tasks still to complete.

The biggest casualty from the floods are the IMF-driven efforts to reform the Pakistan economy.

There are two dominant narratives of the havoc wreaked by floods in Pakistan. One, that it is a humanitarian disaster of immense magnitude which deserves greater attention from the world community. The second one is that it has further weakened the hold of the Pakistani government, enhanced the esteem of the Pakistan army and allowed the jehadis to win the hearts and minds of many Pakistanis by providing aid and relief to the victims of this disaster. While both of these are valid concerns, the bigger danger still lies elsewhere.

Despite establishment of strict benchmarks by the IMF when it bailed out Pakistan with a $11.3 billion loan in 2008, Pakistan has consistently failed to meet them. Beside bringing down the fiscal deficit, this included a reform of its tax infrastructure, which the Pakistani parliament and the provinces have successfully stalled so far. Matters over delay in implementation of VAT had come to such a head just prior to these floods that the IMF was considering suspending the latest tranche of its loan.

This Reuters report explains that it is all headed further southwards now:

The government has already been struggling to meet an IMF target for a fiscal deficit 4 percent of gross domestic product this year. The flood crisis will mean more strain. One analyst said he expected a fiscal deficit of 8 percent this year. If that is financed by borrowing from the central bank, inflation will be pushed up further.

The government will come under domestic pressure to slide on IMF requirements under its $11.3 billion loan programme. Moves to cut subsidies, to increase taxes, including introduce a value-added tax, and to reform the public sector enterprises are all likely to be delayed.

Pakistani and IMF officials are due to meet on Aug. 23 to discuss a sixth tranche of the loan. Given Pakistan’s role as a major U.S. ally in the global campaign against militancy and in trying to suppress the Taliban insurgency neighbouring Afghanistan, the IMF is likely to cut Pakistan some slack and approve the $1.13 billion tranche.[Reuters]

Even this might not be enough. A CFR report adds:

To help Pakistan meet its economic challenges, aid from its international partners and an additional loan from the IMF will be imperative in the next twelve months, says Arpitha Bykere, a senior research analyst at Roubini Global Economics.[CFR]

In theory, the issue of economic reform is separate from the issue of suffering of the Pakistani people caused by the floods. In reality, the suffering of poor Pakistanis would be used as an excuse by the Pakistani ruling elite to further stall any attempts at economic reform, which was agreed upon between the government of Pakistan and the IMF. It is understandable that certain benchmarks such as the fiscal deficit target may be unattainable due to additional disaster relief spending by the Pakistan government, but there can be no justification for not introducing the VAT or undertaking other long-term tax reforms in the country.

So what does this mean? It means that Pakistan will, in the foreseeable future, continue to be a conflux of jehadi terror, radicalised society and weak governance — made doubly dangerous by a weak economy. If this was not enough of a potent cocktail, add a belligerent  military which exports terror as an instrument of state policy, and a hundred nuclear weapons to the mix.

Unfortunately such a state happens to be India’s neighbour. India would better be worried. And justifiably so.

Terror strike in Sopore and RAF employing non-lethal weapons for mob control in Srinagar.

The aim is not to over-emphasise a point but this news story from J&K [HT: @TheComicProject] serves as a timely reminder that terrorism has not vanished from the Kashmir valley yet.

Three policemen were killed when heavily-armed militants opened fire on them in Jammu and Kashmir’s Sopore town last night.

According to sources, the militants attacked the guards at the residence of Nationalist Political Party (NPP) leader Muhammad Abdullah Dar in Warpora area of Sopore.

The security men at the house returned the fire, triggering a gunbattle in which three policemen were killed while the militants managed to escape.[ANI]

Every single attack like this makes the security forces — mainly reliant on lethal weapons — more jittery while dealing with violent protestors. Thus the next news story from Srinagar is even more heart-warming. The Rapid Action Force (RAF) companies of the CRPF deployed in Srinagar have got the latest non-lethal weapons for crowd control such as the Active Denial System (ADS) and the Long Range Acoustic Device.

The CRPF officials said the RAF has brought along many “sophisticated mob control devices.”

“About ADS I am not sure but they (RAF) have many sophisticated mob control devices particularly the ones mounted on their vehicles,” the CRPF PRO Prabakhar Tripathi told Greater Kashmir. He said the forces would use the mob control devices only if a situation arises.[Greater Kashmir]

As the old saying goes, it is better late than never. But one can be reasonably certain that these non-lethal weapons would not be available in sufficient numbers to be deployed everywhere in the Kashmir valley. It is a good start but more needs to be done — to equip more units of the J&K police with such gadgetry for crowd control.

Finally, although Eeben Barlow says it in a different context, his views perhaps provide a decent explanation of government’s actions in Kashmir.

Yet, we seem to stand by and wait until the problem reaches a situation that it cannot easily be contained – and then we try to take action. Ironically, we then cannot understand why it is so difficult to resolve the issues, win the wars and end the conflicts. A 10-ton truck free-wheeling downhill cannot be stopped by simply jumping into its path. With enough men at hand, we can probably stop it but at an enormous cost in lives lost and collateral fall-out.

By allowing the enemy to gain momentum and maintain the initiative, we lose the ability to put a rapid end to it. Our reactive actions are almost akin to trying to stop that free-wheeling truck. And despite all the warnings, we act surprised when we are unable to stop it.

…If we continue to miss all of the warning signals flashed at us, we will continue to be reactive. The implication is that we will continue to be surprised, unprepared and find ourselves fighting on the back foot – often against untrained, ill-disciplined, out-numbered and technology-poor enemies.

Until such time as we begin to exploit our assets and resources to maximum effect and look for exploitation options whenever and wherever we can, we will remain at a disadvantage both on and off the battlefield.

We may appear to be politically correct but we will lose the battle – and there is no second prize for the loser – and the truck will keep rolling.[Link]

Indeed. It is not about appearing politically correct but about winning the battle. And about bringing the damn rolling truck to a stop, at the lowest possible cost and with least collateral fallout.

