An anecdote to dispel two myths
Jehad in Kashmir didn’t start in 1989. And Islamisation of Pakistan didn’t start with General Zia.
Here is Lieutenant General (retired) SK Sinha recounting an incident from the 1940s:
It was in Indonesia in 1946, as a defending officer. I had to defend Aslam Khan and Mohammad Shareef of 4/8 Punjab Regiment. They had deserted with their weapons and had been taken prisoners in battle wearing the uniform of captains in the Indonesian Army. At the summary of evidence they had stated that they answered the call of Islam and were fighting for their Indonesian Muslim brothers. They were charged with waging war against the King and for desertion with arms in war. Capital punishment is prescribed for both offences. I was at a loss as to how to defend them. When the summary of evidence was recorded they were not told that it was not incumbent on them to make any statement, but should they make one it could be used as evidence against them in a court martial. My request for a fresh summary of evidence, on this ground, was accepted. The accused now stated that an Indonesian girl had offered them cigarettes and that they had passed out on smoking these. When they recovered, they found themselves in an Indonesian Army camp. They joined the Indonesian Army so that they could get back to their regiment at the first opportunity. They were convicted and sentenced to seven years’ rigorous imprisonment, a light sentence considering they could have been executed. Little did I know that Aslam Khan, grateful to be alive, would have another role to play.
Pakistan invaded Kashmir in October 1947 but denied complicity, saying it was a freedom struggle that was raging in Kashmir. I had to collect evidence of Pakistan’s involvement to be presented to the UN commission due to visit India. I went to Yol, where Pakistani prisoners were kept. I met Aslam Khan there. He told me that after Partition he and Shareef were released from Jhelum District Jail and hailed as heroes as they had fought for Islam in Indonesia. They were reinstated in the Army and promoted to junior commissioned officers. He was prepared to depose before the UN commission that he was with his battalion fighting in Kashmir.[Asian Age]
This anecdote should dispel two misconceptions that exist in the minds of many Indians. The first one is about Kashmir, where many believe that Islamist jehad started in the state only after 1989. Praveen Swami has written a brilliant book on the subject — India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The covert war in Kashmir, 1947-2004 — but it has unfortunately not received as much public recognition as it deserves.
This book explores the history of Jihadist groups in Jammu and Kashmir, documenting the course of their activities and their changing character from 1947 to 2004. Drawing on new material, including classified Indian intelligence dossiers and records, Praveen Swami shows that Jihadist violence was not, as is widely assumed, a phenomenon that manifested itself in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir only after 1988. Rather, a welter of jihadist groups waged a sustained campaign against Indian rule in Jammu and Kashmir from the outset, after the Partition of India. This book first analyses the ideology and practice of Islamist terrorism as it changed and evolved from 1947-1948 onwards. It subsequently discusses the impact of the secret jihad on Indian policy making on Jammu and Kashmir, as well as its influence on political life within the state. Finally, looking at some of the reasons why the jihad in Jammu and Kashmir acquired such intensity in 1990, the author suggests that the answers lie in the transfiguration of the strategic environment in South Asia by the nuclear weapons programme of India and Pakistan. As such, the book argues, the violent conflict which exploded in these two regions after 1990 was not a historical discontinuity: it was, instead, an escalated form of what was by then a five-decade old secret war.[Link]
The second myth is directly related to the first one. That Pakistan’s Islamisation started only during the reign of General Zia-ul-Haq, and that too largely because of the US support to his regime, is the myth that stands discredited by this anecdote. Farzana Sheikh’s Making Sense of Pakistan does a great job of demolishing this myth. In her own words:
With hindsight it is clear that the main impetus behind this book stemmed from my rising frustration with existing explanations about the causes of Pakistan’s long-standing malaise. Too many of these interpretations, it seemed to me, were merely concerned either to pin the blame on the nefarious role of foreign powers, especially the United States, or the failure of successive generations of leaders to live up to the vision of Pakistan’s founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Few were inclined to wrestle with the issue of Pakistan’s uncertain identity or examine the constraints created by its conflicted relation with Islam.
The stark importance of this question has been brought home to me all the more sharply in the wake of Pakistan’s involvement in the “war on terror.” As someone called upon regularly to comment on and brief policy makers about the country, I have been obliged to lay out the complexities that shape Pakistan’s response or lack of response to terrorism. In doing so I have repeatedly emphasised that, ultimately, Pakistan will not be able to “do more” about terrorism until it has clarified its vexed relationship with Islam.[ROROTOKO]




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