There is not just one way to look at the current situation in Kashmir.

Almost all the Sunday newspapers today have special reports, columns and commentaries on the situation in Kashmir. The underlying assumption in most, if not all of them is that Indian security forces have inhumanly massacred a group of innocent young Kashmiri kids. Moreover, the Indian state is not contrite about it; it is not magnanimous enough and if the Union government were to suddenly do the right thing — and not one commentator will tell you precisely what these right things are — the violence will immediately come to an end.

They ostensibly fail to comprehend that there is a time to contain a crisis and another time to address the issue. Even the greatest visionary can’t possibly be focused on reconstructing a house when the immediate goal is to dowse the fire engulfing the house. Let us quickly go over a few of the other misconceptions here.

The major issue that a lot of Indian commentators feel aggrieved over is the use of violence by the state to quell stone-pelters, which has even led to the “killing” — the choice of word is not death but killing — of a eight year old boy. Let us first look at the issue of the eight-year old’s death. While every single child’s death is lamentable, the question should instead be asked as to what such a young kid was doing at the frontline of violent protestors. What kind of a civil society uses its children as human shields and sacrificial lambs in public protests? The outrage should then be directed against protestors and their leadership, and not against the CRPF or JK Police. How are the security forces to distinguish within a mob comprising suspected terrorists (remember that the terrorists did open fire at the police during a protest in Sopore), violent young men who are torching police stations, teenage stone-pelters and young kids?

Another criticism that has been levelled against the security forces is that they should have used non-lethal means of crowd control. It is a fair criticism, but it ignores the fact that these very same security forces have been attuned to fighting terrorists for last two decades and a quick re-orientation is practically impossible in such a short period of time. This should not be bandied around as an excuse by any well-governed state — but J&K and India are anything but well-governed. However the state also can’t allow its writ to wither away and shrink away from its responsibility of maintaining law and order by giving violent mobs a free run, just because the security forces have no effective non-lethal options available with them. Even then, no one has disputed the fact that these lethal options have also been been used only in self-defence by the security forces so far.

The argument about these seemingly unpalatable state actions can also be framed in the context of the ancient Indian concept of Dharma. In the words of Gurcharan Das, the author of The Difficulty of Being Good: On the Subtle Art of Dharma:

The good Vidura tells us in the Mahabharata that in judging a king’s action he looks at results. If it benefits people, it is an act of dharma. Hence, a ruler would agree to “sacrifice an individual for the sake of a village and a village for the sake of a nation”. Vidura is half-brother and royal counsellor to the king of Hastinapur and he speaks from the experience of managing a state. In agreeing to sacrifice a person in order to save many, he has drawn a distinction between public and private dharma, a pragmatism that is uniquely suited to public policy. The English thinker, Jeremy Bentham, went on to make this criterion famous in the 19th century via his utilitarian slogan: “the greatest good of the greatest number.”[Business Standard]

Now to the other big issue of political gestures that Centre should announce to reconcile with the protestors and the separatists. Kashmir indeed could do with some big political gestures but the question is of timing. One of the newspapers has listed its wish-list of six steps that Centre should immediately announce. All the bloggers at INI have continuously proposed since 2008 that most of these steps should have been announced after the successful assembly elections of 2008, or after the UPA government returned to power at Delhi in 2009. That was the time for the Indian government to be magnanimous as that would have meant that it has responded to the faith in Indian democracy demonstrated by the Kashmiris. When a violent mob tries to coerce the Indian state into submission, it is perhaps not the best time to make any concessions as it is tantamount to conceding to blackmail. It also sends the message across to everyone else in the country that the Indian government is only amenable to the language of violence and coercion.

So, how and when should the big political steps come then? Firstly, they should, and necessarily must, come after the violence has been suppressed and a certain degree of normalcy has been restored in the state. The process of political engagement by back-channel has been established by the state government and it must continue. More importantly, these political steps must seen to have been initiated at the behest of the state government. That is perhaps also the best way to bolster the credibility of the Chief Minister Omar Abdullah and the state government in the state.

The state government indeed needs to go beyond even these political gestures or plans of economic development. It must also dispel the impression that three or four districts of Kashmir valley are the equivalent of the complete state of Jammu and Kashmir. Since the exodus of Kashmiri pundits from the Valley two decades ago, these districts have become ghettoised with only one particular sect of Muslims dominating the region. While the Kashmiri pundits may not be willing to come back in huge numbers — and understandably so — the state government must encourage and facilitate the movement of Shias (from Kargil region) and Gujjars and Bakarwals (from Rajauri-Poonch region) into the Valley so that these communities can also avail of the political and economic opportunities present there. It will also integrate the Valley socially and politically with other regions of the state, thereby lending itself less susceptible to being tricked into these periodic outbursts of mob violence.

Finally, it is true that Indian government has historically, starting from 1948, made a lot of mistakes in Kashmir. These errors have played a huge part in making the crisis that it is today. But the Indian government has made equally big mistakes in other parts of the country. Why haven’t we seen a similar crisis anywhere else? Is it because of what another commentator suggested: when we have continuously sent a message across to the Kashmiris that they are “special”, can we actually blame them for thinking that and behaving as if they are “special”?

Perhaps it is also time to visibly and publicly reinforce the Constitutional dictum that all Indians are equal. And equally special.

Shocking revelations in the latest CAG report on Mi Series helicopters in the Indian Air Force.

While a lot of coverage in the media will be given to the CAG report pertaining to poor quality of rations for the army — as evident from this statement by the MoS for defence, Mr Pallam Raju — the real alarming story is in the CAG audit about the helicopters of the Indian Air Force. Chapter-1 of CAG Report No. 7 of 2010-11 pertains to the performance audit on Operation and Maintenance of Mi Series Helicopters in IAF (pdf here).

Here are the highlights of the findings of the report.

#1- There was a deficit of 26 per cent in the total availability of helicopters compared to the numbers required for achieving current operational projections. Categorywise shortfalls were most apparent in the case of attack helicopters where the holdings were 46 per cent below the actual requirement.(Paragraph 1.2.1.1)

#2- Despite availability of funds and a specific acquisition programme for the 10th Plan period, IAF was unable to induct even a single helicopter which has adversely affected maintenance of force levels and operational preparedness. (Paragraph 1.2.1.1)

#3- The existing fleet is ageing and nearly 78 per cent of the helicopters have already completed their prescribed life and Total Technical Life extension has been carried out on them elongating their life.(Paragraph 1.2.1.2)

#4- Serviceability levels were low and fell consistently short of the prescribed 75 per cent. Combined with high Aircraft-on-Ground levels, this was indicative of inefficiency in operations, low utilization of Mi series fleet and poor repair and maintenance activities.(Paragraph 1.2.1.4)

#5- Seven helicopters were modified for ‘VIP’ role without approval of the Government. Such modification also lacked justification as a separate specialized communication squadron with adequate helicopter for use by VIPs already existed. Modification of helicopters for VIP/OEP use affected availability of helicopters for operation purpose.(Paragraph 1.2.1.6)

#6- Manpower deployment was not rational with respect to norms fixed per helicopter as there was an overall shortage of pilots ranging from 12 to 27 per cent during 2003-07 while, at the same time, there was an excess of aircrew.(Paragraph 1.2.1.7)

#7- Achievement with regard to engine overhauls and repair in respect of Mi8 and Mi17 helicopters was considerably lower than the tasks fixed. This was due to shortage of spares which resulted from both delayed and inadequate provisioning for these spares. As a consequence, 210 engines were sent abroad for overhaul at a cost of Rs 68.49 crore.(Paragraph 1.2.2.1)

The complete chapter is worth a read. A scary and depressing read. For eg.,

Despite the fact that its own needs were not being met, IAF sent 25 helicopters abroad for participation in UN Missions, allocated another seven for VVIP use and diverted six Mi8 helicopters to the Cabinet Secretariat (Aviation Research Centre). As a result, over all availability was only 61 per cent.

And here is the concluding sentence of the chapter that should induce premature ageing in all well-meaning Indians:

The matter was referred to Ministry in October 2008; their reply was awaited as of February 2010.

Final thought. As fellow blogger Retributions always reminds us, we in India are always ready to pounce on an error of commission but are happy to completely ignore the errors of omission. An error of commission is one where the person responds — invariably with wrong intentions — where they should not. An error of omission, in comparison, is where the person fails to respond when they should.

One is just left wondering if there is any other robust modern democracy in the world which would allow its government and its defence minister to get away with such a criminal error of omission. Ponder.

The need for a fresh approach to Pakistan.

Of course, it is easy to dismiss the bloggers at INI as either naive or hawks — for they do not possess an understanding of the nuances of India’s diplomatic manoeuvers — especially when it comes to dealing with Pakistan. But surely, a former foreign secretary and former special envoy of the Prime Minister understands all those nuances better than us.

Here are the extracts from an interview with Mr Shyam Saran:

Q. In the light of the recent disclosures, is there a need for a fresh approach to Pakistan?

A. We have to recognise that the approach adopted so far, by the present government and the Vajpayee government, has not yielded results.

A pattern has come to be established. We show our willingness to engage in dialogue. This peace process can go forward in an atmosphere free from violence and cross-border terrorism. We get assurances but attacks keep increasing. The worst have been on our Parliament and on Mumbai. Our response is to interrupt the talks. Then we again justify its resumption on the basis of verbal assurances. This has been the established pattern since the time of General Zia-ul Haq. That is when the strategy of keeping India off-balance — short of going to war — crystallised.

Unless you can convince Pakistan that its strategy will no longer be low-risk, low-cost, Pakistan will carry on in the old way. This is our fundamental challenge, and is not especially related to WikiLeaks. For diplomacy, I’d say you should never present your political leadership with a binary choice — either war or appeasement. Therefore, we need to develop a range of options to convince the other side that there is a cost attached.

Just as Pakistan exploits what it sees as vulnerabilities on the Indian side, what are the vulnerabilities you can take into account there? Then convince the Pakistani leadership of the downside. Disrupting dialogue is not a diplomatic tool. Talks should be held to deploy our leverage.

Q. What do you mean by Pakistan’s vulnerabilities?

A. Over time, build negative and positive leverages with Pakistan. Take Kashmir, for instance. We can take the people in PoK (Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir) and in Gilgit-Baltistan to be our citizens, as we believe that the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir is ours, and go in for a strong espousal of their case. Why do we not assert our claims in diplomatic terms? Do we have a strategy of engaging people in those territories?

Also, why should we be defensive about our independent Afghanistan policy? If we assert it, we will be building greater pressure on Pakistan. Our self-interest should be made explicit.

At the same time, while dealing with Pakistan, we should seek to expand the positive constituency in that country — say trade and business. This can be an instrument of positive leverage. Islamabad and the people of Pakistan should be made to understand that improving business and economic ties with India is in their own self-interest, and this can grow only if ties with India are positive.[Asian Age]

Forget the fact that this vindicates what the humble INI bloggers have been saying for years now, when almost everyone else in the mainstream media was chanting the “only talks with Pakistan equal peace” mantra. We must move away from this self-created paradigm of “either talks or war” with Pakistan to explore the range of options suggested by Mr Saran. India may have lost a few years in chasing a futile pipe-dream of peace with Pakistan but as the wise men say, it is better late than never.

Goddammit, Government of India! Please listen to Mr Saran at least. Now.

The state has no choice but to launch sustained security operations to quell the current spate of violence in Kashmir.

Curfew has been imposed in nine districts in Jammu & Kashmir, says one of the agency reports today. In all likelihood, it means to say that parts of these nine districts are under curfew although it conveys the impression — wrong impression — that the complete jurisdiction of these nine districts is under the curfew. Notwithstanding this anomaly where major incidents of violence in state are still limited to less than 15 police stations, the situation in J&K has worsened in recent days. Violence continues nearly unabated and it is not something that any well-meaning Indian can be comfortable with.

There has been a lot of lamentation and commentary on the subject. Commentators have delved into the causes of the morass: stagnant economy of the region, lack of mass engagement from mainstream political leaders in the state, Pakistani hand in fomenting this organised stone-pelting after failing to reignite militancy, mistakes compounded by New Delhi’s inaction in the aftermath of successful assembly polls in 2008 under the assumption that normalcy had returned, historical aspects of the problem, and religious dimensions of the issue. Perhaps, all of these have contributed in some measure to the problem as it exists today. But that also means that there is no single root cause which can be deracinated instantenously to fix the problem.

A lot can be said about each of these causes — and their long-term impact — but that would serve no purpose today. The pressing question is about the immediate steps that the governments, both at the centre and the state, must take for the sake of the ordinary Kashmiri. These immediate steps, considering the violent situation of the last few days, will have to be security-centric, focused on a single goal: to break this incessant cycle of violence. Let us not forget that peace and security is the primary responsibility of the state towards its citizens. Moreover, this would lead to re-establishing the rule of law, bring a certain degree of normalcy in daily routine of the average Kashmiri and re-impose the authority of the state. This will break the momentum which the violent mob — and their separatist leaders — have generated in the favour of stone-pelting, provide some respite to beleaguered security forces and change the prevailing narrative in the media.

Any political engagement or talks with ‘all shades of opinion’ in the state can only occur — let alone succeed — once the state is able to suppress, if not eradicate, the current spate of violence. Those who seek a political solution to the problem and purport to be a voice for the legitimate aspirations of the average Kashmiri must thus support and goad the state into action on this path —  to quell the violence immediately.

Quelling the violence now, however, will not be easy for the state. It would be a throw-back to the era of the Punjab militancy, where an equally violent situation was brought under control by the state police and the paramilitary forces. It will be ugly; there could be a few instances of state’s high-handedness; there will be some not-so-nice images coming out from the state; it will not win India any brownie points internationally; and such measures will require unstinting support of the political leadership of the state and the centre.

But as the old saying goes, desperate times call for desperate measures. There are no easy choices left for the state. It has to launch a cohesive, strong and sustained security response to quell the violence and restore a certain degree of normalcy for the populace. The reduction of violence to acceptable levels should, and must, be followed by bold political initiatives from the Indian government. Else India would have again stolen failure from the jaws of success.

Failure is not an option. The state must knuckle down and brazen it out. And bring a stop to this madness of violence in J&K immediately.

Can a suicide bomber claim to be as much a victim of explosive as the innocent people killed by that bomber?

In response to British PM David Cameron’s statement at Bangalore about Pakistan’s links with terror, here is the complete official statement from Pakistan’s foreign office:

Terrorists have no religion, no humanity, no specific ethnicity or geography. Terrorists’ networks, as the UK knows full well mutate and operate in different regions and cities. The genesis of terrorism as a global phenomenon warrants close attention. Pakistan is as much a victim of terrorism as are Afghanistan, India or other countries.

Pakistan has done much more than any other country in combating terrorism. Our people and security forces have rendered innumerable sacrifices. We hope that our friends will be able to persuade India to view this issue objectively and the value of “cooperation” in counter terrorism.[Link]

“Pakistan is as much a victim of terrorism as are Afghanistan, India or other countries.” Indeed. Truer lies were never spoken. For as that Jewish saying goes, “A half-truth is a full lie.”

The complete truth is this: Pakistan may be a victim of terrorism along with India but the terror that India suffers is owed completely to Pakistan. For decades now, Pakistan has used terror as an instrument of state policy against India — as a strategic tool of its diplomatic and national security policy. And it has not been merely limited to something that has been an outcome of an Islamist- jehadi ideology which has occupied the centre-stage in last two decades. In the 1980s, Pakistan’s abetment and promotion of terror in Punjab  had little to do with some non-state actors spreading their rabid version of jehad in India. Even today, while Pakistan acts against the terror groups threatening the Pakistan army and its intelligence agencies [this explains where Pakistani "people and security forces have rendered innumerable sacrifices"], it doesn’t merely turn a blind-eye but actively promotes India-centric terror groups like the Lashkar-e-Toiba.

If Indians were to view this issue objectively — as the Pakistan foreign office suggests — they would only come to this conclusion:  can a suicide bomber claim to be as much a victim of explosive as the innocent men, women and children killed by that bomber?

National Security Advisor must institutionalise a weekly meeting at the level of the five secretaries concerned with national security.

In light of the Government of India pulling in different directions before, during and after the meeting between foreign ministers of India and Pakistan, K Subrahmanyam issues a timely reminder about fine-tuning the working mechanisms of the government when it comes to national security.

All this does not rule out the need for better coordination among the concerned ministries dealing with various aspects of national security. The realisation of the need for such coordination brought into existence the office of the national security adviser. Those who believed in the conventional philosophy of governance in which every cabinet minister practised a “live and let live” style of governance did not welcome the NSA. It has taken more than 12 years for that office to evolve into its appropriate role of a coordinator instead of being an independent executive in the national security set-up.

But, to be effective, the coordination should be at two levels, as in the US. The first level is that of five cabinet ministers who form the National Security Council. The second level is of the five secretaries dealing with national security: the cabinet secretary and foreign, defence, home and finance secretaries. In the US NSC set-up, they have a weekly deputies’ meeting to effect coordination and thrash out the issues before they reach the NSC under the president. Most of the hard and complicated work gets done initially at this level. Such weekly meetings sensitise key officials to issues of national security in a holistic manner and make them a coherent team. The Indian NSA should give thought to institutionalising a weekly meeting at the level of the five concerned secretaries. That would improve the coordination among the five national security ministries.[Indian Express]

The benefits of such close cooperation among various ministries should have been evident to the government after the cooperation offered by Bangladesh in handing over leaders of North-Eastern terror groups to India. The recent agreements(pdf) signed by the government with the military government of Myanmar are also a step in the same direction — primarily aimed to strangulate the North Eastern terror groups who have found a safe haven in that country.

The need for closer cooperation among various ministries must have been further driven home by the recent FATF report on Anti Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism in India. The report is extremely critical about the capability of Indian laws to counter terrorist financing.

To put it in simpler terms, no single ministry can no longer claim to be the sole repository of any national security policy. While each such ministry will, and should, remain the face of  its domain, the overall policy goals will have to be formulated after considering the views of all the stake-holders. India cannot afford a repetition of the Islamabad fiasco which was borne more as much out of a lack of coordination, than as much from a lack of direction. The suggestion from Mr Subrahmanyam to the NSA to coordinate among the five secretaries thus could not have been more timely.

Let us institutionalise this weekly meeting of the NSA. Now.

It doesn’t matter whether India talks directly to GHQ in Pakistan or not; because India doesn’t have the capacity to make the other side listen.

Mehmal Sarfaraz, Op-ed editor of The Daily Times, has a piece in today’s Hindustan Times which argues contrary to its title: Why should India talk to the army? [LT: Smita Prakash] She collates the arguments from Pakistani writers to suggest that such clamour in some Indian circles to bypass the democratically elected government of Pakistan is fallacious and unsound.

Now this idea of Government of India talking directly to Pakistan army’s General Headquarters (GHQ) has gained some traction in recent days after the failure of Indo-Pak talks at Islamabad. While this idea sounds great in theory, a closer scrutiny reveals that it is both unsubstantial, and a non-starter. Firstly, it should not be forgotten that India has no power to choose to whom it will talk to in the Pakistani government or establishment. For that matter, even the civilian government in Pakistan doesn’t have the power to decide who will talk to India from their side. This was conclusively proved in the aftermath of Mumbai terror attacks, when despite the wishes of the democratically-elected, civilian governments of both the countries, the ISI chief’s proposed visit to Delhi was vetoed by the GHQ. Thus the idea that India can pick and choose its Pakistani interlocutors is in itself a non-starter.

It is not only India that the GHQ is capable of snubbing. When the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, was in Islamabad recently for the second round of US-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, it was she who was forced to go and call on General Kayani at his office. General Kayani’s reticence to call on Ms Clinton is not merely a breach of diplomatic protocol but a veridical snub to the United States, a country that veritably bankrolls the organisation that General Kayani heads, the Pakistan army. Considering the disdain with which the GHQ currently treats the US, to expect it to reciprocate to a serious Indian offer of direct talks is indeed far-fetched.

Moreover, if India were to place such a demand, what stops Pakistan from making a similar demand on India? Will India accept it if the GHQ says that it will only talk to Mr Chidambaram, and not with Mr Krishna? Such a demand would certainly be unacceptable to Indian government.

Let us accept for a moment that somewhat miraculously, notwithstanding such an offer being construed by Pakistan army as a sign of India’s weakness, GHQ agrees to hold direct talks with the Indian government. And the dialogue proceeds wherein India, at some point, asserts: Stop this proxy war and export of jehadi terror to India…Or…; and the GHQ taunts: …Or what,…what will you do?

What will you do? The question that all the commentators who further this idea wish to skirt is about the India’s inability to enforce its will over the Pakistan army. India has little leverage over Pakistan, whether diplomatic, economic or military. While creating a leverage in the first two domains may not be in India’s sole control, regenerating and building up its military capacity is a course that India can single-handedly pursue. [See this blogpost on why the only way for India to have successful peace talks with Pakistan is by building its military capacity.]

To put it bluntly, there is no incentive for the GHQ to listen to India now. Once India has the ability to generate that coercive power to hurt GHQ’s interests, only then would it be willing for talks with India. [Dinkar’s classic Hindi poem Shakti aur Kshama captures this dilemma poetically. Read it here.]

That is the crux of the matter. It is not about talks. It is not about what we talk either. It is also not about whom we talk to: for irrespective of the face we may see in Pakistan, the voice we hear — and the message that it delivers — will always come from the same quarters in Rawalpindi. It is about our capacity to make them listen.

If we have the capacity to make them listen, i.e., deliver a credible message, the face won’t matter. The message will automatically reach the right quarters in Rawalpindi.

It is right to blame the lack of political will for stalling police reforms. But what about the non-existent public will?

If the centre and all the state governments were really bound by the directions of the Supreme Court, India would certainly have been a more secure country by now, and its populace better protected. On 22 September 2006, the judgement of the Supreme Court on Police Reforms required all governments, at centre and state levels, to comply with its seven directives by 31 December 2006 and to file affidavits of compliance by the 3 January 2007. As we all know now, not much progress has been achieved on that front till date.

Here is an old post on the subject which explains the directives of the Supreme Court. To sum them up, these were:

• Separate law and order from investigation
• Set up a Police Establishment Board at state level for postings and transfers
• Selection of DGP of the state with a two-year fixed tenure
• Two-year fixed tenure for IG, DIG, SP &  SHO
• Set up National Security Commission for selection and posting of heads of central police organisations
• Set up police complaints authority at district and state level
• Set up state security commissions

Today’s The Tribune does a great job of summarising the present status of the progress achieved on these directives:

• Not a single state has managed to fulfil all the criteria prescribed by the Supreme Court with regard to the State Security Commission (SSCs). Most states have set up SSCs that do not reflect the court’s criteria with regard to the composition, function and powers. States such as Tamil Nadu, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir and Andhra Pradesh are in complete non-compliance with this directive.
• Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland are the only states that have adopted the court’s prescribed criteria with regard to the selection, tenure and removal of the Director-General of Police. A few states have only partially incorporated these criteria whilst several states such as Karnataka, Jharkhand, Haryana, Kerala and Andhra Pradesh are not compliant with this directive.
• Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and the north-eastern states of Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland are in full compliance with this directive which provides for a fixed tenure for officers on operational duties. While a few states have partially satisfied the criteria set by the Supreme Court, it is notable that the majority are not in compliance with this directive.
• Several states such as Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka and Sikkim have complied with the Supreme Court’s directive to separate the law and order police with the investigation police. However, a majority of states have not fully implemented this directive.
• Most states have established a Police Establishment Board, but only Arunachal Pradesh and Goa are in full compliance with all the court’s stipulated criteria in this regard. In contrast, Bihar is the only state which has taken no steps towards complying with this directive.
• No state government has established Police Complaints Authorities at both district and state level that fully comply with the Supreme Court’s orders. Many states have established Authorities which only partially comply with the court’s directive in terms of the composition, mandate and powers. Many states — Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Mizoram, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Jammu and Kashmir and Andhra Pradesh have completely ignored this directive.

Out of 636 districts in the country, 223 districts, as per MHA’s 2009 estimate, are affected by Maoist activities; another 20 districts by the Pakistan-backed jehadi war in Jammu & Kashmir; and 67 districts by the multiple insurgencies that trouble India’s North-East: that makes it 310 districts out of a total of 636. In addition, the country has suffered from and continues to live a constant threat of jehadi terror; it has suffered spectacular terror strikes — from the attack on Indian Parliament to the terror strike on Mumbai.  These facts, by themselves, should have been enough incentive for the centre and state governments to pursue police reforms. But even the judgement by the Supreme Court to pursue these reforms has failed to budge them.

An oft-cited culprit for reluctance for police reforms among governments of all political hues is  a lack of political will. But what is this animal called political will? Ultimately,  political will is a hypothetical condition that is nearly impossible to define and measure. Evidence  of political will is typically indirect and retrospective — with a failure to implement bold policy prescriptions bandied as manifesting a lack of political will, and successful implementation constituting proof of its  existence. However, going by Hammergren’s characterisation of political will as “the slipperiest concept in the policy  lexicon,” where it is “the sina qua non of policy success which is never defined except by its  absence,” lack of police reforms in India is a indubitably a case of lack of political will.

Even if one accepts that there is no political will, what this nation doesn’t have either on the subject is the “public will”. Public will, which is committed public opinion or effective public opinion, is closely linked to political will in a representative democracy like India. Where is the visible public support for achieving policy action on police reforms in India? Without a place on  the public agenda and subsequent creation of the public will, there is little chance that the political class will support police reforms. The media can play a major role in this agenda-setting process but it has, lamentably, failed to focus on this issue of grave national importance.

This non-starter experience with police reforms, despite the Supreme Court judgement, is enough proof that no major policy reform in India can happen today due to the absence of political will. In today’s times, when interests of the political class run contrary to such a policy change, only an exhibition of firm public will can lead to creation of political will to undertake police reforms. While media can play an important role in shaping the public opinion and setting the public agenda, on its own often this is not  enough to effect large-scale policy change. The major impetus for this reformist initiative will have to come from the civil society.

But can India boast of such an activist civil society today? Unfortunately, the answer is in the negative.

Oh, and yes, these directives were passed by the Supreme Court in 2006, as part of its judgement on a PIL that was filed in 1996. 1996! 14 years and still counting…

Let it be said then. This nation — the political parties, the government, the media, the judiciary and even the civil society — truly doesn’t give a damn about the safety, security and protection of its own citizens.

The current event-driven and personality focused Indo-Pak peace process is a dead horse. It is time to dismount and inter the dead horse.

Another episode of India-Pakistan peace talks soap opera came to an end this week, albeit on an acrimonious note. It is the world’s longest running soap-opera, made for great television viewing, and has discontinually run for six decades now. The major episodes of this soap-opera are bilateral events between the two countries. In the past decade, these events have usually accompanied multilateral summits; UN General Assembly meetings and SAARC summits being the ones often overshadowed by these public spectacles.

Earlier these Indo-Pak events used to be an offshoot of — highlights yes, but still only a part of —  the bilateral diplomatic process. However the roles seem to have been reversed in the recent years. Now these events have instead become the drivers of the process, with each such opportunity attracting saturated media coverage and intense public scrutiny in both countries. As these events have gained in prominence, so has the propensity of the two governments to manage the events. Sometimes these events do run as per script — as at Thimpu — and are acclaimed by the media as a huge success (although this blogger had disagreed even then); at other times, the event is poorly scripted leading to adverse reaction in one or both the countries — Sharm-el-Sheikh being a case in point; and then there are instances when the actors get carried away and start delivering unscripted lines — remember Musharraf at Agra — which results in an over-hyped event ending up as a disaster.

The botched-up bilateral summit between the two foreign ministers at Islamabad earlier this week falls in the last category —- unscripted lines popping up suddenly to the chagrin of the event managers. Some prescient commentators had seen it coming, those more sanguine about the outcome before the event were evidently mistaken in their beliefs. The post-facto blame game has already started in the media, with Siddharth Varadarajan of The Hindu pillorying the Union Home Secretary for speaking the truth about ISI’s role in the Mumbai terror attacks. Besides my fellow blogger The Acorn‘s rebuttal, Siddharth’s contentions have been robustly countered by Vir Sanghvi. Vir rightly says: “…let’s not expect our civil servants to lie about events like 26/11 only so that the Pakistani foreign minister’s feelings are spared. Any peace process that is based on lies is doomed to fail anyway.”

Is there no hope for the Indo-Pak diplomatic process then — ignoring the fact that the nomenclature of a peace process, like that ugly buzzword trust-deficit, is too hi-falutin and places a huge burden of expectations on the process? If yes, what is the way ahead to push the process?

One of the possible ways to push this process forward is to turn the clock back — shift the focus back from the events to the process itself. This means that these events where political leaders of both countries can indulge in grandstanding must end immediately. Instead, the complete process should shift to under-the-radar, low-profile negotiations between the officials of the two countries. In today’s times, there are interests of far too many government agencies, ministries and institutions involved in the process to be equitably represented by only the foreign ministries from both the countries. If the equally pressing, and often interlinked agendas of various stakeholders — home, defence, water resources and commerce ministries, besides the intelligence agencies, to name a few on the Indian side — have to be addressed concurrently, a knuckled-down approach involving a wider spectrum of government bodies is essential. The example of US-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, where a wide array of officials and ministers of both the governments are involved, proves the efficacy of this broad-based model in current era.

However there are a couple of major differences between the US and Indian engagement with Pakistan. Unlike the high-profile nature of the Pakistan-US interaction which is again focused on events — a requirement of their dysfunctional relationship — the India- Pakistan interaction must be low-profile, away from the media glare and involve officials, not ministers, who are responsible for dealing with those subjects as part of their charter of duties. The US-Pakistan interaction, essentially being transaction based, is short-term in nature. In contrast, the ideal India-Pakistan interaction will have to be a very long-drawn process, wherein the political leadership must resist the temptation to show tangible results immediately. As the process will be bureaucratic-driven, routine and away from the spotlight, the ebb and flow of this interaction will not be a cause of consternation for the government, caused by an intense, and often adversarial media coverage.

Keeping the political leadership away till the negotiations have been completed between the officials lends another huge advantage to the government. There is a limited political capital and time available to the political leadership in a democracy. Rather than fritter it away on the mirage of an immediate and impossible peace with Pakistan, the political leadership of a developing country like India can expend it on many other internal challenges facing the country. From problems in J&K, NE states to the threat of the Maoists on the internal security front, consolidating economic growth and pursuing the next set of economic and labour reforms, provision of quality education and public health, and reinvigoration of governance and public services delivery mechanisms, there is enough that needs to be tackled by the government on a greater priority.

Indubitably, as India becomes internally stronger, it will be in a position to negotiate with Pakistan on a better footing. India’s rise in the last decade, based on its internal growth, has already removed the hyphenation between India and Pakistan (When President Clinton visited India a decade ago, he was virtually forced to make a stop-over in Pakistan. Now Secretary of State Clinton clubs her trip to Pakistan with a trip to Afghanistan without a murmur from any quarters). If Indian leadership can focus on building itself internally, it might eventually leave the whole process of chasing peace with Pakistan nearly inconsequential, if not completely irrelevant at some point in time in the future.

Pakistan, in a similar vein, can use this period of low-profile engagement to focus on even bigger existential challenges facing the country and the society.

It goes without saying that Pakistan has many power centres. Equally well-known is the fact that Pakistan Army has the final say when it comes to its relations with India. The civilian government of Pakistan thus has limited say on its foreign policy towards India and is thus incapable of delivering on any promises made to the Indian government. Moreover, the division of powers between the President and the Prime Minister in Islamabad has further compounded the decision making processes of the Pakistani policy makers.

In comparison, the military or the intelligence agencies have limited, if any, say on India’s foreign policy. Whether that is a good thing by itself is a question that needs a separate answer.  But does the current Indian Prime Minister really have the political capital to push for his dream of a peace with Pakistan, in what many perceive to be at any cost to the country? After the debacle of Sharm-el-Sheikh, wherein the government had to face a lot of flak in the Parliament and was pilloried for its stance in the media, the top political leadership of the UPA must be extremely wary of any repetition of the Sharm-el-Sheikh saga. As Dr Manmohan Singh has a very limited political role, he does not have to bear the political consequences of his actions on the diplomatic front; it is the Congress President who is responsible, if not answerable, for keeping up the political and electoral fortunes of his party.

The marginalisation of the current NSA, Shiv Shankar Menon, considered by many to be the architect of the Sharm-el-Sheikh fiasco, from the Indo-Pak parleys is a clear pointer that the role of the PMO in the bilateral talks has been curtailed.  The sudden change in Mr Krishna’s stance, who was virtually parroting the official Pakistani line on Hafiz Saeed till a couple of months ago, to the one which he displayed in Pakistan can also be thus explained. While harsher theories about a conspiracy to clip the wings of the Prime Minister in case he succeeds and becomes an alternate power centre in the party may be far-fetched, the point of interest here is that the process, as formulated by the current Indian Prime Minister, is incapable of being culminated. It is instead distracting him and his government from focusing on bigger internal challenges facing the country. India can ill-afford for that to happen.

There are too many layers to the Indo-Pak engagement on both sides of the border. The process as we understand it today — driven by events and personalities — is not only a non-starter but akin to a proverbial dead horse. When you are riding a dead horse, buying a stronger whip or greater riding ability won’t help it move forward. Harnessing several dead horses together to increase the speed or asserting that “This is the way we always have ridden this horse” won’t help either. Tribal wisdom says that “when you discover that you are riding a dead horse, the best strategy is to dismount.”

It is time for India to dismount this dead horse, inter it and start with a new pony — a broad-based, low-profile, bureaucratic, long-term and institutionalised interaction with Pakistan where events are offshoots of the process, and aspirational political leaders incidental to the outcome. There is a fair chance that pony might eventually turn out to be a thoroughbred galloping towards the distant dream of Indo-Pak peace.

But let us start with dismounting the dead horse first.

Can India willingly countenance a militant fundamentalist or Pakistan-backed government in Kabul?

In accordance with the prevailing wisdom about an impending end-game in Afghanistan, Eurasia Review has a provocatively titled piece — Should India Also Talk To The Taliban? While it is easy to dismiss this as a rhetorical and impractical question because India has nothing concrete to talk to Taliban about, there is a related question that ought to be considered — Can India willingly countenance a militant fundamentalist or Pakistan-backed government in Kabul?

Fortunately, there is a quasi-official answer available to that question. And it comes from the report on Is a Regional Strategy viable in Afghanistan? by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace which has a chapter on India. This chapter has been authored by Gautam Mukhopadhaya, who is incidentally the Indian Ambassador-designate to Afghanistan. Here is Gautam’s answer to the question:

…for India to willingly countenance a militant fundamentalist or Pakistan-backed government in Kabul, it would minimally require that such a regime (1) maintain normal diplomatic relations with India and ensure the safety of its embassy, consulates, and development projects; (2) guarantee against its use for Pakistani or jihadi ends; and (3) that Pakistan abandon its own use of jihadi militancy and terrorism as instruments of state policy against India.

A couple of quick points here. One, it suggests that India has no problem with any non-jihadi government in Afghanistan, even if it is a militant fundamentalist or Pakistan-backed government out there at Kabul, provided certain conditionalities are met.  However, it is clearly evident that India today has little leverage over Pakistan and Afghanistan Taliban to enforce these conditionalities. Because India has focused exclusively on an economic and developmental aid programme for Afghanistan, it will thus be forced to live with the government — and not a very friendly one at that —  that eventually comes up at Kabul.

Will we then again be back to the pre-2001 era where the Taliban’s symbiotic relationship with a revanchist military-jihadi nexus in Pakistan threatened India and Indian interests with a series of security challenges, political reversals and terrorist incidents?

Understanding the conflicting Pakistani and US interests in Afghanistan

In the final paper in  a comprehensive report titled Is a Regional Strategy viable in Afghanistan? released by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in May this year, Ashley Tellis presents his synthesis of the multiple interests of the regional states and their implications for US policy. Here is a long extract from his essay explaining how the discrepancies between American and Pakistani goals threatens any attempts to secure lasting peace in Afghanistan.

Pakistan, the most critical U.S. ally in the war in Afghanistan and one of Afghanistan’s most important direct neighbors, pursues far more divergent aims relative to Washington (and Kabul) than the high American dependence on Pakistan would lead one to assume. Although both Washington and Islamabad have gone to great lengths to publicly emphasize their shared goals in Afghanistan since 2001, a close analysis reveals deep and perhaps unbridgeable gulfs between the two countries, at least in the near term. These chasms are manifested most clearly on the core issues of high politics: defeating the Afghan Taliban and preventing its return to power in Kabul by force, and constructing a minimally effective central state in Afghanistan.

On both these counts, Pakistan’s interests differ from those of the United States. Where the first is concerned, Islamabad—or more precisely, the Pakistani military, which dominates national security decision making—views protecting the Afghan Taliban leadership and its core capabilities as essential to shielding Pakistan’s westward flanks against India. Although Pakistani policy makers certainly do not prefer to see the Taliban ensconced in Kabul, as they did before—in part because the events leading up to this outcome would be quite dangerous to their own country—they nonetheless seek a government in Afghanistan that has sufficient Taliban representation because of their conviction that such a regime alone would be capable of reversing India’s current influence and denying it any significant role in that country.

Islamabad also rejects the goal of building an effective central state in Afghanistan, because it fears that if such an entity comes to be dominated by secular Pashtuns, they would stymie Pakistan’s goal of preventing Afghan territorial claims on its Pashtun-dominated lands. Were a competent central authority in Afghanistan to be controlled by non-Pashtun ethnic groups, the disenfranchisement of Pakistan’s closest tribal allies in Afghanistan could, it is feared, leave Islamabad at a conclusive disadvantage vis-à-vis India. For these reasons, Pakistan’s commitment to supporting the U.S. objective of raising a minimally effective central state in Afghanistan is suspect. The erection of an effective central state in Afghanistan would also undermine Pakistan’s long-term goal of becoming the principal foreign adjudicator of Kabul’s strategic choices, which—whatever its justification—ends up placing Islamabad at odds not onlywith the United States, India, and Iran, but also with Afghanistan itself, when the interests of the Karzai regime, the northern regions, and the non-Taliban Pashtuns are taken into account.

The discrepancy between Pakistani and American goals in Afghanistan continues in the realm of economics as well: while Washington has a strong interest in ensuring the viability of the fledging Afghan state by restoring it to its historical position as a trade and transit corridor between Central and South Asia, Pakistan’s fear of becoming merely an appendage in the process, mainly supporting the growth of other major powers such as India, has led it to obstruct all worthwhile proposals relating to the expansion of economic intercourse across the greater South Asian region.

The foregoing summary does not by any means suggest that Pakistan and the United States are hopelessly divided on all issues: the partnership between the two countries has been particularly close on counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda and the indigenous rebellion mounted by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. The United States also continues to rely heavily on Pakistan for the transport of dry cargo for coalition military operations in Afghanistan. But, on balance, the tension between U.S. and Pakistani goals is so acute on some critical issues that it could make the difference not only to the success of U.S. operations in Afghanistan but also to the viability of any regional approach intended to induce greater cooperation within the region.

But the money quote in the report comes from Frédéric Grare in his chapter about Pakistan:

Last but not least, Pakistan will be central in the agreement-making process vis-à-vis the present quagmire in Afghanistan. In a political environment where the political pressures to exit Afghanistan are on the rise, there is the temptation to view Pakistan as a destabilizing factor only as long as, and because, it feels threatened by its neighbors. The reality is different: Pakistan is a revisionist power and, in the eyes of India, an aggressor. It will therefore continue to feed its own paranoia. For this reason, concessions to a Pakistan that will not renounce terrorism as a means of pursuing its foreign policy objectives is likely to lead to a resurgence of the very organizations the coalition has been trying to eliminate for the past eight years. In a regional context where the political balance might have been altered in favor of Pakistan, such concessions would constitute regression and would make little sense from a security perspective.

As for the Indians, their position is perhaps best summed up by this quote from the famous British cartoonist, Ashleigh Brilliant.

My biggest problem is what to do about all the things I can’t do anything about.